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This thesis is about the relationship between the brain and morality. In the last two 
decades there has been a rapid growth in the neuroscience and psychology of morality, 
such that a new a field has emerged called “moral cognition”. However, much of this 
study is reductive in nature and philosophically uninformed. The aim of this thesis is to 
discuss the need for an account of moral cognition that is integrative in its character and 
interdisciplinary in its approach. The current neuroscientific literature shows that moral 
cognition operates as a physically integrated network. No single part of the brain is 
solely responsible for moral processing. This raises the question of how the various 
regions and processes found to be associated with moral cognition function together. In 
particular, do some processes such as emotion or reason take precedence over the 
other? To answer these questions a neuroscience informed by moral philosophy is 
required. Indeed, the study of moral cognition is necessarily dependent on moral 
philosophical theories, as a notion of what counts as “morality” is required prior to any 
study, in order to give the study a clear focus. Some of the key figures in the current 
study of moral cognition are aware of this, and often explicitly take up philosophical 
presuppositions. However, they do so in cursory ways. Furthermore, current 
neuroscientific techniques are unable to describe the temporal and holistic nature of 
moral cognition. Any analysis which relies solely on these techniques is missing normal 
aspects of moral thinking. Therefore, neuroscience can only be part of an 
interdisciplinary approach. A theoretical neuroscience informed by a nuanced moral 
philosophy is needed to start to approach a description of the relationship between the 
brain and morality. This relationship between neuroscience and moral science can be 
characterised as involving two perspectives. The scientific perspective brings with it an 
explanatory account, and is concerned with causal descriptions of brain processes 
underlying moral behaviour. At the same time, a nuanced moral philosophy inevitably 
identifies the significance of a first person or agent perspective. From this perspective 
morality involves a sense of obligation – it recognises that morality is normative. 
Neuroscience cannot describe morality from a first-person or normative perspective, 
but the normative aspects of morality cannot be discounted. In this thesis the moral 
philosophy of Christine Korsgaard is discussed as it is particularly effective in 
introducing the first-person or normative account of morality and has the advantage of a 
neuroscientifically plausible view of reason and reflection. The thesis will finish with 
iii 
 
an exercise of interdisciplinary analysis, where neuroscience can reciprocally inform 
moral philosophy. I will discuss key aspects of Korsgaard’s theory in the light of 
contemporary themes in current neuroscience. Specifically, I discuss how her 
understanding of rational reflection is both supported and moderated by the work of 
contemporary neuroscience, particularly the work of Antonio Damasio. I also show 
how her theory and neuroscience can jointly explain the integration of emotion and 
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Table of Figures 
Figure 1 The human brain with regions relevant to moral cognition highlighted. 
Relevant regions are labelled. The amygdala, represented by the red, is a structure deep 
in the brain, towards the inferior surface. The Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
represented by the teal, is on the inferior surface of the prefrontal cortex and extends 
medially. The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), represented by the green, is a midline 
structure situated anteriorly. The Insula, represented by the pink, is a lobe of the brain 
that is deep to the brains lateral surface. The Temporoparietal junction and the posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (TPJ/pSTS), represented by the yellow and blue respectively, 
are closely situated structures, positioned at the margin of the temporal and parietal 
lobes. This figure is modified from Kennedy and Adolphs (2012). ............................... 11 
Figure 2 The brain and skull of Phineas Gage. (A) A lateral brain view. The tamping 
iron, represented in solid white, is shown in its estimated position in relation to Phineas 
Gage’s brain. (B) The tamping iron, represented in solid red, is shown in its estimated 
position relative to Phineas Gage’s brain and skull. The bilateral vmPFC is estimated to 
have been lesioned. The figure is modified from Damasio et al. (1994). ...................... 14 
Figure 3 The ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. (A) An inferior view of the brain (looking from the bottom up). This figure 
shows the interelation of the vmPFC (seen in red) and the OFC (seen in the green and 
red). Note that the vmPFC actually extends into the midline of the brain, as seen in 
Figure 1. (B) A lateral view of the brain (looking from the side). This figure shows the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), which is situated on the upper outer portion of 




Kant’s second critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, is a systematic account of 
morality and its central role in human life. This passage from its closing pages 
describes a kind of “science” aimed at developing moral “wisdom”:  
…We have at hand examples of the morally judging reason. We may 
analyse them into their elementary concepts, adopting, in default of 
mathematics, a process similar to that of chemistry, i.e., we may, in 
repeated experiments on common sense, separate the empirical from the 
rational, exhibit each of them in a pure state, and show what each by itself 
can accomplish. Thus we shall avoid the error of a crude and unpracticed 
judgment and (something far more important) the extravagances of genius, 
by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher’s stone, visionary treasures 
are promised and real treasures are squandered for lack of methodical study 
and knowledge of nature. In a word, science (critically sought and 
methodically directed) is the narrow gate that leads to the doctrine of 
wisdom, when by this is understood not merely what one ought to do but 
what should serve as a guide to teachers in laying out plainly and well the 
path to wisdom which everyone should follow, and in keeping others from 
going astray. It is a science of which philosophy must always remain the 
guardian; and though the public takes no interest in its subtle investigations, 
it may very well take an interest in the doctrines which such considerations 
first make clear to it. 
(Kant, 1993, pp. 170-171) 
Kant is looking ahead to what he sees as the future of ethics. Living at the time of the 
enlightenment, he recognised the extensive and rapid development of the physical 
sciences, which had only recently shrugged off the shroud of “superstition”. For 
instance, a century before Kant’s writing, Newton had made great strides by describing 
gravity and the laws of motion. Such scientific advances uncovering “the starry heavens 
above” filled Kant with awe (Kant, 1993, p. 169). What was next, in his mind, was to 
investigate the equally wonderous “moral law within”. Vital was the further excision of 
superstition. In this passage, Kant proposes that morality requires a systematic and 
methodical study, not unlike science, where the “empirical” and the “rational” would be 
used effectively and synergistically. 
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The scientific frontiers in Kant’s time were mechanical physics, chemistry, 
astronomy and anatomy. In modern times, with the development of cognitive 
neuroscience, the human mind, and with it human morality, has begun to be 
investigated as a physical science. Within neuroscience, a field has emerged which 
specifically studies the relationship between the brain and moral thinking. It appears 
that Kant’s interest in the starry heavens, a stand-in for scientific mystery, has begun to 
collide with the study of the “moral law”. 
This new scientific study of moral cognition includes the psychological and 
brain processes involved in human moral thinking. This includes the neural processes 
underlying moral judgements, moral emotions and moral motivations. Individual 
researchers and philosophers each employ specific definitions of what these are, that 
segregate morally relevant behaviours from other behaviours in terms of their effects 
(like increasing co-operation) or motivations (necessity of altruism). This diversity in 
conceptualising moral cognition presents a significant challenge for the neuroscientific 
study of moral cognition. However, in all cases the broad aim of studying moral 
cognition is to explain the relationship between the brain and the operation of 
“morality”.  
In the past two decades, understandings of moral cognition have undergone 
significant development, largely due to development in neuroimaging techniques in 
cognitive neuroscience, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Such 
technologies have enabled experimental work to provide extensive data about the brain 
regions and processes involved in various kinds of moral thinking and behaviour. 
Models of moral cognition have developed alongside this experimental work, which 
attempt to systematically describe principles and processes common to moral thinking. 
Often included are explanations of the operative roles of emotion, reason and social 
cognition in moral judgements and motivations. These modern models often have roots 
in older theories from moral philosophy, such as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, virtue 
theory and sentimentalism.  
In this thesis I discuss the need for an account of moral cognition that is 
integrative in character and interdisciplinary in approach. I will argue that we need such 
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a model to understand the relationship between the brain and our moral lives. The 
model proposed is “integrative” in three ways: 
1. Neuroscientifically integrated: Moral cognition refers to a network of brain 
regions. These regions operate with integrative brain processes and as such 
should be described using theories of higher-level cognition. The 
intertwinement of reason and emotion is essential in this framework. 
2. Integrated across disciplines (as in “inter-disciplinary”): From a methodological 
standpoint any comprehensive description of moral cognition needs to refer to 
moral philosophy, neuroscience and psychology (at least) and integrate their 
respective methods, generating a synthesis of perspectives.  
3. Integrated explanatory and normative accounts of morality: To form a complete 
account of our moral lives, both explanatory and normative descriptions are 
necessary. 
By an explanatory account of morality, I am referring to a causal description of 
morality, typical to psychology and neuroscience. By a normative account of morality, I 
am referring to an explanation of the normativity underlying moral claims, i.e. a 
justification of the “ought” inherent to such claims. 
If one wants to describe moral cognition and the relationship between the brain 
and our moral lives accurately and comprehensively, a framework based on these three 
features is required. I will argue for this requirement in two ways. Firstly, I will 
critically analyse the neuroscience of moral cognition using moral philosophy. 
Secondly, I will undertake an interdisciplinary analysis, including a reciprocal critique 
of moral philosophy using neuroscience. 
The current neuroscientific literature shows that moral cognition involves a 
coordination of brain processes, which operate as a physically integrated network. This 
is sufficient to show that there is no part of the brain solely responsible for moral 
processing. Rather moral cognition is distributed and multi-faceted, involving emotion, 
reason and social cognition. This raises the question of how the various regions and 
processes found to be associated with moral cognition function together. In particular, 
do some processes such as emotion or reason take precedence over the other? To decide 
which is the best account of moral cognition, requires a neuroscientist to turn outside 
the world of neuroscience, and to the world of moral philosophy.  
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The study of moral cognition is necessarily dependent on moral philosophical 
theories, as a notion of what counts as “morality” and “moral judgement” are required 
prior to any study, in order to give the study a clear focus. Some of the key figures in 
the current study of moral cognition are aware of this, and often explicitly take up 
philosophical presuppositions. However, they do so in cursory ways. Furthermore, 
current neuroscientific techniques are unable to describe the temporal and holistic 
nature of moral cognition. Any analysis which relies solely on these techniques is 
missing normal aspects of moral thinking. Therefore, neuroscience can only be part of 
an interdisciplinary approach. A theoretical neuroscience informed by a nuanced moral 
philosophy is needed to start to approach a description of the relationship between the 
brain and morality.  
This relationship between neuroscience and moral science can be characterised 
as involving two perspectives. The scientific perspective brings with it an explanatory 
account and is concerned with causal descriptions of brain processes underlying moral 
behaviour. At the same time, a nuanced moral philosophy inevitably identifies the 
significance of a first person or agent perspective. From this perspective morality 
involves a sense of obligation – it recognises that morality is normative. Neuroscience 
cannot describe morality from a first-person or normative perspective, but the 
normative aspects of morality cannot be discounted. In this thesis the moral philosophy 
of Christine Korsgaard is discussed as it is particularly effective in introducing the first-
person or normative account of morality and has the advantage of giving a 
neuroscientifically plausible view of reason and reflection.  
Neuroscience, if it is to further a study of moral cognition needs to recognise the 
shortcomings and limits of the presuppositions made about the nature of morality, some 
of which come out in experimental restraints and others through a cursory use of moral 
philosophy. It is worthwhile for the neuroscience to be developed in this way, so that it 
performs its descriptive role as best as possible. If we do this well it will also set 
reasonable limits to any normative account of morality from the perspective of moral 
philosophy. 
This thesis will finish with an exercise of interdisciplinary analysis, where 
neuroscience will reciprocally inform moral philosophy. I discuss key aspects of 
Korsgaard’s theory in the light of contemporary themes in current neuroscience. 
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Specifically, I discuss how her understanding of rational reflection is both supported 
and moderated by the work of contemporary neuroscience, particularly the work of the 
neurologist Antonio Damasio. From this I will develop an integrative model of moral 
reasoning, which will show how both emotion and reasons are integrated in our moral 
judgement. I will briefly indicate how this relates to certain ongoing debates in 
neuroscience. Importantly this framework is not intended to be a comprehensive or 
exclusive model of moral cognition, rather a basic framework for an integrative 
account. As such, certain philosophical perspectives will remain unaddressed and many 
questions will remain open. 
In a review by Wagner et al. (2017) the field of moral cognition was analysed 
from the perspective of bioethics, with a particular focus on the normative implications 
of neuroscientific work. They found a poverty in theoretical work examining such 
implications of moral cognition, and strongly recommended more work in this field 
from the perspective of bioethics and moral philosophy. This thesis is in line with this 
recommendation.  
Theoretical work in this field is incredibly important to further develop an 
understanding of moral cognition, which can aid in the advancement of cognitive 
neuroscience more generally. Because of the complex nature of moral cognition, where 
the component brain regions function as a network, the neuroscientist Joshua Greene 
(2015) argues that it represents the perfect testing ground for theories of higher-level 
cognition. This is evidenced by a recent review by Gillett and Franz (2014) who applied 
John Hughlings-Jackson’s ideas about complex brain organisation to the field of moral 
cognition. Therefore, theoretical work in moral cognition is well poised to further 
general debates in cognitive neuroscience. 
The study of moral cognition has intense and extensive implications for ethics. 
In short, knowing why we are subject to our moral intuitions can aid our ethical 
thinking. It can show us blind spots in our moral reasoning and can inform strategies in 
improving our moral judgments. For example, recently a debate concerning the utility 
of empathy in morality has intensified. Some researchers have argued for the 
deemphasis of empathy in policy development, citing its intrinsic partiality as a 
problem for justice and any attempt to maximise outcomes, see for example Paul 
Bloom (2016). Others maintain that empathy is foundational to morality and that any 
6 
 
deemphasis would be detrimental for ethics (Slote, 2007). By improving our 
understanding of empathy and its role in moral cognition, we can be more informed 
about its normative benefits or drawbacks. An integrative account, like that put forward 
in this thesis would greatly benefit this debate. It would argue that empathy should be 
viewed as part of a network as opposed to being viewed independently, in an attempt to 
more accurately determine its normative implications. 
A well-known example that illustrates how knowledge about moral cognition 
may benefit ethics is Peter Singer’s famous “drowning child” thought experiment. This 
thought experiment is intended to test our intuitions about the extent of our moral 
obligations. It involves the following challenge which he put to his students: 
I ask them to imagine that their route to the university takes them past a 
shallow pond. One morning, I say to them, you notice a child has fallen in 
and appears to be drowning. To wade in and pull the child out would be 
easy but it will mean that you get your clothes wet and muddy, and by the 
time you go home and change you will have missed your first class. 
(Singer, 1997) 
Unanimously the students agree that they have an obligation to save the child. Singer 
then probes further and asks would this obligation remain if the child was in the same 
situation but far away, in a different country, and we could similarly help with little cost 
to ourselves. Again, the students agree. However, Singer (1997) says: “we are all in that 
situation of the person passing the shallow pond”. For little cost to ourselves we can 
help those less fortunate, like those in famine in South Sudan or Yemen, for example. 
Singer’s thought experiment was designed to show how ostensibly hypothetical ethical 
dilemmas are often tangible and highly practical. Despite Singer’s (and the student’s) 
reasoning illustrating the extent of our obligations, most of his students would 
backtrack and attempt to show how the thought experiment does not match with reality. 
This led Singer (1997) to claim that: “There is, of course, for many students and for 
various reasons a gap between acknowledging what we ought to do, and doing it…”. If 
we can study the underpinnings of our moral thinking, then perhaps we can understand 
such a disconnect. We could formulate strategies to overcome such discrepancies in our 
moral reasoning. Some ethicists even go so far as advocating for human “moral 
enhancement”, which could involve the use of “drugs, implants and biological 
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(including genetic) interventions…” to improve people’s moral-decision making 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2008). A complete understanding of the brain processes 
underlying our moral motivations, reasoning and intuitions would allow us to precisely 
identify the neural targets of any enhancement and alter them effectively. Hence, an 
understanding of moral cognition is essential for this project. 
In this thesis I discuss the need for an account of moral cognition that is 
integrative in its character and interdisciplinary in its approach. It is structured as 
follows: The aim of chapter one is to show the support for a physically integrative 
model of moral cognition in the neuroscientific literature. To achieve this, I will review 
recent neuroscientific studies in the field of moral cognition, with a focus on the 
implicated brain regions and their functions. A set of important axioms emerge from 
this research that any subsequent model of moral cognition must abide. These include 
that moral cognition is a multifaceted process involving a network of brain regions, 
disparate in space and function (implicating emotion, reason, and social cognitive 
processes). 
The aim of chapter two is to discuss the need for an interdisciplinary analysis in 
the study of moral cognition. To achieve this, I will discuss three groups of challenges 
facing the neuroscience of moral cognition. These challenges show that the 
neuroscientific study of moral cognition is necessarily dependent on theories in moral 
philosophy, however, much of this study is reductive in nature and philosophically 
uninformed. A theoretical neuroscience informed by a nuanced moral philosophy is 
needed to adequately describe the relationship between the brain and morality. 
In chapter three I will lay out the moral philosophy of Christine Korsgaard, as 
part of this interdisciplinary analysis.1 Korsgaard separates accounts of morality into 
explanatory and normative components. I will show how neuroscientific accounts of 
moral cognition alone are inadequate to explain the normativity behind moral 
judgements. This further indicates the need for an interdisciplinary analysis in 
describing moral cognition. 
In chapter four I will carry out an exercise of interdisciplinary analysis by 
developing an integrative account of moral cognition. This account of moral cognition 
                                                 
1 Korsgaard’s theoretical positions will primarily be taken from Korsgaard, C. (1996) The sources of 
normativity. Cambridge University Press. 
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will be based on an integration of moral philosophy and neuroscience. In particular, it is 
an integration of Korsgaard’s ideas about reason and reflection with current empirical 
and theoretical neuroscience of moral cognition, including the work of Damasio. By 
integrating the differing accounts of moral decision-making of Korsgaard and Damasio, 
an account of morality, that adequately deals with the roles of feelings, empathy, 
reflection and practical reason will emerge. This account will constitute the framework 
of an integrated moral cognition, that emphasises the role of reflection, while criticising 
any hard distinction between emotion and reason. Instead I will argue for a feeling 




1 The integrative moral brain 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to discuss the need for an account of moral 
cognition that is integrative in character and interdisciplinary in approach. To do this it 
is necessary to have an understanding of the state of the neuroscientific literature 
concerning moral cognition. This is the focus of the present chapter. I will describe the 
brain regions commonly implicated in making moral judgements and draw some basic 
conclusions about the nature of the “moral brain”. This discussion will set out the 
neuroscientific landscape before launching into specific critiques of the neuroscience in 
chapter two. 
Much of the literature of moral cognition is concerned with describing brain 
regions and processes involved in the making of moral judgements. There is a general 
consensus that there is no dedicated moral module of the brain (Gillett and Franz, 2014; 
Greene, 2015). Many different brain areas are implicated in making moral judgements, 
yet these areas are disparate and carry out many different functions (Fumagalli and 
Priori, 2012). Individually, these brain regions are involved in a broad range of 
processes, from emotional valence (the positive or negative nature of emotional 
arousal) to conscious deliberation and “theory of mind”, which is the ability to attribute 
mental states and beliefs to others.  
The neuroscience of moral judgement has an extensive history. Initially it was 
primarily a study of lesions and brain injuries, which appeared to have led to 
personality changes, abnormal social conduct and functional loss. In the last two 
decades, neuroimaging techniques such as EEG, fMRI and TMS have become 
increasingly prevalent in cognitive neuroscience. Naturally these techniques were 
introduced into the study of moral cognition, and in the seminal study by Greene et al. 
(2001), fMRI was used for the first time in the identification of the neural correlates of 
moral judgements. Recently, the field of moral cognition has greatly expanded, and 
morality-related words saw an eight-fold increase in the literature (Greene, 2015). 
Put broadly, moral judgements are judgements about whether particular actions, 
entities or norms are “right or wrong”, or “good or bad”. As discussed briefly in the 
introduction, it is a difficult task to decide what actions and entities count as being 
morally relevant. However, it is necessary to posit a specific definition so that the 
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phenomenon is suitable for neuroscientific inquiry. Challenges in conceptualising 
moral judgements and more broadly, moral cognition, will be discussed in chapter two. 
For now, I will briefly address some conventional aspects of “moral judgement” 
researchers have focused on in this field.  
A common use of the term moral judgement pertains to evaluating actions 
resulting in the harming of other individuals. In an example of one such study, Greene 
et al. (2001) presented participants with “trolley problems”, including the “switch” and 
the “footbridge” variants2, to examine what brain regions become active when 
participants made judgements in response to an impersonal dilemma (the “switch 
variant”) or a more personal dilemma (the “footbridge” variant). The example above is 
centrally concerned with moral judgements involving harm, specifically actively 
harming one individual to prevent harm to a greater number of others. 
Studying judgements concerning harmful actions is just one potential avenue to 
explore in moral cognition. Other commonly studied aspects involve evaluating actions 
based on fairness or justice (Decety and Yoder, 2016). More generally some studies 
assess “moral emotions”, which are reactions to a variety of morally salient stimuli, 
such as war scenes, poor children and assaults (Moll et al., 2002). Because of the 
diversity, it seems obvious then that moral judgement in humans would involve many 
different functional aspects of the brain, from the emotive to the cognitive, which will 
be explored now. 
1.1 The Moral Network 
In this section I will summarise and explore some of the regions commonly implicated 
in moral judgement. I will reference a few select studies, with a diverse set of 
methodologies, that exemplify what is known about the function and roles of these 
brain regions within the moral network. The implicated brain regions are well 
                                                 
2 Trolley problems, as a thought experiment were initially formulated by Foot in Foot, P. 1978. Virtues 
and Vices and Others Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press. And further 
developed by Thomson in Thomson, J. J. (1985) 'The Trolley Problem', The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), pp. 
1395-1415. Trolley dilemmas are a form of sacrificial dilemma, where a runaway trolley is endangering 
several individuals tied the upcoming track. One must decide whether to make a sacrifice to save those 
individuals. In the ‘switch’ variant, one can pull a lever to divert the trolley away from five individuals 
and onto a track with only one individual. In the ‘footbridge’ variant, the observer is standing on a 
footbridge above the track accompanied by another large individual. The decision here is whether one 
would push the large individual off the footbridge and onto the track thus stopping the trolley, to save 
five individuals.  
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documented through the extensive work done in cognitive neuroscience over the past 
few decades. Both cortical and subcortical structures are involved.3 
I will focus primarily on four important regions, as these will be consistently 
referred to in the remainder of the thesis. These are the amygdala, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the temporoparietal junction. 
There are many other brain regions implicated in moral cognition, and I will briefly 
review to a select few of them, but they are of lesser importance to the overall 
discussion in this thesis. The objectives of this section are to summarise the functioning 
of these brain regions in moral cognition and to describe the conventional form of 
studies in the field. Finally, through a conventional review of the neuroscientific 
literature I will draw some general conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. 
 
Figure 1 The human brain with regions relevant to moral cognition highlighted. Relevant regions 
are labelled. The amygdala, represented by the red, is a structure deep in the brain, towards the inferior 
surface. The Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), represented by the teal, is on the inferior surface 
of the prefrontal cortex and extends medially. The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), represented by the 
green, is a midline structure situated anteriorly. The Insula, represented by the pink, is a lobe of the brain 
that is deep to the brains lateral surface. The Temporoparietal junction and the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (TPJ/pSTS), represented by the yellow and blue respectively, are closely situated 
structures, positioned at the margin of the temporal and parietal lobes. This figure is modified from 
Kennedy and Adolphs (2012). 
                                                 
3 There are several recent reviews which examine these brain structures, which can be referred to if more 
detail is required: Mendez, M. F. (2009) 'The neurobiology of moral behavior: Review and 
neuropsychiatric implications', CNS Spectrums, 14(11), pp. 608-620.; Fumagalli, M. and Priori, A. 




1.1.1 The Amygdala  
The amygdalae (plural of amygdala) are two nuclei, one right and one left, located deep 
in each temporal lobe, anterior to the hippocampus. This structure has shown to be 
involved in attention, affective arousal and emotional valence (Lane et al., 1999). 
In a study by Moll et al. (2002), participants underwent fMRI, while observing 
non-moral unpleasant scenes or pictures (such as dangerous animals and bodily fluids), 
as well as observation morally objectionable scenes and pictures (abandoned children 
and war scenes). Relative to neutral pictures, amygdala activation was observed in both 
conditions. This suggests that the amygdala is a common neural substrate in the 
processing of both moral and basic unpleasant emotions. A similar relationship is 
observed with the upper midbrain bilaterally, periaqueductal grey matter, right 
thalamus and superior colliculus, right insula/inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral posterior 
temporal–occipital cortex and right intraparietal sulcus, all showing activation, which is 
suggestive of a common neural substrate in the processing of unpleasant emotions with 
both moral and non-moral dimensions (Moll et al., 2002). Therefore the amygdala does 
not seem to be a module underlying specific functions, but rather is part of a network in 
each case. 
The specific role of the amygdala in moral cognition was explored further by 
Shenhav and Greene (2014). In this study participants were presented with moral 
dilemmas similar to the classic “trolley problems”, where one individual agent could 
act to save a greater number of lives by actively harming another individual, or could 
refuse to harm leading to a greater number of deaths.4  Subsequently participants were 
asked which of the two potential responses to the dilemma would produce “better 
results” (utility assessment)5, which the participant would feel worse about doing 
(emotional assessment) and finally which do they find more morally acceptable 
(integrative moral judgement). Brain activity associated with performing the tasks was 
measured using fMRI. Amygdala activity was correlated with negative ratings for how 
the “utilitarian”6 response would feel, i.e. how emotionally aversive that choice was. 
Amygdala activity was also found to be negatively correlated with the “utilitarian” 
                                                 
4 An example of such a dilemma can be seen in Figure 1 of the referenced paper: Shenhav, A. and 
Greene, J. D. (2014) 'Integrative moral judgment: Dissociating the roles of the amygdala and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex', The Journal of Neuroscience, 34(13), pp. 4741-4749. 
5 Utility in this case refers to something of value, e.g. lives, pleasure, happiness. 
6 The response to the moral dilemma opting to cause harm to save more lives. 
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response when participants made the “all things considered” (integrative) moral 
judgement. Coupling of the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
was greatest during the emotional assessment and the lowest during the utility 
assessment. These findings are consistent with the claim that the amygdala plays an 
important role in moral cognition, specifically in the emotional assessment of salient 
stimuli, in response to potentially harmful actions. Shenhav and Greene (2014) have 
hypothesised that their results indicate that the amygdala can guide moral behaviour 
through its connectivity with the vmPFC. In summary, the evidence suggests that the 
amygdala has a role in normal moral and social processing. 
1.1.2 Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex  
The Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is part of the prefrontal cortex (which is 
involved in higher cognitive processes) and is located just above the position of the 
eyes, on the inferior surface of the brain. The vmPFC is commonly associated and 
physically overlaps with the orbital frontal cortex (OFC), a region similarly on the 
inferior surface of the frontal lobe. These two regions will be discussed together. The 
vmPFC is an area commonly implicated in social reasoning and decision making. 
Patients with damage to the vmPFC exhibit abnormal social conduct. The most 
famous example of such as patient was Phineas Gage, who provides an early case of 
brain trauma being linked to specific social and moral abnormalities. Gage was a 
railroad construction foreman in New England in the mid-1800s. On the 13th of 
September 1848, Gage was injured in an accident while blasting rocks to make way for 
new railway. An explosion caused a tamping iron7 to pass through his skull, destroying 
part of his brain. Amazingly, despite the extent of his injury, Gage remained conscious 
and survived (Harlow, 1999).  
Gage’s physician Henry Harlowe described his patient’s post-accident changes 
in this way:  
He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which 
was not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for his 
fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at 
times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many 
                                                 
7 A large iron rod used to compact sand on top of ignition powder. Gage became distracted while using a 
tamping iron, leading to ignition of the powder. 
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plans of future operation, which are no sooner arranged than they are 
abandoned in turn for others appearing more feasible. 
(Harlow, 1993) 
Famously, Harlowe (1993) reported that many of Gage’s friends and family said he was 
“no longer Gage”. 
A famous study by Damasio et al. (1994) used medical imaging on Gage’s skull 
to calculate which brain areas would have been affected. They concluded the vmPFC 
was most likely damaged, and that Gage’s reported behavioural changes are like those 
of modern patients with vmPFC lesions. However, Macmillan and Lena (2010) have 
argued that Gage’s case is commonly exaggerated, in that many researches 
retrospectively embellish Gage’s story and behavioural changes, whereas in reality 
Gage recovered and adapted psychologically to his injury. Nevertheless, the neurologist 
Antonio Damasio studied similar patients with vmPFC lesions and noted changes in 
their social and moral behaviour, such as an increased propensity to make risky social 
and financial decisions (Damasio et al., 1990), which indicates there is some credibility 
to the link that Gage is used to illustrate. Damasio (1996) developed the “somatic 
marker hypothesis” to explain these abnormalities. This hypothesis argues that “somatic 
markers” (feelings that are embodied) are important in guiding decision-making and 
practical reasoning, and have an influence through the vmPFC, which if damaged 
severs the link between feelings and reasoning. 
 
Figure 2 The brain and skull of Phineas Gage. (A) A lateral brain view. The tamping iron, represented 
in solid white, is shown in its estimated position in relation to Phineas Gage’s brain. (B) The tamping 
iron, represented in solid red, is shown in its estimated position relative to Phineas Gage’s brain and 




In the earlier mentioned study by Moll et al. (2002) brain regions that activate 
when showing participants moral unpleasant images compared to non-moral unpleasant 
images were also examined. Three regions showed relatively increased activation to the 
morally salient stimuli. These regions were the right posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) the medial frontal gyrus (MedFG) and the right OFC (a region closely associated 
with the vmPFC). This suggests the importance of the vmPFC in processing moral 
scenarios that elicit emotions. Similarly, the vmPFC has been consistently implicated in 
automatic moral judgements in response to emotionally laden dilemmas (Greene et al., 
2001; Greene et al., 2004). 
In a review by Padoa-Schioppa and Cai (2011) that focused on the OFC 
(vmPFC), the researchers collated findings that implicated this structure in economic 
decision making. In response to this literature these researchers proposed that the 
general functioning of the OFC is to compute subjective values for abstract 
representations of goods that are behaviourally relevant (Padoa‐Schioppa and Cai, 
2011). It has been shown that the vmPFC carries out a similar function in moral 
judgement, with the vmPFC being sensitive to the “moral value” of specific actions and 
outcomes (Shenhav and Greene, 2010). These findings reflect the idea that the moral 
network (the network of brain regions implicated in responding to moral judgements) 
involves brain regions that perform domain general functions, which are generalisable 
and foundational functions that can be translated to operate in many domains, such as 
the “moral domain”. 
As discussed above, in the study by Shenhav and Greene (2014), coupling of the 
amygdala and the vmPFC was greatest during the emotional assessment of stimuli, and 
lowest during the assessment of utility. They also found that vmPFC activity was 
greatest during the “all things considered” moral judgement, where after being exposed 
to a moral dilemma and the two potential response options the participants were asked 
“which do you find more morally acceptable”. This judgement was assumed to involve 
both affective and cognitive processes. They concluded that the vmPFC played a role in 
integrating an affective signal from the amygdala with a “utilitarian” assessment from 
other brain structures (Shenhav and Greene, 2014). 
Damage to the vmPFC has been associated with an increase in “utilitarian” 
judgements when individuals are faced with moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007). In 
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response to their own study’s findings Shenhav and Greene (2014) hypothesised that 
“utilitarian” decision making can still occur independent of the vmPFC; however, 
paradoxically, the amygdala relies on the vmPFC to exert control on behaviour. This 
leads to the proposal that when the vmPFC is damaged, an increase in “utilitarian” 
judgements are observed; not because of damage to a structure involved with an 
intrinsically affective process, but rather due to damage of the conduit that integrates 
affective processes into choices associated with decision making (Shenhav and Greene, 
2014). 
1.1.3 Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex  
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is another specific area within the prefrontal 
cortex and is located on its superior and lateral surface, inferior to the upper left and 
right margins of the forehead. The dlPFC is implicated in executive control and 
famously is one of the final areas of the brain to fully develop through adolescence and 
young adulthood (Sowell et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 3 The ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. (A) An inferior 
view of the brain (looking from the bottom up). This figure shows the interelation of the vmPFC (seen in 
red) and the OFC (seen in the green and red). Note that the vmPFC actually extends into the midline of 
the brain, as seen in Figure 1. (B) A lateral view of the brain (looking from the side). This figure shows 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), which is situated on the upper outer portion of the prefrontal 
cortex. The figure is modified from Davidson et al. (2000). 
An interesting study by Steinbeis et al. (2016) illustrates the general functioning 
of the dlPFC. This study looked at decision making in children (6 to 13 years old), 
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examining their preference between short and long-term rewards, with the long-term 
rewards being of greater magnitude. A preference for the more immediate reward is 
called temporal discounting. It was shown that older children were more likely to 
choose the greater long-term reward compared to younger children. This could either be 
explained by the subjective values of long-term rewards increasing over time, as 
children get older, or by greater “top-down” control in older children who resist the 
temptation towards short-term rewards, or both. To test these hypotheses, using fMRI, 
Steinbeis and colleagues examined the functional connectivity between the vmPFC 
(which, as mentioned previously computes subjective values) and areas responsible for 
executive control such as the dlPFC. They found that the increasing preference for 
long-term rewards was not related to any difference of choice-independent valuation. 
Rather, it correlated with greater vmPFC – left dlPFC connectivity. The researchers 
concluded that as people age, and the dlPFC matures individuals are better able to 
exhibit behavioural control and forego immediate pleasures (Steinbeis et al., 2016).  
In the moral realm the dlPFC has been shown to exhibit a similar function as 
described above. Greene at al. (2004) showed that the dlPFC was more active during 
processing of impersonal moral dilemmas associated with a participant indirectly 
causing harm to save others, and less active during personal moral dilemmas, where the 
harm is more direct and the participant is more responsible. More importantly, the 
dlPFC showed greater activation in the participants that chose the option that most 
maximised utility, when faced with the personal “trolley-like” dilemmas. They 
concluded that the dlPFC was executing control to regulate emotions that opposed 
causing harm to the sacrificial individual, allowing the action that maximised utility to 
be performed. On top of this, they concluded that the dlPFC has a more direct role on 
the outcome of the moral judgement, as it plays a role in abstract reasoning, such as 
assessing utility (Greene et al., 2004). 
One final study shows the importance of the dlPFC in the application of rule-
based behaviour. Prehn et al. (2007) studied which brain areas became activated when a 
participant made a socio-normative judgement (such as whether it’s OK to smash glass 
on a train), as a function of the participant’s moral competence. Moral competence was 
defined as the participant’s ability to “apply moral orientations and principles in a 
consistent and differentiated manner in varying social situations” (Prehn et al., 2007), 
and was measured using the MJT (Moral Judgement Test) taken from Lind (2008). The 
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researchers found that activity in the dlPFC was inversely related to moral competence 
and was more active, on average, when participants with low moral competence made 
socio-normative judgements. The researchers proposed that the dlPFC is important in 
people’s conscious execution of rule-based behaviour as a compensatory mechanism 
for a failure to consistently apply moral principles automatically. The dlPFC is thus an 
important structure in abstract cognition in moral judgements, specifically regarding 
rule-based behaviour and executive control. 
1.1.4 Right Temporoparietal Junction/Posterior Superior Temporal 
Sulcus  
These two regions are close structurally and many papers refer to them together or 
single out one while referring to the brain region in general. Hence, the two structures 
will be discussed together. They are the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), more 
specifically the right TPJ, and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS). These two 
regions are roughly located deep to and superior to the ear relative to the skull. The TPJ 
is the literal junction between the parietal and the temporal lobes. The PSTS is 
consistently implicated in the moral network and is one of the three regions identified 
by Moll et al. (2002) that is active specifically when participants view morally 
unpleasant images, compared to non-moral unpleasant images.  
The TPJ has been shown to have a variety of different roles. A meta-analysis of 
the neuroimaging literature was conducted by Decety and Lamm (2007). According to 
the review the TPJ has been implicated in many complicated cognitive functions, such 
as theory of mind, empathy (sharing emotions with others), agency (the attribution of 
actions to oneself or another) and re-orientating attention (switching attention between 
different available/significant stimuli). 
Let us focus on theory of mind (ToM), which the TPJ and the PSTS have both 
been implicated in (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). ToM has obvious importance in general 
social functioning and decision making, however it also plays a role in moral cognition. 
Young et al. (2010) conducted an experiment using transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to temporarily disrupt the neural activity in the right TPJ in participants and 
observed the effect on moral judgements. The participants were split into control 
(where the TMS was used 5cm behind the TPJ) and TPJ-TMS groups, and both 
completed a series of moral judgement tasks with four variants, concerning the 
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intentions of characters and outcomes of different potentially harmful events. The TPJ 
disruption group judged less harshly than the control group characters who attempted to 
harm yet failed to cause harm to another individual. Young et al. (2010) concluded that 
the TPJ is involved in belief attribution which is essential for making typical moral 
judgements. The disruption of the TPJ led to a misalignment between the intentions of a 
malicious actor and the participant’s assessment of that actor, with the participant’s 
assessment relying more on the consequences of the action. 
Another study, by Decety and Cacioppo (2012) used high-density electrical 
neuroimaging to examine the patterns of connection between the PSTS/TPJ, the 
amygdala and the vmPFC when participants viewed videos depicting someone causing 
either intentional harm or accidental harm to another person. High-density ERPs were 
used to determine the spatio-temporal dynamics between those regions, i.e. the specific 
times they became active relative to each other. The researchers found that the first 
region to become active was the PSTS, followed by the amygdala (emotional 
processing), and then the vmPFC. The results are consistent with the view that the 
PSTS/TPJ are involved in the processing of intentionality that is necessary for these 
kinds of moral judgements and their activity precedes the judgement itself (Decety and 
Cacioppo, 2012). Taken together, these studies illustrate the importance of the 
PSTS/TPJ in social cognition, and how early categorisation, such as belief attribution, 
directs our moral judgements, before emotional inputs, executive control and abstract 
reasoning integrate into the judgement.   
The TPJ has also been specifically implicated in processing difficult moral 
decisions. In a study by Feldmanhall et al. (2014), researchers used fMRI to examine 
the differences in brain activity when people are exposed to either “easy” or “difficult” 
moral dilemmas. Difficult moral decisions were defined as responses to moral 
dilemmas where there is no obvious consensus amongst the participants (FeldmanHall 
et al., 2014). Subsequently, to determine whether their distinction between easy and 
difficult moral decisions was accurate, the researchers asked participants after the 
experiment to rate the difficulty of the dilemmas they were given. Participants 
consistently rated the preordained “difficult” moral dilemmas as more difficult and vice 
versa for the “easy” dilemmas. During difficult moral dilemmas it was found that the 
vmPFC decreases in activity while activity in the TPJ and regions inferiorly along the 
temporal lobes increases. The inverse was found during easy moral decisions. 
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Importantly the effects were not observed during difficult non-moral dilemmas, so this 
relationship is specific for moral dilemmas. Feldmanhall et al. (2014) propose that the 
reliance on the TPJ during difficult moral decisions reflects the use of a more reflective 
cognitive network that involves attentional shifting allowing for the weighing up of 
relevant cognitive and social stimuli. 
The studies discussed above reveal the extremely important role that the 
TPJ/PSTS plays in moral cognition and social processing more generally. It has been 
shown to be a primary brain region involved in theory of mind – which some theorists 
refer to as “cognitive empathy”, the ability to understand what another person is 
thinking8 - as well as shifting attention to different stimuli, which may point to an 
ability to reflect upon different reasons before forming a judgement. 
1.1.5 Other structures: Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Insula 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a midline structure towards the anterior (the 
front) of the brain, but deep to the prefrontal cortex that was discussed earlier. 
Alongside the amygdala it is referred to part of the “limbic” system which is associated 
with emotional processing. Like the TPJ/PSTS the ACC has been implicated in a 
variety of different functions.  
Using fMRI Singer et al. (2004) showed that the ACC was activated when 
participants experienced pain, and when they perceived their loved ones experience the 
same pain. The response of the ACC also correlated with the empathy scores of the 
participant. These results illustrate the role that ACC plays in empathy, as it is involved 
in processing the affective component of pain both first hand and empathically. In the 
same study a similar relationship was found with the anterior insula. This form of 
empathy is often referred to as “emotional empathy” – where one feels what one 
perceives someone else is feeling (Bloom, 2016). Empathy for others, especially 
regarding physical pain is important for moral processing. It alerts individuals to the 
suffering of others, makes the suffering salient and is a motivator. 
The ACC also plays an important role in cognitive conflict resolution. In the 
study by Greene at al. (2004), the ACC alongside the dlPFC showed greater activation 
during “difficult” moral dilemmas. Greene et al. (2004) hypothesised that the ACC is 
                                                 
8 Take for example Paul Bloom: Bloom, P. (2016) Against empathy: The case for rational compassion. 
The Bodley Head. 
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highly active in detecting conflicts and resolving conflicts through a recruitment of the 
dlPFC. 
Like the ACC, the insula is another deep brain structure involved in the limbic 
system and consists of two lobes. The insula lobes are located either side of the corpus 
striatum (the anatomical core of the brain). The insula is typically related to emotional 
processing. The study by Moll et al. (2002) discussed earlier identified insula activation 
in participants while they observed both morally unpleasant and non-moral unpleasant 
images. As mentioned in the ACC section, the insula is involved in empathy. In the 
aforementioned study by Singer et al. (2004), the insula was active when participants 
experienced pain and when they observed their loved ones experience the same pain. 
The anterior insula also plays a role in the emotion of disgust. In a study by 
Wicker et al. (2003), fMRI was used to measure levels of insula activity when 
participants smelled a disgusting odorant, and when they viewed the face of an actor 
smelling and odour and responding with disgust. In both cases the activity in the 
anterior insula increased. The previous two studies suggest that the activity in the brain 
of the empathisers is similar to the activity in the brain of the person they are observing. 
Although this form of empathy, emotional empathy, is also called “affect sharing”, the 
empathic emotion is actually induced in the empathiser (Singer, 2006). Despite being 
similar, the empathic emotion and the genuine emotion are not indistinguishable 
(Singer, 2006). 
Emotional processing in general, in the insula, as well as the ACC and 
amygdala is integral to moral cognition. It has been shown that emotions like disgust 
can influence and bias moral judgements. In a study by Olatunji et al. (2016) 
participants were split into three groups. One group had their hands submerged in fake 
vomit to elicit disgust, another had their hands submerged in cold water to elicit 
discomfort and the third group was a control. Each group were given a set of scenarios 
containing moral violations and were told to rate how morally wrong those violations 
were. The disgust group rated purity violations (e.g. “John spit in someone’s drink” and 
“John knowingly served someone food past its expiration date”) as being morally worse 
than the control and discomfort groups. 
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1.2 Features of the Moral Network 
All six of these brain regions discussed in this chapter have been consistently 
implicated in moral judgements, in both lesion and neuroimaging studies. Despite their 
disparate locations in the brain, these brain areas are linked at a higher functional level, 
in the process of moral cognition, where each area plays a specific role within the 
brain’s “moral network”. 
Each brain region discussed is also implicated in other functions, outside of 
moral cognition. This is because each region has domain-general functions, meaning 
that they perform more general functions that play a role in many different higher-
cognitive processes. For example, the vmPFC is implicated in economic decision 
making as well as moral cognition, with a domain-general function underlying both 
processes. As discussed earlier, the structure has been theorised to compute subjective 
values for abstract representations of specific goods that are behaviourally relevant 
(Padoa‐Schioppa and Cai, 2011). In both moral and economic contexts this function is 
important. Making moral judgements draws upon the neural circuitry associated with 
this structure, to compute the “moral” value of actions or outcomes (Shenhav and 
Greene, 2010). Similarly, the anterior insula is implicated in domain-general functions 
which translated to higher-level functions. This structure processes general emotions 
such as disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), which can then be involved in moral cognition 
(Moll et al., 2002). Finally, the TPJ has been implicated in theory of mind and attention 
shifting (Saxe and Wexler, 2005), and has also been shown to play an important role in 
moral cognition, especially during difficult moral dilemmas when one is weighing up 
many different socially relevant stimuli (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). Thus, there is no 
specific brain structure solely responsible for moral function. 
In summary, the findings of recent neurological and psychological research into 
moral cognition suggest that moral cognition is a diverse process. It consists of regions 
that are implicated in multiple cognitive processes such as exercising executive control 
(dlPFC), attention switching between stimuli (TPJ/PSTS) and computing subjective 
values (vmPFC). Affective regions are involved that have been shown to bias (insula), 
inform through empathy (insula and ACC), and directly integrate into processing of 
moral judgements (amygdala through the vmPFC). Regions involved with social 
processes also play an integral role in moral cognition. Processes like theory of 
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mind/cognitive empathy are important in belief attribution (TPJ/PSTS), and emotional 
empathy plays a role in moral motivation and raising awareness of others in need 
(insula and ACC). Any psychological theory of moral cognition must contend with the 
evidence of its plurality. 
1.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed selected contemporary literature on the neuroscience of 
moral judgement, with a particular focus on the key brain regions implicated in a 
“moral network” and the complex faculty of empathy. I have shown that moral 
cognition is a complex process involving the integration of these brain regions, which 
are disparate in space and function. These brain regions build off their domain-general 
functions to carry out the higher-level process of moral cognition. These findings 
suggest a multi-faceted and integrative model of moral cognition. By integrative, I 
mean that the implicated brain regions function as a network, where there is intense 
connectivity and associations between them. By multi-faceted, I mean that the 
implicated brain regions and their functions are diverse, involving processes related to 
emotion, reasoning and social cognition. This conclusion however requires more 
support and is contrary to several prominent mainstream accounts of moral cognition. 
This neuroscientifically integrated feature is part of an “integrative account of moral 
cognition” and will receive greater focus in chapters two and four of this thesis. 
In chapter two I will set out three major problems facing the neuroscience of 
moral judgement. These challenges will set out where care needs to be taken when 
using the results of empirical neuroscience, and how when used alone, they 
inadequately describe human moral cognition. Despite these challenges, many 
important findings and results have come out of cognitive neuroscience, referenced by 
the discussion and conclusions of this chapter. In chapter three I will introduce a neo-
Kantian account of moral obligation and in chapter four, I will relate this moral 
philosophy to current neuroscience. This work will aid in the development of an 




2 Challenges with the Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Morality 
The neuroscientific study of morality requires an integrative approach. Two kinds of 
integration are required. The first relates to methodological integration in the form of an 
interdisciplinary analysis. The second relates to the integration of a brain network: it 
concerns the need for an account that explains how moral cognition results from 
various integrated brain processes. The need for such an account was discussed in 
chapter one, where I showed how key neuroscientific studies of moral cognition 
suggest it to be a multi-faceted process, involving emotion, reason and social cognition. 
Brain regions disparate in space and function, operate as a network, that “builds off” 
each regions domain general functions. 
In this chapter I will explain why an interdisciplinary analysis is needed, by 
outlining the methodological challenges facing the current neuroscience of moral 
cognition. These challenges can be clustered into three groups. In each grouping I will 
discuss the challenges in relation to both the underlying empirical neuroscience and 
theories in moral philosophy. 
The first set of challenges concern the relationship between moral philosophy 
and models of moral cognition, which attempt to systematically describe principles and 
processes common to moral thinking. Many neuroscientific models of moral cognition 
have roots in older ethics theories. There is a common assumption in the literature that 
these traditional theories, such as utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics are 
represented in neural circuitry. There are methodological problems with this 
neuroscientific assumption. For example, it is difficult if not impossible to accurately 
attribute certain kinds of ethical reasoning to a participant based on their responses to 
moral dilemmas in an experiment. What is needed is a more nuanced use of moral 
philosophy, that moves away from simplistic and traditional versions of theories and 
towards versions that are neuroscientifically informed. 
The second category are “circularity” challenges. These involve challenges in 
conceptualising moral judgements, crafting methodologies to study them, interpreting 
any findings and relating models of moral cognition to these findings. There is a 
potentially problematic circularity that underlies this process. To explore moral 
25 
 
cognition, one must adopt a working definition of “morality” and then “moral 
cognition”. These conceptualisations in turn influence what cognitive faculties are 
considered as relevant to moral cognition and thus worth exploring. This in turn 
influences the kinds of methodologies employed to study these relevant faculties and 
the interpretation of any findings.  
The third category of challenges concern the methodological limits in the 
neuroscience of moral judgement. Due to technological limitations in current 
experimental techniques, cognitive neuroscience cannot capture how the brain regions 
involved in the moral network integrate as the “higher-function” of moral cognition. 
Secondly, most neuroimaging studies only capture up to a few seconds of brain activity 
around the making of a moral judgement.9 This fails to capture the complexity of moral 
judgments which extend much further temporally, including minutes, hours and even 
days. Furthermore, many experiments in neuroscience fail to capture the real-life 
conditions and context that moral judgements are made in. This means that they lack 
ecologically validity, and hence their results do not accurately describe moral cognition. 
In the following sections of this chapter I will discuss these problems in more 
detail and propose some potential solutions. Some of these challenges can be overcome 
and the neuroscience can be improved. Ultimately though, some deep problems remain. 
This shows the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of moral cognition 
that utilises empirical neuroscience alongside social psychology, moral philosophy and 
theoretical neuroscience. In particular, neuroscientific study depends on moral 
philosophy to conceptualise moral cognition and interpret any findings that emerge. 
2.1 The Relationship Between Moral Philosophy and Models of 
Moral Cognition 
Alongside the recent empirical search for the brain regions and processes involved in 
moral judgement, models of moral cognition have been developed. The philosophical 
inquiry into the nature of human moral thinking, however, is far older and in many 
ways anticipates the current debates. In this section I will lay out the prominent 
historical and modern models of moral judgement. The models will be described using 
                                                 
9 In EEG specifically, this time window is even less, with only a few hundred milliseconds of brain 
activity being recorded. 
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two polarities: the first concerns the roles of reason and emotion, and the second 
concerns the level of dissociation or integration of the processes involved in moral 
cognition. There is an observable and pervasive link between moral philosophy and 
these neuroscientific models of moral cognition. While moral philosophy is needed to 
inform neuroscience and the interpretation of any findings, the link may not be so direct 
as many theorists have posited. There is a popular assumption in the literature that 
normative ethics theories should be represented in neural circuits. Often, simplified and 
historical theories receive the most focus. This assumption is methodologically 
dubious, as it can be difficult to prove that certain responses participants give to moral 
dilemmas in fact reflect processing akin to a specific normative ethical theory. What is 
needed is a more nuanced use of morally philosophy, that moves away from simplistic 
and historical versions of theories and towards versions that are neuroscientifically 
informed. 
2.1.1 Rationalism and Sentimentalism  
One long-standing philosophical debate currently being reiterated in the psychological 
and neuroscientific study of moral cognition is between moral rationalism and moral 
sentimentalism. Moral rationalism, often associated with Kant, asserts that moral 
thinking is fundamentally a rational process, and that moral truths can be known a 
priori. By contrast, moral sentimentalism, often associated with David Hume, asserts 
that moral truths are grounded in human emotional responses to experiences. Several 
important modern models of moral cognition have roots in these older philosophical 
theories, and interpret the empirical evidence with the conceptual framework they 
provide. The contemporary application of these theories is often expressed through a 
focus on roles of reason and emotion. This focus concerns whether these two faculties 
are inputs or outputs of the moral judgement, and whether they constitute or merely 
inform the moral judgement (Prinz, 2016).  
Modern rationalist models assert that pure reason, practical reason, deliberation 
and cognitive control play the most significant role in the making of moral judgements. 
These models do not deny the association of emotions with morality, but hold that they 
play a less important role. For example, one might hold that stealing is morally wrong 
on the basis of certain reasons, and then after observing an act of stealing become 
angry, disgusted or saddened. However, even if these feelings are based on the moral 
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judgement, the judgement itself is based on the reasoning. Immanuel Kant is a famous 
historical proponent of rationalist theory. The moral law, he argued, can be distilled 
into the following “categorical imperative”: “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 
2002). According to Kant, the evaluation of moral actions is therefore purely based on 
the requirements of reason. 
The primary “modern” advocate of rationalist theorists in the field of 
psychology was Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg was highly influential in the 20th 
century, before the emergence of the cognitive neuroscience of moral judgement, with 
its extensive use of neuroimaging. Therefore, despite being the most notable proponent 
of rationalist theories in moral psychology, his theories are largely historical. Kohlberg 
(1971) proposed a six staged theory of moral development, and with each stage: “…the 
obligation to preserve human life becomes more categorical, more independent of the 
aims of the actor, of the commands or opinions of others…” 
Sentimentalist models of moral cognition assert that emotions and sentiments 
are the major constituents of moral judgements. Hence, such theories are the opposite 
of rationalist theories. Importantly, sentimentalist models do not deny any role for 
reasoning in morality, however they argue that it is subservient to emotions. David 
Hume is a famous historical proponent of a sentimentalist theory of moral cognition. 
He argued that reason is only ever a “slave of the passions”, and that moral judgements 
are constituted by feelings of approbation and disapprobation, i.e. praise and blame 
respectively (Hume, 2007, p. 266). Jesse Prinz is a modern proponent of sentimentalist 
theories, and he argues that sentiments, which are dispositions to certain emotions, 
underlie moral judgements (Prinz, 2011). These important emotions are anger and 
disgust when one observes an immoral act, and guilt and shame when one performs an 
immoral act. Prinz argues that an action is wrong if one experiences a sentiment for 
these emotions when either observing or performing that action (Prinz, 2011). 
In the early 2000’s, following the publication of a famous article by Haidt 
(2001) “The Emotional Dog and Rational Tail” there was a major decline in the 
popularity of rationalist theories within neuroscience. In this article Haidt proposed the 
“social intuitionist model” of moral judgement. In this model emotions and intuitions 
lead to moral judgements, and reasoning is a post-hoc process, meaning that it is 
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performed after the judgement is made (Haidt, 2001). Haidt (2001) admits that 
reasoning may lead to a moral judgement, but this is very rarely the case.  
In summary, modern models of moral cognition often involve a contemporary 
application of older theories from moral philosophy. A traditional philosophical conflict 
between rationalism and sentimentalism is particularly noticeable, in the treatment of 
emotion and reason as oppositional faculties. 
2.1.2 Integration and Dissociation 
Modern neuroscience has made extreme versions of sentimentalism and rationalism 
untenable, and so most of the current prominent models are hybridised to some extent. 
Hybridised models of moral cognition assert that both reason and emotion play 
important roles in the making of moral judgements. However, these models are highly 
diverse, with both reason and emotion, among other mental faculties potentially playing 
multiple roles that differ greatly between different models. One such variability 
concerns the level of integration of the various neural components in moral cognition. 
On one end, the neural components are highly dissociated, compete against each other 
and operate independently. On the other side the neural components are highly 
integrated and operate as a network. The components may involve emotional and 
rational processes. 
Greene’s “dual process model” of moral judgement is an example of a 
dissociative hybrid model (Greene, 2016). This theory holds that the brain has two 
avenues for making moral judgements. The first is automatic, intuitive and emotionally 
informed and often leads to what Greene (2016) categorises as “deontological 
judgements”, i.e. judgements that deem the action itself is judged as right or wrong 
irrespective of its consequences. The second is deliberative and involves the cognitive 
control of emotions. Greene (2016) claims that this leads to “utilitarian judgements”, 
where the value of an action is calculated based on its consequences. According to his 
“dual process model”, moral cognition is highly dissociated, as emotion and reasoning 
are involved in two separable modes of making judgements, these being automatic and 
deliberative. 
The model proposed by Casebeer and Churchland (2003) transcends the 
traditional dissociation between reason and emotion. Their model is best represented by 
a neo-Aristotelian virtue theory, where morality concerns what one should do and think 
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to function well as a human. They argue that the diverse brain processes involved in 
moral cognition are collaborative. Emotive and cognitive processes integrate with 
empathy, perspective taking, and one’s memory system to allow an organism to “think 
about and actually behave in a manner enabling it to function as best it can” (Casebeer 
and Churchland, 2003). Moll et al. (2008) advocate for a form of hybridised 
sentimentalism, where emotion and reason both contribute to altruistic motivations, 
which they claim, underlie moral actions. They claim that processes involved in reason 
and emotion are nondissociable, and are represented in integrated cortico-limbic neural 
assemblies, that constitute such moral motivations. Moll et al. and Casebeer and 
Churchland, hold that moral cognition involves the collaboration and integration of 
processes that are both emotive and rational (Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Moll et 
al., 2008). Thus, compared to Greene’s dual process model, these two models represent 
significant alternatives to the typical reason-emotion dichotomy. 
2.1.3 Should We Expect Moral Theories to be Reflected in Neurological 
Processes? 
Another broad challenge that arises in the testing of moral cognition is whether we 
should expect cognitive or neurological processes to reflect theories in moral 
philosophy. There is a common assumption in the literature that competing normative 
ethics theories, such as deontology, utilitarianism and virtue theory will be represented 
in different neural networks and brain processes. In other words, there is an idea that 
normative theories would either correspond with or manifest from a particular brain 
region or network of regions. 
The assumption that multiple normative ethics theories are represented in 
different neural networks involves the idea that these neural networks mirror the 
functioning of the theories they represent and compete with each other, much like the 
theories do in moral philosophy. Greene’s Dual Process theory of moral judgement, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, is a prominent case that illustrates this assumption. 
Remember, according to this theory, when someone is given a moral dilemma, 
depending on the specifics of the dilemma (like how personally involving and emotive 
the scenario is) either a deliberative or automatic brain process would take precedence 
over the other (Greene, 2016). Greene (2016) asserts that the automatic and emotive 
process corresponds with deontological decision making, where rightness or wrongness 
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are dependent on how the action is initially perceived or characterised, and not the 
consequences. He bases this assertion on the fact that certain brain areas associated 
with automatic and emotive processing become active when the participant makes a 
typical “deontological” type moral judgement in response to a moral dilemma. For 
example, this would be the case when participants opt not to push the man off the 
bridge in the overbridge variant of the trolley problem, where pushing the man off 
would have killed him but saved five others. By contrast, Greene (2016) views 
decisions that involve deliberative and cognitive processing as reflecting utilitarian 
reasoning, which involves consideration about the consequences, i.e. consideration of 
whether the action maximises “utility”. He bases this assertion on the fact that when 
participants make typical utilitarian decisions in response to a moral dilemma, brain 
areas associated with exercising cognitive control and higher-level cognitive operations 
become active. For example, this would be the case when participants opt to push the 
man off the overbridge in order to save five others. Thus, Greene’s approach reflects an 
assumption that common normative ethical theories can be identified with different and 
dissociable brain circuits. Moreover, he claims that these circuits are inversely related, 
i.e. when one process is active the other is inhibited/inactive, and that this dynamic 
corresponds to the different ways ethical dilemmas are often approached (Greene, 
2016). 
Another way that moral theories can be applied to brain processes is 
“holistically”. So, whereas Greene and others match certain moral theories to particular 
brain circuits, one might instead view the whole of human moral cognition i.e., all the 
regions and neural circuits involved, as working together in a manner that corresponds 
with a particular moral theory. On this approach, it is assumed that the theory that can 
be shown to “best-fit” with our understanding of these brain processes is more likely to 
correctly describe human moral cognition, and that this theory is suitable for 
interpreting subsequent evidence as it emerges. Casebeer and Churchland (2003), as 
discusses earlier in this chapter, make this claim, and put forward a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue theory as the candidate for “best fit”:  
Our initial take on the domain of moral cognition, then, can and should be 
informed by a background moral theory (in our case, a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue theory, according to which moral concerns relate to what we have to 
think and do so as to function well as human beings). 
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(Casebeer and Churchland, 2003, p. 172) 
Their adoption of virtue theory is partly based on recent neuroscientific evidence, 
similar to what was discussed in the previous chapter, which appears to indicate that 
moral cognition is multifaceted, involving “reason, appetite, emotion and affect” 
(Casebeer and Churchland, 2003, p. 172). They argue that these findings are more 
consistent with virtue theory than other mainstream normative ethics theories, as virtue 
theory contends that right action must be understood with reference to the overall 
functioning of the person, i.e. what must they do to be a “virtuous” person (Casebeer 
and Churchland, 2003, p. 172). They go further and claim that moral cognition should 
be informed with a “background moral theory”, which they argue should be virtue 
theory, meaning that any new data should be interpreted in the light of that theory. 
There are several problems with this approach that Greene and Casebeer and 
Churchland have taken up. Firstly, it can be difficult to prove that certain responses 
participants give to moral dilemmas in fact reflect processing akin to a specific 
normative ethical theory (Kahane, 2015). For example, suppose I constructed a study 
that uses the bridge variant of the trolley problem as a moral dilemma, and presented 
this to participants when they underwent fMRI (this is a similar methodology to the 
study by Greene at al. (2001)). Suppose I assume that when a participant opts to push 
an overweight individual off of a bridge to stop the trolley from killing five others that 
they are making a “utilitarian” type decision, whereas if they opt not to push the 
individual, they are making a “deontological” type decision. Such an assumption is 
very common in the literature (Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 
2011; Zheng et al., 2018). This methodology reflects a general consensus in the 
philosophy literature about which responses are typically supported by certain 
normative ethics theory, but this does not show that the participants in these 
experiments are thinking in terms of those theories. The connection between the 
participants’ responses and the corresponding ethical theories may only be superficial. 
This problem might arise with any theory, though Kahane (2015) singles out 
utilitarianism as being particularly poorly reflected in the moral judgements made in 
response to sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem. He points out that 
utilitarianism is primarily two things: it is maximising, meaning that it aims to achieve 
the highest value of utility, and it is impartial and unbiased (Kahane, 2015). A 
participant may give a typical utilitarian response to a sacrificial dilemma, when their 
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actual thinking may have been motivated by self-interest (many sacrificial dilemmas 
used in these studies involve danger to the participants as well). One such common 
dilemma described in Greene et al. (2004) is as follows: 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge 
in the cellar of a large house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers who 
have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry 
loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand 
from his mouth, his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who 
will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save 
yourself and the others, you must smother your child to death. Is it 
appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the 
other townspeople? 
(Greene et al., 2004, p. 390) 
This dilemma is subtly different to a trolley dilemma in two important ways. The 
participant is in danger, and the baby would die anyway regardless of the decision 
(whereas in a trolley dilemma one individual could die instead of a group of others). So, 
in this example the participant may be motivated by self-interest, or they may be 
willing to sacrifice their baby because they were motivated by “group solidarity”. 
Neither of these motivations would demonstrate utilitarian thinking. For many of these 
sacrificial dilemmas there are a number of possible motivations for coming to a 
decision that are not typically utilitarian or deontological.  
Further to this point, it has been found that psychopaths are more likely to make 
utilitarian type decisions when faced with sacrificial dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2011). 
Psychopaths of course typically lack concern for the well-being of others and are self-
centred (and so are not impartial). It is therefore unlikely that they are motivated by the 
need to maximise happiness according to utilitarian reasoning. Instead it appears that 
selfishness and callousness (indifference to suffocating the baby in the above example), 
may be the real motivating factors for their decision. 
As noted, Kahane (2015) directs this criticism at utilitarianism. The point may 
be applied to other applications of moral theories in the interpreting of neuroscientific 
data. If, for instance, participants give typical deontological responses to a trolley 
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dilemma (perhaps by opting not to push the overweight person off the footbridge to 
save five others), we cannot simply assume their decision is attributable to 
deontological processing. Instead of believing that they have a categorical duty not to 
kill anyone (a typical deontological reason), it may be that they were motivated by a 
simple emotional aversion to killing, or that they just did not want to get their “hands 
dirty” (a far more selfish motivation), or that they simply opted out of the dilemma by 
doing nothing at all (because the scenario was too distressing). Thus, caution is required 
when attributing specific kinds of reasoning to participants on the basis of their 
decision. 
In response to the criticisms, Greene might argue that normative ethics theories 
are manifestations of neural networks in moral cognition. For Greene (2008) the 
conventional philosophical definitions of utilitarianism and deontology are of 
secondary importance. What is primary in his analysis are the functional roles of 
utilitarianism and deontology, i.e. the ways that they generally tend to operate (Greene, 
2008). Utilitarianism generally allows for the sacrifice of one individual to achieve a 
“greater good”, and deontology generally condemns the use of any individual as “a 
means to an end”. He argues that it is this general operative functioning that determines 
whether a decision made by an individual is utilitarian or deontological, as opposed to 
adherence to philosophical reasoning.  
There are several problems with Greene’s position. Traditionally, deontology 
has been associated with reason and reflection as opposed to emotion and reflexivity. 
For example, Kant’s moral system – commonly put forward as a preeminent 
deontological theory – claims to show why moral obligations must be based solely in 
reason (Kant, 2002). However, Greene proposes the inverse: that deontological 
judgements stem from an automatic and emotive brain process, and utilitarian 
judgements on the other hand, stem from a deliberative and cognitive process. This 
makes it unclear what is conveyed by Greene’s use of theoretical terms. When 
philosophical theories are employed to describe brain processes, to which they only 
bear superficial likeness, the link is weak at best. 
In reviewing the neuroscientific models of moral cognition earlier in this 
section, it is obvious there is a pervasive link between them and theories in moral 
philosophy. Often, it is simplified or traditional versions of these theories that are used, 
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for example, traditional Kantian deontology and classical utilitarianism, which have 
clear cut objectives and features. Such theories are used to describe brain processes 
involved in moral cognition. However, researchers are often reaching when they claim 
that these traditional theories are manifestations of brain processes; primarily this is a 
methodological issue, as it is difficult to prove that participants particular responses to 
ethical dilemmas reflect processing akin to a specific normative ethical theory. Despite 
this issue, moral philosophy remains important in the interpretation of findings in moral 
cognition, because it has provided researchers with many diverse and complex 
frameworks through which to view morality. So, what is needed is a more nuanced use 
of morally philosophy, that moves away from simplistic and historical versions of 
theories and towards versions that are neuroscientifically informed. 
2.2 Challenge of Circularity in the Neuroscience of Moral 
Cognition 
The neuroscientific study of moral cognition is particularly susceptible to a problem of 
circularity. In this section I will discuss the general difficulties in conceptualising 
morality and moral cognition, which are due to the diverse range of morally relevant 
behaviours. Following this, I will discuss the challenge of circularity which broadly 
occurs in two directions. The first direction concerns how one’s conceptualisation of 
moral cognition can influence which findings emerge and their interpretation. In order 
to give study a clear focus, one is required to produce a definition of moral cognition 
that is unambiguous and methodologically viable. However, this preconception of 
moral cognition segregates which behaviours are regarded as being morally relevant 
and hence which brain regions will be focused on. The second direction involves 
reading a favoured model or theory of moral cognition into the data (which is often 
flexible and susceptible to the influence of theory). Because of these factors, the study 
of moral cognition is particularly susceptible to circularity. To overcome this problem 
the study of moral cognition requires greater reflection and researchers should be more 
aware of the presuppositions taken. 
2.2.1 Difficulties in Conceptualising Moral judgement 
The general idea of “morality” is interconnected with ideas of moral judgement and 
moral cognition. A definition of one entails a definition of the other two. In simple 
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terms, moral cognition is the operation of the cognitive faculties involved in morality, 
whether that involves making moral judgements, moral motivations and moral 
emotions. The borders of morality are notoriously hard to define, partly because they 
seem dependent on interpersonal and intercultural differences. Typically, studies of 
moral cognition do not focus on defining morality, but rather rely on presuppositions or 
a consensus definition. Paradigmatic examples of morally relevant conduct, such as 
altruistic behaviour, fairness and justice are incorporated into this general definition 
(Decety and Yoder, 2016; Moll et al., 2008). Without such presuppositions, the study of 
moral cognition as a branch of scientific inquiry could never get off the ground. 
Opinions from moral philosophy often influence such presuppositions. 
Let us examine an example definition of “morality” commonly used in the 
neuroscience. Moll et al. (2008) has adopted an operative definition of morality as “the 
sets of customs and values that are embraced by a cultural group to guide social 
conduct”. An obvious feature of this definition is the inclusion of cultural variability, 
which is seen as an advantage as it avoids arbitrary dismissals of such variations. This 
definition also allows for the inclusion of different psychological domains potentially 
involved in morality, i.e. “disgust, harm, care, fairness and authority” considerations 
(Moll et al., 2008). Moll et al. (2008) stress that morality is evaluative and requires 
motivation and presume that it has emerged by way of gene-culture coevolution. This 
kind of definition has massive scope. Specificity is required to constrain the area of 
inquiry.  
Definitions of “morality” inform definitions of moral cognition and moral 
judgement. This involves determining which actions, consequences, emotions and 
character traits are to be regarded as relevant to moral cognition and which are not. For 
example, a filthy toilet and a brutal murder can both generate strong reactions of disgust 
in an observer, yet one reaction is morally relevant and the other not. Similarly, what 
differentiates a judgement about the correct move in a chess game, from the correct 
action in a trolley dilemma? Questions such as this must be answered before embarking 
on an empirical study of moral cognition. Similarly, moral judgements can involve a 
highly diverse array of situations. Studies examining moral cognition have presented 
participants with moral situations such as: Observing a poor abandoned child in the 
street (Moll et al., 2002), making choices in varieties of the trolley problem (Greene et 
al., 2001), observing an individual either intentionally or unintentionally hurting 
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someone (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012), and judging whether an incestuous relationship 
between consenting adults is wrong or not (Haidt, 2001). We can regard all of these 
situations as being morally relevant, yet it seems, superficially at least, that they differ 
in significant ways. For example, the first situation involves responding to an 
emotionally troubling image, the second involves weighing up competing emotions and 
reasons to solve an abstract dilemma, the third involves quickly categorising and 
judging an agent’s actions, and the fourth involves reflecting on a deeply ingrained 
socio-cultural norm. This indicates the range and complexity of moral cognition as a 
field of study. 
This range and complexity presents anyone conducting neuroscientific research 
into moral cognition with a dilemma. To construct an experimental methodology a 
concise and well-circumscribed definition is required. However, in formulating such a 
definition one risks oversimplification. A possible solution to this problem is to break 
moral cognition down into many different types of judgements and study each of these 
types accordingly (Greene, 2015). Much of the literature is already diverse, as the 
above four very different scenarios presented indicate, and involves a wide range of 
methodologies. However, there is still a need for an overarching definition of moral 
cognition that can encompass this diversity, if we regard this research as studying the 
same thing, viz. “moral cognition”. This overarching definition should also guide 
decisions about what future research should and should not be considered within this 
category. 
If in the future, a practically “complete neuroscience” was achieved, meaning 
that the brain processes involved in any potential behaviour in differing contexts could 
be completely explained, one would still need to define what counts as “moral 
cognition”. This conceptualisation process will remain difficult, because of the 
diversity of behaviours and contexts that are deemed as morally relevant.  
Let us take some examples of existing attempts at conceptualising moral 
judgement in the literature. Alongside their conception of morality, Moll et al. (2008) 
have a related conception of moral cognition (from which we can extract a definition of 
moral judgement). They propose that the most distinctive aspect of moral cognition is 
that it altruistically motivates social behaviour. This definition distinguishes moral 
cognition from other non-moral forms of social cognition that may have different 
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motivations, such as selfishness or reciprocal altruism (altruism performed with the 
expectation of reciprocation). On this definition, whether one’s judged permissibility of 
an incestuous relationship, or one’s response to a trolley dilemma are instances of 
moral judgment depends on whether the judgements involve genuine altruistic 
considerations. If so, then in studying an individual’s responses to these scenarios one 
is studying “moral cognition”. On this definition morally relevant social conduct can be 
distinguished from non-moral social conduct by examining the motivations of the 
conduct. 
Greene (2014) uses a different definition of moral cognition. He claims that 
“morality is a set of psychological adaptations that allow otherwise selfish individuals 
to reap the benefits of co-operation”. In explaining this, Greene (2014) describes 
morality as an evolutionary solution to the “tragedy of the commons”. The tragedy of 
the commons is a societal problem where an individual acting in their own selfish 
interest undermines some common, social good, and thereby undermines her own 
interests. In other words, when everyone acts selfishly, the common good – the 
“commons” – become spoiled. Compared to Moll et al.’s definition of moral cognition, 
Greene’s is far broader in the sorts of behaviours it implicates. For example, motivation 
is still important, as genuine altruism may be a mechanism to combat selfishness and 
avert the tragedy of the commons. However, it is only a means to the end that is human 
cooperation. This definition can help sort morally relevant social conduct from non-
moral social conduct by examining the general functioning of the given behaviour at an 
individual and a societal level. 
As a brief aside, a significant omission in Moll and Greene’s definitions is the 
normativity inherent in moral judgements. Normativity concerns the sense of “ought” 
behind moral judgements, and the idea that there is a justification for the claims that 
morality makes on us (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 9-10). Neuroscientific studies and articles 
like those of Moll and Greene seek to provide an explanatory account of morality, i.e. a 
causal description of how moral judgements are made and why individuals are 
susceptible to the influences of morality. In doing so they regard the question of 
whether a person actually “ought” to act morally as either secondary or irrelevant. I will 
discuss this distinction further in the next chapter. 
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2.2.2 Circularity in Conceptualising Moral Cognition and Interpreting 
Data 
When applied to experimental design both definitions mentioned in the previous section 
bring us to a fundamental methodological challenge: The problem of circularity. The 
way moral cognition is framed explicitly and implicitly influences which cognitive 
faculties will be examined and how any findings are interpreted, and hence which will 
constitute an important part of an emerging model of moral cognition.  
For example, because Moll et al. (2008) focus on altruistic motivations, any 
neuroscientific findings will be interpreted in this context. In this case, moral cognition 
becomes the study of the brain processes that constitute such motivations. Moll et al. 
(2008)claim that the literature suggests that emotional and cognitive faculties in moral 
cognition are non-dissociable. In their view, moral motivations are constituted by the 
integration of these processes, which form cognitive-emotional association complexes, 
represented in cortico-limbic neural assemblies (Moll et al., 2008). A conflicting moral 
decision represents a conflict between two different motivations, each represented by 
different cortico-limbic assemblies. The researchers particular focus on motivations and 
their interpretation of the data trace back to their initial conception of morality. 
In contrast, as Greene’s definition of morality centres on the psychological 
adaptations that enhance co-operation, he views the evolution of these psychological 
mechanisms as important to his theory (Greene, 2014). Greene proposes the “the dual-
process model of moral judgement”, whereby we have a fast, automatic and largely 
emotive way of making moral judgements, and a slower, deliberative and more energy 
intensive way. Greene (2014) pitches this dichotomous model for moral judgement as a 
classic evolutionary trade-off between efficiency and flexibility. It makes sense from an 
evolutionary standpoint that we would have evolved an automatic way of making moral 
judgements for maximum efficiency, as well as a more deliberative and mentally costly 
way for harder and novel moral dilemmas. The key point here is that Greene’s interest 
in such psychological adaptations, and his dual process theory, trace back to his initial 
conception of morality. 
In discussing the inherent circularity of research into moral cognition, Casebeer 
and Churchland (2003) claim that the theory of morality used to create a working 
definition of moral judgement dictates “how widely you cast your moral cognitive net”. 
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For example, if one defines moral cognition in a given way, based off a theory of 
morality, then this will produce some initial empirical findings. These findings can aid 
in the development of models of moral cognition and even eliminate some models that 
are unsupported and deemed unrealistic. This process of reformulation can influence 
changes the initial working definition of moral cognition. However, Casebeer and 
Churchland (2003) also claim that this circle is not necessarily vicious, and instead 
propose that definitions of moral cognition and experimental models need to be 
developed together. Hence, this process does have a circular element, which is 
inherently problematic. However, if this analysis becomes more reflective, it may be 
reviewed as hermeneutical. With a nuanced use of moral philosophy and awareness of 
one’s presuppositions, this circularity will be far harder to miss. 
In the previous chapter I showed why it is widely accepted that there is no 
specific module in the brain that is solely responsible for moral cognition. Instead what 
exists is an integrated network of brain regions, that can be implicated in a wide variety 
of studies, that employ differing methodologies that examine different kinds of moral 
judgements. Greene (2015) concurs with this point and argues that moral cognition is 
“fragmented at the cognitive level but unified at the functional level”. However, 
whatever “function” is used in the working definition of moral cognition will dictate 
which fragmented cognitive components will be tested and focused on. 
So far, what has been discussed is how initial conceptualisations of moral 
cognition can influence the methodologies chosen, which brain regions are studies and 
how any findings are interpreted. Another aspect of the challenge of circularity is the 
tendency for researchers to read their favoured model of moral cognition into the 
neuroscientific data.  
One reason for this circular tendency is that much of the neuroscientific 
evidence is ambiguous in relation to these models. In other words, it is often the case 
that evidence can be used to support most if not any of them. In section of “Moral 
Brains” (2016), the philosopher Jesse Prinz performs a brief literature review of the 
neural correlates of moral judgements and sets out the various models of moral 
cognition. Before launching into their descriptions however, he states: 
To put it bluntly, every model presented here is consistent with every study 




Prinz argues that we cannot be decisive in any endorsement of a model of moral 
cognition based on the neuroscientific literature alone. Nevertheless, he presents his 
own sentimentalist model as having the greatest support from the literature. Prinz 
(2016)does so by presenting an alternative method of analysis, where theories of moral 
cognition, often originating from moral philosophy are utilised to interpret findings. 
Though this approach may be useful, it should be used with caution. The fact that 
neuroscientific studies can be interpreted flexibly with regards to moral theories, means 
that it is very easy to read a moral theory into the data. Prior theoretical positions 
therefore would be more likely to dictate one’s conclusions than the findings 
themselves. 
Let us take the example of Prinz’s own analysis of one study and its relation to 
models of moral cognition. We will see that Prinz’s analysis is as problematic as the 
others he criticises. The study he addresses concerns a neuroimaging experiment by 
Decety and Cacioppo (2012), which was discussed briefly in chapter one. In this study, 
high-density Event Related Potentials (ERPs) were used, which represent participants’ 
brain activity in response to a fixed event, such as when participants watch a video. 
Participants were made to watch a video depicting an actor either intentionally or 
intentionally harming another individual. Intentional harm ERPs were distinguishable 
from unintentional harm ERPs at three temporal points, which correspond to activity in 
the right pSTS first, the amygdala second, and finally the vmPFC third.10 The 
researcher’s interpretation of their own findings is that early in moral cognition 
processing, the intentions of the actor are evaluated, and this guides the judgement. 
Following this is the involvement of affective processes, which act as a “gain 
antecedent”, alerting the observer to the “moral salience” of the scenario, before a harm 
evaluation is made (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012). 
Prinz (2016) disagrees with this interpretation as it relegates the role of 
emotions in moral judgement, which are proceeded and guided by a seemingly 
cognitive process, i.e. the intentionality judgement. Using the same data, Prinz argues 
that any model of moral cognition could account for the initial involvement of this 
                                                 
10 In chapter one, all three of these areas were discussed, and are implicated in evaluating intentions, 
emotional arousal and decision-making respectively. 
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cognitive function. He proposes a sentimentalist “constitution” model, which asserts 
that sentiments (dispositions for certain emotions) constitute moral judgements (Prinz, 
2016). For example, if one sees someone intentionally harming another, as in this 
experiment, one gains a sentiment which disposes one to anger, which is equivalent to a 
moral judgement that the action was wrong. In Prinz’s model, a categorisation of the 
act by evaluating the intentions of the actor is necessary before one can have an 
emotional reaction to it, and hence form a judgement. Thus, the early involvement of a 
cognitive brain region, he argues, is no real threat to his model. In Prinz’s analysis, the 
involvement of affective brain regions represents more than just a “gain antecedent”, 
instead they are the judgement itself. 
There is a third way to interpret these results, which rejects a hard dichotomy 
between reason and emotion, and argues for a neuroscientifically integrative view. This 
is the position taken up by this thesis and will be discussed later in this chapter. In this 
view, brain regions implicated in moral cognition function as a network, so it does not 
make sense to say that any one region of kind of process solely constitutes the moral 
judgement. Instead, occurring very early in the moral judgement is the integration of 
affective and cognitive processes to carry out a judgement. Decety and Cacioppo 
(2012)  hint towards a seemingly integrative process when they emphasise the 
reciprocal connections between the pSTS and the amygdala, and the projections of the 
pSTS and amygdala to the vmPFC.  
Prinz (2016) argues that the ambiguity of the available empirical evidence such 
as in the Decety and Cacioppo (2012) study indicates the need for interdisciplinary 
work. He argues that the interpretation of findings in empirical neuroscience needs to 
be supplemented by “philosophically grounded theories” and “behavioural work”, 
which is sometimes but not regularly the case in current neuroscientific studies (Prinz, 
2016). I concur with Prinz’s conclusion, however as an amendment I want to empathise 
the importance of theoretical neuroscientific work, in this interdisciplinary process. 
Theoretical neuroscience, for example the work in the article by Gillett and Franz 
(2014), is few and far between, and ought to be a primary focus in the field of moral 
cognition. It also requires emphasis that this interdisciplinary work should be mutual. In 
other words, the collaboration between moral philosophy and theoretical neuroscience 
should not exist in a unitary direction.  
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The study of moral cognition is particularly susceptible to circularity. This is 
due to the need for presuppositions in conceptualising moral cognition, and in the use 
of theory to interpret of any findings, which are often ambiguous and open to multiple 
interpretations. To overcome these problems, a reflective collaboration between moral 
philosophy and theoretical neuroscience is required to inform the neuroscience. Most 
importantly, this must be accompanied by an awareness of the origin of any 
philosophical or theoretical presuppositions and how these may influence findings. 
2.3 Methodological Limits in the Neuroscience of Moral 
Cognition 
In chapter one, I examined key studies in the neuroscience of moral cognition and 
discussed their implications for the nature of the moral brain. The moral network is 
highly disseminated in the brain, involving a multitude of brain regions with various 
functions. This presents a problem for the cognitive neuroscience of morality, as most 
neuroimaging techniques are limited in one or more ways in their ability to capture the 
moral network. fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) and EEG 
(electroencephalography) are the two most common neuroimaging techniques used to 
study moral cognition, though TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) is also 
common. fMRI has high spatial resolution, and poorer temporal resolution, this means 
that it can distinguish brain activity in specific brain regions more clearly. However, it 
provides less data on the precise timing behind that activity. The inverse is the case for 
EEG which has low spatial resolution and high temporal resolution (Mulert et al., 
2004).  
When the data from each of these techniques are analysed together it can help 
elucidate both the timing and the localisation of brain activity. However, due to the 
nature of moral cognition, this will continue to yield an incomplete picture. If, as the 
literature suggests, moral cognition involves a network, then it must be understood 
somehow as integrative. Hence, current neuroimaging techniques, that focus on specific 
brain regions will be of limited value. There are some techniques that can be applied to 
neuroimaging data during the analysis phase that provide some information on the 
interaction of multiple brain regions, however this remains limited. Currently, the only 
way to address this technical limitation is through theory.  
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In this section I will describe these inadequacies in more detail, which can be 
explained in three parts. Firstly, because of the context-dependent nature of moral 
cognition, many neuroscientific experiments will lack ecologically validity, meaning 
that they fail to emulate the real-life conditions that moral judgements occur in. 
Secondly, methodologies and experimental techniques fail to capture the temporal 
nature of moral decision-making, that can occur over minutes, hours and days. Thirdly, 
the same methodologies and experimental techniques will fail to capture the holistic 
nature of moral cognition, that operates as a complicated network of processes. 
2.3.1 Ecological Validity in Testing Moral Cognition 
A common criticism of experiments employed in the neuroscience of moral cognition is 
that their methodologies are not ecologically valid. Ecological validity refers to how 
well a methodology resembles the real-life conditions the experimental target occurs in. 
In experiments on moral cognition, the sorts of moral judgements a participant makes 
in experimental conditions may differ from moral judgements made in everyday 
circumstances. 
One important example of a lack of ecological validity is how experiments often 
fail to emulate the context-sensitivity of moral judgements. A rigorous and replicable 
experimental design carried out in a laboratory environment can lack the deep 
contextual setting most real-world moral judgements are made in. This contextual 
richness might involve a range of factors. Moral judgements can be intensely 
emotional, especially if they are personally engaging and the real-life stakes are high. 
Also, moral judgements are embedded in a social context which involves interacting 
with others who may be connected by complex relationships. Finally, the physical and 
cultural environment a moral judgement is made in can radically alter our ethical 
conclusions, as the same action performed in two different contexts can lead to either 
condemnation or endorsement. For example, consider the actions of Hannie Schaft and 
the Oversteegen sisters, who were part of the Dutch resistance to Nazi occupation 
during World War II. They seduced and killed German soldiers and sabotaged various 
military targets. In the context of Nazi occupied Netherlands these three women are war 
heroes and their actions praised. In a different context their actions would be 
condemned. Casebeer and Churchland (2003) identify a range of ways that moral 
cognition might be context dependent, and discuss the implications this has for 
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empirical research into moral cognition. These include the inability to study certain 
kinds of genuine moral behaviours, such as moral heroism or akrasia (weakness of the 
will). They also point out that our moral judgements are organic and directed, meaning 
that in addition to being context sensitive, they involve a sense of having to act. A 
judgement about how one will actually act may be neuroscientifically very different 
from a judgement made from the experimental “armchair” (so to speak) (Casebeer and 
Churchland, 2003).  
In general, methodologies that contain more abstract moral dilemmas with 
significant imaginary components are more susceptible to problems of ecological 
validity. This is particularly true of experiments that utilise sacrificial moral dilemmas. 
In such experiment’s participants are asked to make a difficult moral choice, often 
represented by sacrificing or harming one individual to achieve a greater good (Greene 
et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2011). The most typical example of 
these dilemmas are trolley problems, including both the switch and bridge variants.11 
These experimental designs are abstract, highly hypothetical and unlike the kinds of 
moral dilemmas people encounter in real life. While such dilemmas may have a place 
in the overall analysis of moral cognition, some claim the backbone of moral cognition 
research should instead focus on more realistic everyday examples of moral judgement 
(Kahane, 2015). 
In response to the problems outlined here, a number of abstract and implausible 
sacrificial dilemmas have been dropped from experiments in favour of more 
ecologically valid alternatives. For instance, Feldmanhall et al. (2014) only utilised 15 
moral scenarios from previous literature and developed 50 more scenarios of their own 
to address this issue. They argued that many moral scenarios in the existing literature 
were too extreme and unfamiliar in nature, giving the example of “deciding whether to 
cut off a child’s arm to negotiate with a terrorist” (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). Their aim 
was to include moral dilemmas that had higher ecological validity, i.e. scenarios that 
were more familiar and relevant to the participants understanding of ethical rules. This 
move towards greater ecological validity is an important step in increasing the quality 
of research in the neuroscience of moral judgement. 
                                                 
11 Refer to chapter one for descriptions of the trolley problem and its variants. 
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From an experimental perspective, the lack of ecological validity i.e. a reductive 
approach, may have certain advantages. In a criticism of the methodologies employed 
in the neuroscience of moral cognition, Kahane (2015) points out that an abstract and 
artificial moral dilemma might allow for the isolation of the specifically moral 
components in cognitive processing. In other words, by filtering out factors that would 
be present in all kinds of context-dependent social interactions, it might be possible to 
identify certain moral responses that do not rely on mere “social convention”. There 
may well be a tension between ecological validity and attempting to isolate certain 
brain processes such as this. 
However, these potential downsides of ecological validity can be addressed in 
other ways, that do not include sacrificing it altogether. For instance, including a broad 
array of methodologies ensures that the cognitive complexity of moral judgements in 
many different contexts can be assessed, and this includes the kinds of judgements that 
have higher or lower reliance on social convention. For example, studies that examine 
automatic and social judgements can be analysed in conjunction with studies that 
examine difficult moral judgements, where the reliance on “convention” would be less. 
2.3.2 Challenge of Temporality 
In order to study moral cognition, there is a need for a consistent and replicable 
behaviour that can be repeated and recorded accurately. Hence, to study the neural 
correlates of a moral judgement, what exactly is considered as a moral judgement needs 
to be standardised and simplified. For example, in chapter one, many studies examined 
participant’s judgements in response to sacrificial dilemmas in a standardised way. In 
one such study by Greene et al. (2004) participants were given 46 seconds to read the 
scenario (depicting the moral dilemma) and give their response. Eight fMRI images 
were taken around the time of the response (four prior, one during and three following), 
capturing a 16 second window around the judgement. fMRI measures differences in 
haemodynamic flow (blood flow), which is (under a well-accepted assumption) related 
to brain activity. Greene et al. (2004) explains that the images taken following the 
response were taken because they allow for a “lag in h[a]emodynamic response”.  
Methodologies such as this are common, and only capture the brain during the 
few seconds of making a moral judgement. In many cases this limitation is 
unproblematic, as the target brain activity corresponding to a behaviour or cognition is 
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highly specified and well defined. However, moral cognition is a complex process. In 
everyday life moral judgements can be formed over the course of minutes, hours and 
even days. Operating morally can involve interacting with others socially and involve 
reflecting on moral problems in relation to past and current experiences. Thus, moral 
cognition cannot be adequately captured in the few seconds of brain activity recorded 
during neuroimaging studies, which remains a methodological necessity. Furthermore, 
regarding ecological validity, moral judgements are formed within the broader context 
of one’s moral life. However, during neuroscientific experiments, participants are often 
asked to read a scenario, merely imagine it unfolding, and respond in a standardised 
way. 
Pizarro and Bloom (2003) discuss the temporal range of moral cognition in 
relation to reason. They do so in a response article to the work of Jonathan Haidt, who 
claims that reason is only of secondary importance in moral judgements (Haidt, 2001). 
Pizarro and Bloom (2003) argue that reason is extremely important, and that its role is 
just less visible. What is highlighted is how morality cannot be reduced to the brain 
activity or behaviours surrounding a specific judgment. They argue that cognitive 
appraisal, the cognitive interpretation of a scenario, can greatly influences one’s 
intuitive judgements. For example, searching for more contextual information about a 
seemingly rude individual, can reveal that they had just lost their job, which alters your 
perception of them. Secondly, through a selective control over one’s environment, 
controlling what one is exposed to and what one learns, can ‘“educate’ the moral 
intuitions” (Pizarro and Bloom, 2003). An example given by Bloom and Pizarro (2003), 
is how one can consciously choose to take a class on racism, taught by an African 
American professor, which involves a deliberate and conscious decision to change 
one’s intuitions. In these ways, prior reasoning can inform one’s automatic judgements, 
but in a subtle way that is unobservable in neuroscience. 
Think of the topic abortion. It is true than many people have intuitions about 
abortion that guide their judgements in most circumstances when the topic comes up. 
Individuals even commonly identify as being “pro-life” or “pro-choice”. If one wanted 
to examine the neural correlates underlying moral judgements about abortion then, one 
may easily conclude that emotive and automatic processes contribute to these 
judgements. In the few seconds surrounding the judgement, neuroimaging may reveal 
that this is the case. However, one’s views on abortion are not reducible to a judgement 
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in that instance. Instead, if I were to interview participants about their views on 
abortion, they would reveal the intermittent prior reasoning lead them towards their 
intuition, which may have occurred over the course of months or even years. Perhaps 
they have even had personal experiences with abortion that have led them to their 
stance. 
I call this inability for neuroscience to capture the temporal nature of moral 
cognition, the challenge of temporality. However, it is important to remember that 
although the current neuroscience literature is inadequate in this way, the results remain 
important in contributing to our understanding. Such findings give us a general, albeit 
incomplete idea of the brain processes involved in moral cognition, in particular during 
“short-term” moral judgements. To describe the expansive temporal nature of moral 
cognition an interdisciplinary analysis is required, that involves behavioural work and 
theoretical neuroscience. Experiments in social psychology are helpful as they allow 
researchers to study moral judgements that extend further temporally, although they 
provide limited information about specific brain regions involved. 
2.3.3 Challenge of Holism 
As outlined in the previous chapter, much of the empirical work studying moral 
cognition has focused on particular brain regions and their implicated functions. This is 
necessary work. But if – as the evidence seems to indicate – these brain regions interact 
in complex ways as a network, this work only reveals half the picture. Moral cognition 
is a complex process that involves diverse brain regions, disparate in space and 
function, that build off their domain general functions to operate as a network. There is 
a general and well-accepted assumption is that there is no brain module that is solely 
responsible for moral cognition (Gillett and Franz, 2014; Greene, 2015). This indicates 
the need for a shift in approach, towards neuroscientific research that examines how the 
implicated brain regions interact. Despite this assumption, researchers continue to 
search for a specific neural correlate of moral judgement. For example, after discussing 
various models of moral cognition, Prinz (2016) raises a question for these alternatives 
compared to his “constitution model”, that was discussed earlier in the chapter:  
If moral judgements are not emotional states, what brain structure is their 
neural correlate? There is no obvious candidate suggested in the literature. 
We are left wondering where moral judgements reside, with no clear 
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proposal how to find the answer. The constitution model provides an 
answer: moral judgements reside in emotion pathways, or, more accurately, 
in the joint activation of those pathways and brain structures that represent 
actions. 
(Prinz, 2016) 
This is the type of view that needs to be countered. Why do moral judgements have to 
be reduced to a simple neural correlate? This reduction of morality may seem to 
provide a simple explanation, but it misses a great deal. Instead, moral cognition in the 
brain operates as a network, that cannot be reduced to a single circuit. Many brain 
regions and functions are implicated in moral cognition, and are all the “neural 
correlates”, thus, it makes no sense to single out a single process in order to explain 
what a moral judgement is. 
Hence, to better describe the relationship between the brain and morality, the 
study of moral cognition needs an increased emphasis on taking a neuroscientifically 
integrative perspective. This means that the focus shifts from studying the individual 
functioning of the various brain regions which comprise the moral network, towards an 
account of how they communicate to carry out their collaborative higher-level function 
of moral cognition. Many basic foundations of a neuroscientifically integrative moral 
cognition were referenced from the literature in chapter one. These included that moral 
cognition involves diverse and disparate brain regions, in both space and function, that 
build off their domain general functions and integrate at multiple levels. Furthermore, 
there has been no specific “moral module” discovered in the brain, which has led 
Greene (2015) to predict that: 
…moral cognition will continue to flourish, not as the study of a single 
cognitive organ (Hauser, 2006), and not only as the study of loosely related 
problems, but as a testing ground for more general questions about the 
nature of high-level cognition, questions about how the brain’s disparate 
cognitive components are integrated to produce (mal)adaptive behavior.  
(Greene, 2015) 
Taking an example of a higher-level theory of cognitive function, Gillett and Franz 
(2014) have proposed using the work of John Hughlings-Jackson as a framework to 
examine moral cognition in a more neuroscientifically integrative context. Hughlings-
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Jackson was an English Neurologist prominent in the late 19th century, who proposed 
important ideas about complex brain organisation (Franz and Gillett, 2011). His 
fundamental idea was that higher-brain areas elaborate the functioning of simpler brain 
areas. In other words, through successive levels of integration, simple and specific 
sensorimotor brain process are represented and then re-represented by different and 
more complex sets of brain regions, which converge on the brain’s highest centres.  
Franz and Gillett (2011) have used Hughlings-Jackson’s thesis of brain 
organisation to analyse seemingly contradictory results from recent cognitive 
neuroscience studies that examined social cognition. In such studies many well-
circumscribed and specific brain regions (such as the TPJ) have been implicated in a 
diverse array of higher functions. At first it seems paradoxical that a specific brain 
region would contribute to each of these diverse functions, however Franz and Gillett 
argue that in the light of Huhglings-Jackson’s ideas these results are more explicable.  
For example, in chapter one I introduced the meta-analysis by Decety and 
Lamm (2007), which analysed 70 functional neuroimaging studies of the right TPJ. 
They found that the right TPJ was implicated in theory of mind, empathy, attribution of 
agency and attentional shifting. In reference to the TPJ, Gillett and Franz (2011) state 
that basic sensorimotor processes are being integrated and re-represented in this brain 
region, by noting that each of these social functions require the integration of 
contextual information so the actor can respond to complex situations. Decety and 
Lamm (2007) propose an idea very similar to that of Hughlings-Jackson when 
interpreting their own results:  
…activation in the TPJ during social cognition may therefore rely on a 
lower-level computational mechanism involved in generating, testing, and 
correcting internal predictions about external sensory events. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with an evolutionary view that higher levels 
operate on previous levels of organization and should not be seen as 
independent of, or conflicting with, one another. Evolution has constructed 
layers of increasing complexity, from nonrepresentational to 
representational and meta-representational mechanisms, which need to be 
taken into account for a full understanding of human social cognition. 
(Decety and Lamm, 2007) 
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Gillett and Franz (2014) have also applied the ideas of Hughlings-Jackson theoretically 
to moral cognition more specifically. They proposed that from a high-level cognitive 
perspective, moral reasoning would involve the maximal integration of emotion and 
social cognitive structures, based on the representation and re-representation of 
environmental contingencies. Meaning that moral cognition is a complex and 
essentially integrative process. Hughlings-Jackson’s ideas are important for an 
“integrative moral cognition” because they set out a framework that shifts focus from 
individual brain regions and processes towards an account of the “moral network” as a 
whole.  
Viewing the brain at this level naturally undermines the dichotomy between 
reason and emotion. Specific brain regions, like the amygdala may primarily function 
as emotional responders, and others as purely cognitive structures, however, this 
distinction breaks down when examining each region as part of an integrated network. 
Instead emotion, feeling and reason are intertwined, and are essentially related during 
the higher processing of moral cognition.  
I call this the challenge of Holism. Empirical neuroscience alone cannot 
adequately describe the holistic nature of moral cognition. In the current neuroscientific 
literature there needs to be an emphasis on testing theories of higher-level cognition. 
This work would greatly benefit from the accompaniment of theoretical work in both 
neuroscience and philosophy. Importantly however, the technological limitations 
preventing neuroscience from describing the holistic and temporal nature of moral 
cognition may one day be overcome. It may be possible, in the near future to accurately 
study higher-level cognitive operations in the brain and the complex relationships 
between regions and processes. Then empirical neuroscience may play a greater role in 
describing the moral network as a whole. 
2.4 A Call for an Interdisciplinary and Integrative Approach to 
Moral Cognition  
In this chapter I have discussed three groups of challenges facing the neuroscience of 
moral cognition. Interspersed throughout the chapter were also criticisms of some 
predominant models of moral cognition. The first group of challenges included issues 
with the use of moral philosophical theories in the neuroscience of moral cognition. 
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Models of moral cognition have roots in such theories, however their use of moral 
philosophy is often simplistic and cursory. The second group of challenges concerned 
issues of circularity in the neuroscience of moral cognition. These arose regarding the 
conceptualising of moral cognition and moral judgement and in the interpretation of 
any findings. The third set of challenges concerned the methodological limits of the 
neuroscience of moral cognition, such as the lack of ecological validity in experiments, 
and the inadequacy of neuroscience, on its own, to fully explain the temporal and 
holistic extent of moral cognition. 
These challenges highlight the need for an integrative and interdisciplinary 
approach to moral cognition. By integrative, I refer to a neuroscientifically integrative 
approach, where moral cognition should be viewed as a complex network of brain 
regions, that operate together. From this perspective, there is increased emphasis on 
theoretical work attempting to explore the nature of higher-level brain functioning.  
By interdisciplinary, I refer to a synthesis of methods and perspectives to study 
moral cognition. In this chapter I have shown the dependence of neuroscience on 
theories in moral philosophy. In order to conceptualise moral cognition, philosophical 
presuppositions are necessary, and moral theories provide frameworks to aid in the 
analysis of ambiguous experimental data. However, much of the use of moral 
philosophy is limited, as there is an excessive focus on simplistic and traditional 
theories. Instead, neuroscientifically informed variations of such theories should be 
used. The neuroscience of moral cognition is also particularly susceptible to circularity, 
in part because of the reliance on philosophical presuppositions. Without an 
understanding of philosophical theories, it is more difficult to see and reflect on this 
circularity. Finally, because of the current methodological and technological restraints 
of experimental neuroscience, theoretical neuroscience, informed by moral philosophy 
is needed to explore the holistic and temporal nature of moral cognition. In each of 
these cases a synthesis of perspectives is required. Therefore, an interdisciplinary 
approach to moral cognition is needed, that primarily uses moral philosophy and 
theoretical neuroscience alongside empirical neuroscience. Behavioural work, such as 
in social psychology will also prove useful, as it allows one to study morally relevant 
behaviours in real-life contexts experimentally. Compared to cognitive neuroscience, 
social psychology also allows one to study moral judgements made across greater 
periods of time. 
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In the introduction I laid out a basic description of what an integrative account 
of moral cognition might include. Both features above are essential features of this 
framework. In chapter one I discussed the contributions of neuroscience to our 
understanding of the relationship between the brain and morality. In this chapter I have 
discussed where neuroscience can go wrong. In chapter three I will introduce moral 
philosophy into the discussion. In particular, the focus will be on the work of Christine 
Korsgaard and her neo-Kantian account of moral obligation. This discussion will reveal 
that in order to produce a complete understanding of the relationship between the brain 
and our moral lives, an account of the normativity of moral claims is necessary. 
Importantly, one cannot give a normative account of morality solely using 
neuroscience. This is the third and final feature of an integrative account of moral 
cognition. In chapter four I will conduct an exercise of this interdisciplinary work. This 
will involve integrating what has been learnt from empirical and theoretical 





3 Korsgaard and the Normative Question in an 
Integrative Account of Moral Cognition 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the need for an account of moral cognition that is 
integrative in character and interdisciplinary in approach. In chapter one, through a 
selective survey of the literature I showed that moral cognition is a complex process 
involving a network of brain regions disparate in space and function. These brain 
regions build off their domain general functions to carry out moral cognition, which 
involves reason, emotion and social cognition. These findings support a multi-faceted 
and integrative model. In chapter two, I outlined three challenges facing the 
neuroscientific study of moral cognition. These included challenges of circularity in 
conceptualising moral cognition and in interpreting any findings, maintaining 
ecological validity during experiments, and the inability of current neuroscientific 
techniques to adequately explore the holistic and temporal extent of human morality. 
These inadequacies show the need for an interdisciplinary and integrative account of 
moral cognition.  
In this chapter I will introduce moral philosophy into the current discussion as 
part of this interdisciplinary approach. I will set out a way of understanding moral 
decision-making that is based in Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian moral theory.12 
This account will reveal many important factors that are obscured in the contemporary 
debate in neuroscience, including a greater emphasis on the role of reason and 
reflection in moral cognition. Korsgaard’s theory of moral decision-making emphasises 
agential unity, which is consistent with the integrative nature of moral cognition. When 
choosing how to act Korsgaard claims that one reflects and endorses an inclination as a 
reason to act. This process is necessarily unifying, as any underlying processing must 
culminate in a single decision. If, as the literature suggests, the brain regions and 
processes involved in moral judgement operate as a network, then in some sense they 
are unified.  
Finally, Korsgaard’s moral theory provides the appropriate setting to discuss the 
distinction between explanatory and normative accounts of morality. The goal of 
                                                 




neuroscience in moral cognition is to produce a causal description of the brain 
processes underlying morality. However, there is another important aspect of morality, 
that of “normativity”. Normativity here concerns the sense of “ought” inherent to moral 
claims on us. Neuroscience alone can never account for normativity, which can only be 
answered from a first-person perspective. Hence, moral philosophy is needed in a 
complete and integrative account of moral cognition. In chapter four, I will develop an 
account of moral cognition by relating Korsgaard’s ideas about reason and reflection 
with modern empirical and theoretical neuroscience. 
3.1 Korsgaard’s Account of Moral Obligation 
In this section I will summarise Korsgaard’s account of moral obligation, drawing 
primarily from her 1996 book “The Sources of Normativity”. In this book, Korsgaard 
sets out to answer what she calls “the normative question”. This question concerns the 
foundations of human morality, and as such goes deeper than much of the scientific 
work in moral psychology, which merely aims to explain why humans have specific 
moral practices and beliefs and perform certain actions under the idea of morality. The 
normative question instead asks: “what justifies the claims morality makes on us[?]” 
(Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 9-10). In other words, it goes beyond a merely descriptive 
account of moral behaviours and attempts to explain the normative dimension inherent 
in moral judgements, i.e. the idea that there are certain ways that we should or should 
not act. One can attempt to explain the psychological origin of an obligation, such as “I 
ought to give to charity”, but no matter what the explanation, one can always question 
the legitimacy of this obligation. Hence, the essential question for a philosopher like 
Korsgaard is, what justifies the authority that morality holds over us in this instance? 
What is the source of normativity? 
Korsgaard (1996) examines historical examples of individual philosophers and 
their schools of thought that have attempted to answer this question, and then develops 
her own solution, based primarily in the philosophy of Kant. She presents this solution 
as a synthesis of the previous historical attempts. In short, Korsgaard argues that 
normativity arises when an individual reflects upon their thoughts and endorses a 
reason to carry out a particular action that fits with what she calls their “practical 
identity”. Such acts are autonomous, as by doing so one is “self-legislating”, i.e. setting 
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the rules according to which one will live. I will explain Koragaard’s solution in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
In the forthcoming exegesis there will be a significant focus on the moral 
psychology that underlies Korsgaard’s theory. This focus is important as it looks at the 
intersection between a normative account of morality and work in psychology and 
neuroscience. These connections will be developed in chapter four where Korsgaard’s 
ideas about rational reflection will be integrated with modern neuroscientific work. 
Before embarking on this analysis several clarifications of the overarching aim 
are required. The following is not intended to be a comprehensive or exclusive model 
of moral cognition. Several important questions will be left unresolved, and there may 
be other theories more suitable for addressing these. There are two primary reasons for 
focusing on this theory. The first is that it reveals a critical link between reason and 
reflection, that has been largely ignored in the contemporary neuroscientific literature 
and yet is highly suitable for neuroscientific study. Secondly, it indicates neurosciences 
inability to describe the normative aspects of morality. 
3.1.1 The Normative Question 
Ethical claims are normative. This means that they make claims about how we should 
act, and how we should view the actions of others (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 8). As 
Korsgaard puts it, they are a kind of “command”, though not the kind of command that 
is followed because of a threat, but rather because they are authoritative. Ethical 
concepts do not merely describe, suggest or predict how we might conduct ourselves 
through the world, but rather serve as the basis of our behaviours. Indeed, they seem to 
carry a unique power, in that their pull to act a certain way can override all other 
interests. Moral behaviour often involves personal costs, and history provides us with 
many examples of individuals enduring great hardship or pain, and even sacrificing 
their lives for moral causes. 
One such example are conscientious objectors. Archibald Baxter, the father of 
the famous New Zealand poet, James K. Baxter, was a conscientious objector during 
World War One. He was conscripted and subsequently court marshalled for refusing to 
fight. Following this, Baxter was deported to the Western Front, and due to his 
continued refusal to take up arms he was beaten repeatedly and tied up close to the 
enemy lines under heavy artillery fire. Baxter survived unscathed, yet his story remains 
56 
 
a testament to the power morality has over us. Sometimes our moral obligations can be 
difficult, sometimes even demanding our own lives, yet the obligation stands. The 
normative question posed by Korsgaard asks where does the authority of such 
obligations come from? 
Korsgaard describes three conditions that must be met to answer the normative 
question. She maintains that if a solution fails to meet any of these three conditions, it 
should be treated with scepticism. Firstly, a solution must not be suitable merely from a 
third person perspective, as the normative question is asked from a personal standpoint. 
In other words, it concerns one’s own obligations. As Korsgaard writes, it should 
“…satisf[y] us when we ourselves ask the normative question” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 
17). 
Secondly, the solution must be transparent. Knowing the evolutionary or 
psychological origins of our moral intuitions should not disrupt the claims morality 
makes on us. A good solution should be able to survive the knowledge of where our 
moral beliefs and sentiments stem from. As Korsgaard puts it: 
A normative moral theory must be one that allows us to act in the full light 
of knowledge of what morality is and why we are susceptible to its 
influences, and at the same time believe that our actions are justified and 
make sense. 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 17) 
Finally, the solution should concern itself with our personal identities. As noted, 
morality can demand great things from us. For example, Archibald Baxter was even 
willing to die because of his moral opposition to war. To account for such actions 
Korsgaard believes that morality must relate somehow to who we are, i.e. to our 
identity. Hence, a solution to the normative question: 
…must show that sometimes doing the wrong thing is as bad or worse than 
death. And for most human beings on most occasions, the only thing that 
could be as bad or worse than death is something that amounts to death – 
not being ourselves anymore. 
(Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 17-18) 
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3.1.2 Korsgaard’s solution 
To answer the normative question a theory must address us from a first-person 
perspective, be transparent, and appeal deeply to our sense of identity. Korsgaard 
(1996) provides a theory that she believes satisfies these three criteria. In introducing 
her theory, she reviews other historical solutions to the normative question. I will 
briefly summarise this review before setting out her theory, as it further clarifies the 
nature of the problem, and in certain ways mirrors the modern debate. 
Korsgaard discusses several attempts at solving the normative question that 
have arisen in response to what she calls the Modern Scientific World View 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 18). This is the basic view that the world is made of matter and is 
devoid of any larger inherent purpose. The conventional metaphysics of previous eras, 
whether that be of Ancient Greece or Christian Medieval Europe, appear more 
conducive to a form of ethical “realism”, i.e. the idea that normative ethical claims are 
based in something real. For example, one might see a justification for the claims 
morality makes on people in the authority of God.13 However, this kind of solution is 
no longer available to many people following the rise of the Modern Scientific World 
View in the seventeenth century. 
The Modern Scientific World View is an appropriate perspective to take for this 
thesis, given the central importance of neuroscience, which aims to explain 
neurological and psychological phenomena in naturalistic, rather than super-
naturalistic, terms. If one takes this perspective, it is important for any theory of moral 
concepts to meet a certain criterion of explanatory adequacy.14 
Korsgaard presents her selected historical solutions chronologically. Each 
solution, heralded by a different retinue of philosophers, were all formulated in 
response to the Modern Scientific World View which disrupted many of the previously 
conventional “sources of normativity” for moral concepts (e.g. the authority of God). 
Furthermore, she argues that each subsequent solution was formulated in response to 
                                                 
13 While this solution may appear more conducive to ethical realism, this does not mean that it is without 
its problems. The Euthyphro dilemma for example asks: Is the good so, merely because God wills it, or 
does God endorse the good, because it is already good? If the former is true then the good is arbitrary 
because God could will anything to be good, if the latter is true then God has no authority over the good, 
and the question of ‘what is good’ has not been answered. 
14 Korsgaard calls these the “practical and psychological effects of moral ideas”. Korsgaard, C. (1996) 
The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press. p. 12. 
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the previous, each attempting to remedy many of the problems faced by the 
predecessor. I will briefly summarise each of these solutions to illustrate this historical 
development, before moving to Korsgaard’s own solution. 
The first solution presented by Korsgaard is “voluntarism”, which was a theory 
first proposed by Hobbes and Pufendorf in the 17th century (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 21). 
Hobbes and Pufendorf noted that the claims moral concepts place on us are not mere 
suggestions, instead they more closely resemble commands or laws. Law, they argued, 
presuppose a lawgiver or legislator. To give laws, a legislator must have legitimate 
authority over the moral agent. According to voluntarism, it is the will of a legislator 
with legitimate authority that imbues moral concepts with their normativity. 
Furthermore, the authority of the legislator stems from their ability to impose sanctions 
on those who break laws (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 25-26). 
There are many problems with voluntarism. The most obvious resembles the 
famous Euthyphro dilemma: What determines which moral concepts the legislator wills 
as a law?15 If the legislator wills what is good because it is already good, then they are 
not the source of moral concepts, whereas if the good is only good because the 
legislator wills it, then the good is arbitrary. In response, Hobbes and Pufendorf argue 
that the legislature’s will is not actually the source of moral content, only the 
normativity behind that content. They argue that morality concerns performing 
reasonable actions that allow humans to live together socially and the legislative 
authority merely establishes the normativity of these moral claims on us by giving us 
commands. The most fatal criticism of voluntarism involves questioning whether the 
authority of the legislator is in fact legitimate. If their source of authority is deemed 
arbitrary or only partial, then their ability to establish normativity is undermined. 
The second historical solution presented by Korsgaard is the form of “moral 
realism” initially proposed by Clarke and Price (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 28). The authority 
of the legislative figure central to voluntarism can be easily called into question, and to 
avoid a similar problem, the realists aimed to establish an irreducible source of 
authority. They did this by arguing for the existence of intrinsically normative facts 
about morality, comparable to the other sorts of facts by which claims about the world 
are tested and verified. Thus, a moral concept could be considered normative if it were 
                                                 
15 See footnote 13. 
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true, and it was true if it corresponded to moral facts about the universe. On this view, 
if, for example, “murder is wrong” is an intrinsic moral fact in the world, this would 
establish its normativity, and we should never murder. A serious problem arises for 
realism when we attempt to describe what these purported moral facts are. It seems 
their existence is difficult if not impossible to prove. The philosopher J. L. Mackie’s 
famously argued that if such properties existed, they would be queer, meaning they 
would be unlike any other property in the universe (Mackie, 1990). From the standpoint 
of the modern scientific worldview, this makes their existence highly dubious. 
The third historical solution to the normative question was reflective 
endorsement. This is a descriptive term developed by Korsgaard to explain the source 
of normativity in the moral theories of Hume, Mill and Williams (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 
50-51). In each of these theories, normativity is established by appealing to an aspect of 
human nature. Because of our human nature, developed through evolution and 
enculturation, we find ourselves highly susceptible to moral claims on how we should 
act. For example, we have ethical intuitions and we can be moved by the suffering of 
others. This is often as far as the neuroscience goes, theorists such as Greene and Moll 
et al. stop at descriptions of these intuitions and their evolutionary origins. Once we 
have identified why we are moral, by describing our human nature, we can reflect on 
this nature and ask practical questions about whether it gives us a real or compelling 
reason to act. For example, we can ask, does this aspect of human nature, altruism say, 
generally encourage human flourishing, i.e. is it good for us? If altruism sufficiently 
answers our practical questions then we can endorse it, establishing its normativity. 
According to reflective endorsement the answer to “how should we act” arises from 
questioning our moral nature in practical ways and endorsing the aspects of our nature 
that we approve of.  
A key problem for reflective endorsement theories concerns which practical 
questions should be asked and by which criteria should our moral nature be judged. 
Korsgaard’s solution, as we will soon see, similarly involves a form of reflective 
endorsement, however, its methods of generating reasons to act are different. In 
reflective endorsement theories, this criterion arises from preapproved goals or 
sentiments, i.e. the reason is preconceived and applied externally. Whereas in 
Korsgaard’s theory, the act of reflective endorsement itself generates reasons 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 89). 
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Korsgaard’s own solution to the normative question is grounded in an account 
of individual autonomy, and synthesises the theories just summarised. The term 
“autonomy” originates from the Greek words “autos”, meaning “self” and “nomos”, 
meaning “law”, literally meaning to “give laws unto oneself”, i.e. to be “self-
governing”. It is also central to Kant’s moral philosophy, as Kant equates autonomous 
action with moral action (Kant, 2002). Korsgaard (1996) argues that normativity arises 
from the process of reflecting on one’s thoughts, identifying reasons to act, and by 
acting on the reasons that fit with what she calls a “practical identity”. To choose in this 
way is to be a law unto oneself. 
According to Korsgaard, voluntarism is at least partially true because 
normativity is established by the will of a legislator with legitimate authority. However, 
this legitimate legislator is oneself, not God or a despot. Realism is at least partially true 
because there are moral facts about the world, however they are not metaphysically 
queer facts that exist somewhere ‘out there’ in the universe, but rather they arise from 
facts about autonomous agency. Finally, reflective endorsement is at least partially true, 
because normativity is established by reflecting upon and endorsing one’s thoughts as 
reasons, however there is no need to appeal to particular reasons to achieve this. As 
Korsgaard (1996, p. 89) puts it “…the reflective endorsement test is not merely a way 
of justifying morality. It is morality itself.” 
There are two major psychological assumptions required for Korsgaard’s theory 
to get off the ground. The first is that humans have the ability to self-consciously reflect 
on the contents of their mind, e.g. their thoughts such as reasons and feelings. Secondly, 
the fact that humans are self-consciously reflective forces one to form a conception of 
oneself. Korsgaard calls this a “practical identity”, e.g. being a student, or a New 
Zealander, as a way of self-understanding. “Practical identity” can be understood as a 
“description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your 
life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 
101). 
Unlike most animals, which are forced to attend only to the world and have no 
ability for introspection, humans can turn their attention inwards and examine (at least 
in part) the contents of their mind. We can reflect on our desires, passions, reasons and 
intuitions. On the basis of this reflective process of the human mind, Korsgaard (1996) 
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formulates a distinction between the acting self and the thinking self. The capability of 
reflecting on one’s mental activities means that one can “stand apart”, as it were, from 
one’s own thoughts. In this way, the thinking self can exercise power over the acting 
self by understanding the reasons why one acts, actively scrutinising these reasons, and 
by choosing which reasons to endorse. This is the process of acting in a deliberative 
way when making a decision or judgement. Humans appear to be the most developed of 
the animal world in this ability, however there is some evidence to suggest that our 
close ancestors, and certain animals, may also possess a rudimentary form of decision-
making and reflection.16 
The existence of this human capacity for self-conscious reflection presents the 
agent with a problem. If one can reflect on the contents of their mind and choose to act 
in a certain way, they are now faced with the dilemma of “how should I act?” 
(Korsgaard, 1996). One cannot simply ignore this question, as to ignore the question 
would require a conscious decision. One might become distracted and forget the 
question, but this would mean failing to act. So, when faced with a moral dilemma one 
is confronted by thoughts i.e. impulses to act, desires, passions, cognitive operations, all 
of which he or she must assess and ask themselves, are these really reasons to act? 
Therefore, the reflective nature of human consciousness is the origin of the normative 
question. Without it, one would have no ability to understand the reasons why one acts 
and exercise control over their actions, and the normative question would become 
nonsensical. 
Upon reflecting on one’s thoughts and desires, the outcome can be a rejection of 
these as potential reasons to act. For example, if I ask myself “should I give to 
charity?”, I may notice that my desire to be altruistic is in fact based in a form of self-
gratification. I can then ask myself, “is this a good reason to give to charity?” and 
perhaps conclude that it is not. Perhaps there may be something else I would rather do 
with my money. The reflective nature of human consciousness then disrupts the 
automaticity of action; it holds our acting selves back by rejecting our thoughts and 
desires as potential reasons.  
                                                 
16 Hampton, R. R. (2001) 'Rhesus monkeys know when they remember', Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 98(9), pp. 5359-5362. In this study, it was demonstrated that Rhesus monkeys had 
some insight into their memories. In other words, they were self-aware to an extent, about what 
information they could recall and which they could not. 
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For Korsgaard (1996) the solution to the normative question is implicit in the 
stating of the problem. As we have seen, reflecting on the contents of one’s mind before 
acting can lead to the rejection of one’s thoughts as potential reasons, and this is a 
problem. However, if some thoughts can be rejected then some may be endorsed. For 
Korsgaard “‘reason’ means reflective success” i.e. a desire, passion, feeling or 
cognitive operation that has survived one’s introspective scrutiny and justifies a way of 
acting (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 97). To have a reason is to self-legislate, i.e. it is to answer 
the question of how we should act, and ascribe normativity to these claims on us. Such 
reasons are authoritative because they are our own and have emerged through 
successful reflection. Compare this to reasons that are hoisted onto us and that we do 
not endorse, which are only authoritative if they can be enforced. Even then, we can 
rebel. Finally, such reasons are a source of obligation, but they do not compel us to act. 
In deciding to do something one leaves open the possibility of doing otherwise. For 
example, if I need to get out of bed because I have work, I have a good reason to get up, 
but I do not have to. This is very different from being physically and forcefully dragged 
out of bed. In the moral sphere, if I have a good reason to donate to charity, I have an 
obligation as well, however I am not compelled to do so. 
The reflective nature of human consciousness forces one to form a conception 
of oneself. And by reflecting on one’s thoughts, i.e. deliberating, one endorses reasons 
by standing back from one’s inclinations and choosing which to act on. This choice 
arises from oneself, and thus is contingent on one’s self-understanding. As Korsgaard 
puts it: 
When you deliberate, it is if there were something over and above all of 
your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to 
act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your 
actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 100) 
In other words, the assessment of reasons arises from Korsgaard’s second 
psychological assumption: that humans conceive themselves in terms of a “practical 
identity”. Importantly, this “practical identity” is defined as a valuation of oneself and 
actions worth undertaking (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 101). Bundled into practical identities 
are reasons and obligations. For instance, part of my practical identity is that I am a 
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medical student, and there are certain obligations that arise from this. For example, I 
need to be careful not to discuss confidential health information in public. I have an 
obligation to learn, to become a competent doctor, so I must study hard. Many other 
obligations arise from other facets of my practical identity. Being a friend gives me 
reason to “check-in” with certain people. Being a New Zealander gives me reason to 
vote every three years. And so on and so forth. Hence, one’s “practical identity” is the 
criterion by which one judges a thought as a “reason” to act. 
An important aside is that practical identities are not necessarily separate, well-
circumscribed or even well-conceived. Most individuals have a conception of 
themselves that more closely resembles a heterogenous mass, with facets of varying 
importance, which they use to anchor themselves to others and the world. Korsgaard 
(1996, p. 101) says: “Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person 
there will be a jumble of such conceptions”. 
To illustrate Korsgaard’s theory more fully, consider the following scenario: A 
medical student and her classmates are tasked with completing an assignment worth a 
substantial portion of their grade. The night before the due date, she observes two of her 
classmates copying each other’s work. Plagiarising this assignment is a serious offence 
as it was designed to assess the competence of medical students in an essential skill for 
future clinical work. The medical student is now faced with a decision: she could either 
“turn a blind eye”, confront her classmates about the nature of their actions, or report 
their plagiarism to the Dean of the medical school. On Korsgaard’s analysis, the 
medical student acts by standing back and examining her thoughts, including her 
desires, intuitions, passions and any internal arguments. Through this process she can 
think through the various options and the implications of each, and then decide which 
of the potential reasons for acting to endorse. In the act of endorsement, she determines 
herself according to that reason. She may decide that a sense of loyalty or comradeship 
to her classmates is paramount, over and against her duty as a young professional. 
Alternatively, she may consider her responsibilities as a young professional and a 
trainee doctor, which includes upholding the integrity and standards of the profession. 
This will lead her to report the cheating. The option she takes then alters her “practical 
identity” according to the reasoning involved – it effects how she thinks through 
relevantly similarly situations in the future – and so defines who she is and how she 
values her life. 
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In the previous section, taking the example of Archibald Baxter, we examined 
Korsgaard’s condition that any solution to the normative question must appeal deeply 
to one’s identity (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 17-18). If one does not carry out what they 
know they are morally obligated to do, it is corrosive to their sense of identity. For 
example, say the medical student, knowing that she has an obligation to report her 
classmate’s plagiarism because she is a young professional, fails to do so. Or later in 
her career, suppose she spreads confidential information about a patient, and knows that 
this contradicts her moral obligations as a doctor. In so far as she actually cares and 
values herself as a good doctor, these failures will undermine her sense of self-worth. 
The self-contradiction will in turn destabilise any further reflections involving this 
aspect of her identity.  
There is an obvious problem that arises by grounding moral obligation in 
individual practical identities. Moral obligations are meant to have a degree of 
universality, i.e. they cannot be dependent on what a person happens to be concerned 
about or find valuable. Murder, for example, is generally considered wrong for 
everyone, not simply wrong for those people who identify themselves as opposed to 
murder. This is a problem because some practical identities are completely arbitrary, 
inconsequential or even highly morally questionable. For example, a Viking 1200 years 
ago, reflecting on their identity, would have found reasons to loot, pillage and die in 
battle. These actions would have been quite consistent with their practical identity. 
Indeed, there is a popular image of an old distraught Viking who laments about not 
having died in their youth in a foreign land with sword in hand. Dying at an old age 
may be unstable to the Vikings identity. So, someone could act in ways consistent with 
their practical identity and yet be regarded as immoral or perhaps evil from the 
standpoint of others. 
To overcome this challenge Korsgaard argues that rational reflection should 
lead us to a more fundamental identity, which she calls the identity of being human, or 
“the moral identity” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 129). Though one can elect to change or 
reject aspects of one’s identity, one cannot reject the need for identity altogether. 
Humans can self-consciously reflect on the contents of their minds, which forces them 
to have a conception of themselves in terms of a practical identity. This method of self-
understanding is ubiquitous in humanity, so one can group all of humanity together by 
citing a need to form a practical identity. Korsgaard relates this to the universality 
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inherent in reasons. When something exists as a reason for one individual, it exists as a 
reason for another in a similar set of circumstances. For example, if it is wrong for one 
person to kill in particular circumstances, then the same applies to another person in the 
same circumstances. Therefore, when one reflects and endorses reasons in accordance 
with one’s identity it is not a purely individualistic exercise. Humans obligate and make 
claims on each other based on shared reasons. Korsgaard argues that by appealing to 
this identity as a moral agent or an identification with humanity, one becomes 
conscious of certain obligations that are universal. This is similar to Kant’s third 
conception of his categorical imperative, where he states that one should act as a 
member of the kingdom of ends (Kant, 2002). In identifying with humanity, one is 
conscious of an obligation to treat people as ends in themselves as opposed to means to 
ends (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 143). 
Finally, the reliance of Korsgaard’s theory on practical identity does not 
predispose it to critiques by “no-self” theories. Korsgaard does not propose a 
metaphysical model of the self, meaning that there is a thing (a self) that exists over and 
above one’s mind and body. Instead she argues for the practical necessity of forming an 
identity (Korsgaard, 1989), and thus, avoids full-scale philosophical challenges of 
identity, like those made by the philosopher Derek Parfit. Parfit (1984) argues against 
the existence of a metaphysical self, stating that persons only consist of their:  
…brain and body, and the thinking of his thoughts, and the doing of his 
deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and mental events. 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 275) 
In Parfit’s account, unity and integrity of the agent are still important, however, this can 
be achieved with a sense of psychological and physical connectedness with one’s past 
selves (Parfit, 1984, pp. 301-302). By arguing for the practical necessity of an identity 
Korsgaard avoids this criticism. She argues that a unity of self is necessary for one to 
act in a coherent way. One may have many conflicting desires and thoughts, but one 
must decide upon a single way of acting and this process is unifying. She states: “your 
identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and actions” (Korsgaard, 
2009). Forming an identity is also necessary for an agent to act coherently across time. 
For example, long term goals only make sense from the point of an agent that identifies 
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with their future and past selves (Korsgaard, 1989). Therefore, Korsgaard’s practical 
conception of identity avoids potential criticisms from “no-self” theories. 
To summarise Korsgaard’s moral philosophy so far: If one reflects on the 
contents of one’s mind, one encounter thoughts (desires, passions and more cognitive 
operations) as possible reasons to act. One can either reject or endorse these mental 
contents as reasons and use them to self-legislate. By willing laws unto oneself, one 
creates reasons to act. The generation of reasons through reflective success is conducted 
by appealing to one’s “practical identity”. It is in this process of self-legislating, by 
reflecting and endorsing a reason in accordance with your identity which imbues 
certain ethical concepts with normativity (Korsgaard, 1996). In the following section I 
will discuss how these ideas relate to the neuroscience of moral cognition. 
3.2 Potential Contributions of Korsgaard’s Moral Philosophy 
to Moral Cognition 
In this chapter so far, I have outlined Korsgaard’s account of moral obligation. This 
account is her answer to the normative question: the question of where the sense of 
“ought”, inherent in all moral claims, comes from. In this section I will further 
elaborate on how Korsgaard’s theory might advance the neuroscientific study of moral 
cognition.  
In a recent review of the literature of moral cognition (focusing on the use of 
EGG) from a bioethical perspective, Wagner et al. (2017) expressed the need for more 
theoretical work, specifically to examine the relationship between the field’s 
philosophical and neuroscientific facets. Korsgaard’s account of moral obligation, 
centred on the integrating role of reason in human agency, will contribute to this kind 
of theoretical work in multiple ways: Firstly, Korsgaard’s theory of moral decision-
making is broadly consistent with the nature of an integrated account of moral 
cognition. Her theory emphasises agential unity, which is the integration of multiple 
underlying processes to achieve a singular goal or carry out a single directed operation. 
Korsgaard claims that one reflects and endorses an inclination as a reason to act. This 
process is necessarily unifying, as any underlying processing must culminate in a single 
directed decision. The literature suggests that the brain regions and processes involved 
in moral cognition operate as a network and are thus in some sense unified. Secondly, 
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Korsgaard’s theory reveals a critical link between reason and reflection, that has been 
largely ignored in the contemporary neuroscientific literature, and yet is highly suitable 
for neuroscientific study. Thirdly, by setting out three conditions that must be met to 
answer the normative question, Korsgaard’s theory indicates inability of neuroscience 
to describe the normative aspects of morality. In the next section I will demonstrate 
why exactly neuroscience cannot answer the normative question, which demonstrates 
why moral philosophy is required alongside neuroscience to describe the relationship 
between morality and the brain. 
As Korsgaard’s theory primarily attempts to give a compelling account of the 
normative aspects of morality, grounded with psychology, and is broadly consistent 
with an integrated account of morality, it is an ideal candidate for an ‘off-the-shelf’ 
theory in moral philosophy, to utilise in the formulation of an integrated account of 
moral cognition. 
3.2.1 The Normative Question and the Neuroscientific Study of Moral 
Cognition 
In the light of Korsgaard’s three conditions for answering the normative question,17 it is 
worth considering how it might be answered by neuroscience, and how it compares to 
the questions neuroscientists typically try to answer. One difference appears to be that 
while philosophers like Korsgaard are looking to justify the normativity inherent in 
moral claims, neuroscientists are typically seeking a descriptive account of human 
moral cognition. They use the scientific language of psychology, cognitive 
neuroscience and evolutionary biology to present a “detached” view of the relevant 
behaviour. Moreover, this detached view usually takes the form of a causal story, in the 
same way that a physicist might explain why an apple fell from a tree. In this respect, 
they are not actually attempting to answer the normative question at all, because they 
are not meeting Korsgaard’s first criteria. One might say that whereas the neuroscientist 
attempts to explain why we are moral, the philosopher is attempting to say why we 
should be moral. 
                                                 
17 To summarise, a theory must address us from a first-person perspective, be transparent, and appeal 
deeply to our sense of identity. Korsgaard, C. (1996) The sources of normativity. Cambridge University 
Press. pp. 17-18 
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To further explore this comparison, let us consider how two “working 
definitions” of “Moral Cognition” currently being used in the neuroscientific study of 
moral judgement might apply to the normative question. As explained in chapter two, 
definitions such as these are methodologically necessary to define the borders of the 
empirical search for the diverse cognitive faculties that should be regarded as part of 
human moral cognition. An example is Moll et al.’s (2008), which is focussed on the 
motivational factors underpinning social behaviour. According to this definition, if the 
motivation behind an action or decision was that of “genuine altruism” then it was 
relevant to moral cognition, and this is what distinguished it from other kinds of social 
behaviour. Another example is Greene’s definition, which focusses on the evolutionary 
function of specific kinds of behaviours. According to Greene (2014), moral cognition 
is concerned with studying psychological adaptations that functioned to enhance group 
co-operation in otherwise selfish individuals. 
Moll et al. and Greene represent typical approaches in the modern 
neuroscientific study of moral cognition, as most existing attempts at defining moral 
cognition in neuroscience focus on explaining either the specific evolutionary and 
developmental origin of human moral thinking (adaptations to enhance co-operation 
according to Greene (2014)) or the specific psychological origin of human moral 
thinking (genuine altruism according to Moll et al. (2008)). In other words, the focus is 
on describing the instantiation and features of moral cognition. Such descriptions might 
enable us to identify patterns of thinking and behaviour, casual relationships behind 
these patterns, the brain processes underlying these behaviours and more fundamentally 
their evolutionary or developmental origin. While there is value in this work in 
explaining the processes behind human moral thinking, it is important to recognise how 
it is not addressing the normative question. This becomes clear when we apply 
Korsgaard’s three conditions to Greene and Moll et al.’s definitions. To illustrate, 
suppose I were to ask myself “why should I give to charity?”, as a personal question 
(the first criteria). If one looks to Moll et al. (2008) for an answer it might be this: “I 
give to charity because I am motivated by a deeply ingrained sense of genuine 
altruism”. From a personal standpoint, this answer fails to adequately address the 
normative question. By reflecting on such a motivation and scrutinising it, one realises 
that it is not inherently motivating, and it can easily be overridden by a different 
motivation. Moll et al.’s definition does not address this potential moral conflict. 
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According to Korsgaard only through reflection can one tell whether their altruistic 
motivation is well placed. 
If I look to Greene’s definition for an answer, I find something like this: 
“because this behaviour arises from the psychological adaptation of altruism that 
enhanced group co-operation in my ancestors, which through the evolutionary process 
of natural selection became a deeply ingrained psychological factor” (Greene, 2014). It 
may be that I have a sense of altruism because it helped my ancestors survive and 
reproduce, but now that I can reflect, that does not mean that in this instance I ought to 
give to charity. While these definitions attempt to explain the causality behind morality, 
they do not provide an explanation of the authority of moral claims. Merely appealing 
to these answers alone would not justify acting on any moral duty from a personal 
standpoint. Many neuroscientists are aware of the difficultly applying neuroscientific 
theory to moral philosophy. For example, Greene suggests a further answer to the 
normative question. He does this by admitting that we may begin to question whether 
we are truly beholden to our evolutionarily derived moral instincts, and that our moral 
inclinations may not survive this knowledge (Greene, 2014, p. 25). He is particularly 
aware that having a bias and preference towards your in-group is a perfectly viable 
psychological adaptation that would enhance in-group co-operation, however it may 
also be a source of racism and xenophobia. In “Moral Tribes”, Greene (2014) illustrates 
this dichotomy between an explanatory moral theory and a normative moral theory, by 
showing how human morality can extend beyond its evolutionary origins: 
…we can take morality in new directions that nature never ‘intended’. We 
can, for example, donate money to faraway strangers without expecting 
anything in return. From a biological point of view, this is just a backfiring 
glitch, much like the invention of birth control. But from our point of view, 
as moral beings who can kick away the evolutionary ladder, it may be 
exactly what we want. Morality is more than what it evolved to be. 
(Greene, 2014, p. 25) 
Evolution might explain why people are unreflectively moral, but it does not justify the 
claims morality makes on us, in a way that is likely to survive personal reflection. 
Interestingly, Korsgaard uses a similar example to show how a particular moral theory 
could have sufficient explanatory adequacy (illustrating where human morality comes 
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from) but lack normative adequacy (a solution to the normative question) (Korsgaard, 
1996, pp. 14-15). 
Greene is a utilitarian, and he arrives at this normative conclusion through a 
philosophical analysis alongside a review of the neuroscience. The ethical beliefs of 
Korsgaard, a neo-Kantian and Greene, are very different, yet Greene agrees with 
Korsgaard to the extent that he recognises that morality must extend beyond any 
neuroscientific or psychological description of its instantiation. Korsgaard has 
constructed her own modern solution to the normative question, and Greene has done 
something very similar by giving his answer to “how shall we act?” (Greene, 2014). 
Greene appeals to the standard utilitarian principles, which are vulnerable to the 
standard objections. To properly account for moral cognition, it is necessary to go 
beyond mere explanations of why we feel we have specific moral obligations and 
explain whether and why we are obligated at all, knowing the origins of those feelings. 
The fundamental distinction between the explanatory and the normative is that 
the former, broadly using neuroscience, describes morality from a causal standpoint, 
whereas the latter, describes morality from a personal agential standpoint. Despite this 
distinction between scientific and philosophical accounts of morality, there are some 
important points of intersection. It is undeniable that humans can be deeply moved by a 
sense of moral “ought”. So, at a basic level neuroscience-based models of moral 
cognition should be able to account for the fact that ethical concepts appear normative 
to us. Conversely, a philosophical theory answering the normative question that did not 
fit with current neuroscience would for that reason be suspect.  
If one wants to understand the relationship between the brain and our moral 
lives, and neglects an account of normativity, one is missing something integral to 
human moral functioning. If one wants to explain moral cognition in its entirety, 
relying on only a normative or an explanatory model will render an incomplete picture. 
Thus, an interdisciplinary and integrative account of moral cognition requires both 
normative and explanatory aspects. 
3.2.2 Importance of Reason and Reflection in Moral Cognition 
In chapter two I described both the modern and historically predominant models of 
moral cognition. In the 1970’s, rationalist models like those proposed by Kohlberg 
(1971) were popular. These drew on the Kantian philosophical tradition. The important 
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characteristic in Kohlberg’s definition of morality is the formal character of moral 
judgements as opposed to their contents. On this view, the formation of a moral 
judgement is more important than the moral prescription. In this respect Kohlberg’s 
model resembles Korsgaard’s theory, which identifies the formal character of reasons 
as the basis of moral obligation. Kohlberg states: 
Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, preemptiveness, etc. are the 
formal characteristics of a moral judgment. These are best seen in the 
reasons given for a moral judgment, a moral reason being one which has 
these properties. But we claim that the formal definition of morality only 
works when we recognize that there are developmental levels of moral 
judgment which increasingly approximates the philosopher's moral form. 
This recognition shows us (a) that there are formal criteria which make 
judgments moral, (b) that these are only fully met by the most mature stage 
of moral judgment, so that (c) our mature stages of judgment are more 
moral (in the formalist sense, more morally adequate) than less mature 
stages. 
(Kohlberg, 1971, p. 215) 
In Kohlberg’s account of morality, in the fullest form of human moral development 
reasons have the above four features (Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, 
preemptiveness), in other words reasons must be what we could characterise as 
“objective”. 
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s Kohlberg’s rationalist theories were widely 
rejected in the mainstream in developmental and moral psychology, on account of their 
excessive focus on “objective reasoning”, and corresponding neglect of emotions and 
desires in forming moral judgements. As an alternative, Haidt developed his “social 
intuitionist” model of moral judgement, where a moral judgement is formed by intuitive 
and emotional reactions, with reasons being sought to justify the judgement afterwards 
(Haidt, 2001). This model presents an important challenge for Korsgaard’s moral 
philosophy, which I will discuss in detail later in the chapter. 
Sentimentalist models of moral cognition like Haidt’s became increasingly 
popular in the twenty-first century. Consequently, the role of reason and reflection has 
been largely side-lined in research into moral cognition, with much of the focus being 
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placed on emotion. To a certain extent this may be appropriate. However, the increased 
attention on automatic and intuitive judgements has left the reasoning and reflecting 
aspects of moral judgement underdeveloped. Moreover, those models do involve 
reasoning, like the “dual-process” model proposed by Greene (2016), still feature 
fundamentally sentimentalist assumptions. This is because the debate about the 
relationship between reason and emotion, ongoing in Haidt and Greene’s work, 
maintains what seems is a false dichotomy between the two. As I will discuss in the 
next chapter, and what was briefly mentioned concerning an integrative neuroscience in 
chapter two, there are compelling reasons to think that reason and emotion are not 
unrelated and opposing forces, as the various proponents in this debate generally 
assume. Haidt and Greene both hold that generally moral judgement are either made 
through reasoning, or through emotive intuitions, but not both. The primary difference 
between these two theorists is that Greene thinks sometimes, given certain contexts and 
conditions reason can be employed in moral judgements, whereas Haidt argues for the 
primacy of emotion in all contexts (Greene, 2016; Haidt, 2001). 
Korsgaard’s theory centres on an account of reason and reflection (Korsgaard, 
1996). This focus is contrary to the current trends in the literature, and thus her theory 
can contribute to the development of a neglected areas in the study of moral cognition. 
Furthermore, Korsgaard’s view of practical reasoning further highlights the dubious 
dichotomy between reason and emotion, which emerges from the view of moral 
cognition as a network. According to her theory emotions, feelings, passions, empathy, 
sympathy can all be potential “reasons” to act, if they are endorsed through reflection. 
Through an analysis of the literature we saw in chapter one, that moral cognition is 
multi-faceted, involving emotion, reason and social-cognition, which is reflected by 
Korsgaard’s moral philosophy. 
3.2.3 Response to Challenges Facing Korsgaard’s Psychological 
Assumption of Self-Conscious Reflection 
In chapter four I will compare Korsgaard’s theory with findings from neuroscience. 
Beforehand it is necessary to critically examine the key psychological propositions 
involved in her theory, from the standpoint of moral psychology. Moral psychology is 
the study of human behaviour and thought in moral contexts. It is necessarily 
interdisciplinary, integrating psychology, neuroscience and moral philosophy. 
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As I discussed earlier in this chapter, there are two major psychological 
assumptions that are an essential grounding for Korsgaard’s theory (Korsgaard, 1996). 
The first is that humans have the capability of self-conscious reflection. This is the idea 
that humans can reflect on (at least part of) the contents of their minds. The second 
assumption is that this self-conscious reflection forces one to form a conception of 
oneself, and this process of self-understanding involves notions of value and purpose 
(i.e. a self-description that Korsgaard refers to as a “practical identity”). Korsgaard’s 
reliance on psychological assumptions illustrates the inherent interdisciplinarity of 
moral cognition. While she gives a normative account of morality, psychology and 
neuroscience are still essential. This is because Korsgaard’s account of reason and 
reflection emerge from two psychological facts and are thus beholden to neuroscience. 
If for example, reason and reflection are shown to be subservient to emotion during 
moral judgements, this would undermine her theory. Thus, a philosophically informed 
neuroscience will also set reasonable limits to any normative account of morality. 
Both of Korsgaard’s assumptions are uncontroversial on the surface. It is 
obvious that people identify with certain groups, which provides one with a sense of 
value and purpose. Ask anyone you meet to describe who they are, and they will 
describe themselves in various ways that constitute a practical identity. Someone may 
define themselves in terms of their nationality, religion or lack thereof, their gender and 
their profession. As discussed earlier, Korsgaard (1996, p. 101) describes one’s 
personal identity as a “jumble”, a complex group of conceptions, which range in 
importance to the individual. One may not reveal themselves so directly, but practical 
identities are an essential way of understanding oneself as an agent. Secondly, it is 
obvious that humans can reflect on the contents of their minds, allowing one to 
understand one’s reasons for acting. Humans are not completely blind to their own 
inner workings, and more often than not can give their reasons for acting in various 
ways. 
As a reader, you can do this now by simply reflecting on your feelings or 
thoughts about my arguments so far. Introspection is uncontroversial; however, many 
of one’s thoughts and reasons can be obscured. Individuals can be oblivious of their 
desires and biases that lead them to act, and upon reflection one may be uncertain why 
one acted a given way at all.  
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To test the role of reason in establishing moral judgements the social 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001) formulated an experiment called the “dumfounding 
scenario”. Based on this experiment Haidt developed the “social intuitionist model” of 
moral judgement in his famous article “the emotional dog and its rational tail” (Haidt, 
2001). The test involves presenting a scenario that includes various cultural taboos to a 
participant and asks them to make a judgement about the rightness or wrongness of the 
actions depicted. Haidt’s article begins by giving an example of such a scenario: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France 
on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a 
cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if 
they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for 
each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a 
condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide 
not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes 
them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it 
OK for them to make love? 
(Haidt, 2001, p. 814) 
Haidt (2001) discusses how most participants say what was depicted was wrong, and 
then they are asked to give reasons. However, as you can see in the example, cunningly 
built into the scenario are adequate responses to the common reasons given by most 
participants. For example, they point out the potential problems with inbreeding, and 
the harm that may be caused. However, in the scenario the siblings used contraception 
and it explicitly states that no one was harmed. Finally, Haidt (2001, p. 814) says, 
participants say something like ‘“I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s 
wrong.”’ 
If it were shown that reflection had little to no effect on one’s reasoning or 
moral judgements, then this would be a serious problem for Korsgaard’s theory. The 
dumfounding scenario however was employed by Haidt to explicitly critique rationalist 
models of moral judgement, by claiming that reasoning is post-hoc and has little effect 
on the outcomes of moral judgements. In the excerpt above, participants seemingly 
searched for reasons when the interviewer inquired after them. So, the initial judgment 
appears pre-reflective. The interviewer then proceeded to take the participant through a 
guided reflection, and the reasons employed by participants were always met with 
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counter-reasons. Despite all the arguments against any “reason” the participant could 
wield to claim the actions presented were wrong, their initial judgement was conserved. 
Haidt concludes by presenting his “social intuitionist model of moral judgment” where 
primarily only initial intuitions influence judgments. Importantly Haidt (2001) 
acknowledges that occasionally private reflection and observing a peers reasoning may 
alter or inform one’s judgements, but he argues this is much rarer than rationalist 
theories like Kohlberg claim. 
Haidt’s conclusion is not simply problematic for Korsgaard’s theory, but for any 
theory of autonomy, as it entails that one has little control over one’s judgements. 
However, it is not clear that Haidt’s observations justify his conclusions. Common 
sense seems to show that they do not. Consider your own experience and intuitions 
concerning reflection. Can you recall a moment recently where facing a difficult 
decision you had an urge to act one way, but then made yourself reflect which changed 
your mind? Just over a year ago I became vegetarian. Beforehand, I remember 
operating off an intuitive judgement that consuming meat was permissible, and despite 
regularly encountering good reasons to be vegetarian, they barely affected me. In the 
months before making the change I became internally hostile to the idea of 
vegetarianism, and occasionally I would find myself silently condemning vegans and 
vegetarians who I saw as “preachy” and militant. Finally, over the course of a week or 
so, upon reflecting again on the arguments for vegetarianism I made the lifestyle 
change. So, through the process of rational reflection, I was forced to acknowledge an 
imperative not to eat meat. Having made this decision, it is now the case that continuing 
to eat meat would be at odds with this identity. In retrospect I understand that the 
couple months of increased hostility towards vegetarianism was a manifestation of the 
internal struggle between my identity and my failing actions.  
There are reasons to doubt Haidt’s methodology. The kinds of dilemmas he 
employs are highly specific, as they concern moral judgements about “purity”, such as 
an intrinsic condemnation of incest. Purity judgements are absolute judgements against 
certain acts deemed profane, disgusting and abhorrent. Perhaps human reflection is 
weakest against intuitive judgements of this kind, because they are more deeply 
ingrained into the human psyche (and perhaps this is an evolutionary reason). However, 
this does not mean that reflection cannot be a powerful tool to change many other kinds 
of judgements, such as harm judgements. Take arguments for vegetarianism as an 
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example. Even if a person is unconvinced by the arguments for vegetarianism, one 
would nevertheless expect them to give some reason for their continued consumption of 
meat (this could even be that “it tastes good and I value my happiness over animals”). 
This raises questions about the generalisability of Haidt’s findings (Haidt, 2001), which 
may only apply to certain kinds of purity judgements, which are often steeped in 
culture.  
Finally, there is experimental counter-evidence which shows that reflection does 
influence one’s reasoning and moral judgements. A study by Paxton et al. (2012) 
showed just this, using Haidt’s own “dumfounding scenario” to show that reflection 
does alter how one responds to reasons and makes judgements. Their experiment had 
two independent (manipulated) variables, the first was argument strength and the 
second was temporal duration before a judgement. Participants were given Haidt’s own 
“Julie and Mark incestuous relationship” vignette that I introduced earlier in this 
section. Following this, half of the participants were presented with a “Strong 
argument” for why Julie and Mark’s actions were permissible, designed to be as 
persuasive as possible, and the other half were given a “Weak argument” for why their 
actions were permissible, which was designed to be poorly persuasive. Following this, 
half the participants from each group were asked to judge the permissibility of Julie and 
Mark’s actions immediately, while the other half were given an additional two minutes 
to think while the argument remained on the screen. Permissibility scores, the “moral 
acceptability rating” were rated on a scale of 1-7, with 7 being the most morally 
acceptable and 1 being the least. When reflection was not encouraged (i.e. the 
judgement was made immediately after being exposed to the arguments) argument 
strength had no effect on the permissibility rating given by participants, and in both 
cases (weak and strong argument groups) the mean moral acceptability rating was rated 
at around 3. However, when reflection was encouraged, participants exposed to a strong 
argument rated the moral acceptability as much higher than the group exposed to a 
weak argument (with a mean rating of around 4 vs. 2 respectively). This shows that 
reflection not only altered the judgements of the participants, but it was necessary for 
argument strength i.e. reasons to influence the judgement (Paxton et al., 2012). 
It seems then that Korsgaard’s psychological assumptions concerning the 
human ability to self-consciously reflect to endorse reasons and her appeal to practical 
identity, can withstand deeper psychological and philosophical scrutiny. I have not 
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addressed all potential criticisms of Korsgaard’s moral philosophy, but I have shown 
that it can survive these common attempts at refutation. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this Chapter I presented Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian theory of moral obligation, which 
attempts to answer the “normative question” (Korsgaard, 1996). I showed that 
explanatory accounts of morality, typical in neuroscience and psychology, cannot 
answer the normative question. Hence, an integrative account of moral cognition, with 
the goal of adequately explaining the relationship between the brain and morality, 
requires both neuroscience and moral philosophy to explain both explanatory and 
normative accounts. I also discussed how Korsgaard’s moral philosophy might benefit 
the field of moral cognition. In accordance with a need to carry out an interdisciplinary 
analysis within moral cognition and to further develop theoretical work in the field, 
aspects of Korsgaard’s theory will be used. In particular, the emphasis on reason and 
reflection which have recently seen limited focus in moral cognition. Finally, from a 
neuroscientific standpoint, Korgaard’s moral philosophy resonates with much of the 
evidence in the literature and can withstand critiques of identity from philosophers like 
Parfit and critiques of reflection from psychologists like Haidt. 
So far in this thesis I have discussed the need for an interdisciplinary and 
integrative account of moral cognition and have done so in unidirectional way. I have 
used moral philosophy to critique neuroscience, to show the need for the three features 
of an “integrative account”. In the next chapter I will change directions and attempt to 
integrate the aspects of Korsgaard’s moral theory focused on reason and reflection with 
other perspectives in the neuroscience. I will introduce neuroscientific perspectives 
from the literature reviewed in chapter one and the work of the neurologist Antonio 
Damasio to critique her theory. This process is an exercise in interdisciplinarity, the 
goal of which is to modify Korsgaard’s theory so that it better reflects the neuroscience. 
This process of modification and refinement will act as the interdisciplinary work in 




4 The Framework of an Integrative Account of Moral 
Cognition 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to discuss the need for an account of moral 
cognition that is integrative in its character and interdisciplinary in its approach. In 
chapter one, through a select review of the literature, I laid out the background of the 
neuroscience of moral cognition. The empirical evidence suggests that moral cognition 
involves diverse brain regions, disparate in space and function. These regions operate 
as a network by building off their respective domain general functions. In chapter two I 
discussed the challenges facing the neuroscience of moral cognition. These challenges 
indicate the inadequacy of neuroscience alone in describing the relationship between 
the brain and morality, and the need for an interdisciplinary analysis, that includes 
social psychology and empirical neuroscience, alongside theoretical neuroscience and 
moral philosophy. A key part of the interdisciplinary work should be developing an 
account of how brain processes are integrated in moral cognition. Such a focus requires 
the use of theories of higher-level cognition. 
In chapter three I began this interdisciplinary analysis by introducing the work 
of Christine Korsgaard (1996) as a philosophical framework through which to consider 
moral cognition. The chapter began by introducing what Korsgaard describes as “the 
normative question”, i.e. the question of why we “ought” to follow the requirements of 
morality. An answer to this question is necessary to properly explain morality. The 
other component, an explanatory account of morality, focuses on a casual description of 
morality, typical to neuroscience and psychology. In chapter three, I showed that 
explanatory accounts of morality could not answer the normative question. Hence, an 
integrated account of moral cognition addresses both explanatory and normative 
questions. 
In chapter three I also responded to a potential criticism of Korsgaard’s theory. 
This criticism targeted her psychological assumption that humans are self-consciously 
and rationally reflective, and that it is this reflection that determines our moral 
judgements. I showed that rational reflection likely does play an important role in our 
moral lives, and that these faculties are often deemphasised in the current 
neuroscientific literature of moral judgement. 
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The framework described in this thesis has been called an integrative account of 
moral cognition. In the introduction I laid out its features, which are all “integrative” in 
some sense:  
1. Neuroscientifically integrated: Moral Cognition involves integrative brain 
processes and as such should be described using theories of higher-level 
cognition. 
2. Integrated across disciplines (as in “inter-disciplinary”): From a 
methodological standpoint any comprehensive description of moral 
cognition ought to refer to philosophy, neuroscience and psychology and (at 
least) integrate their respective methods, generating a synthesis of 
perspectives. 
3. Integrated explanatory and normative accounts of morality: To form a 
complete account of moral cognition, both explanatory and normative 
descriptions are required. 
So far, in this thesis I have travelled down a single road, in discussing the need for an 
integrative and interdisciplinary account of moral cognition. This discussion has 
centred around demonstrating the need for the three features above, so that one can 
describe the relationship between the brain and morality. Now, I will change directions, 
and carry out the interdisciplinary analysis. So far, I have largely used moral 
philosophy to critically analyse neuroscience, now is the time for some reciprocation.  
In this chapter I will formulate a model of moral cognition based on this 
“integrative account”. This framework will be developed by critically analysing 
Korsgaard’s theory from a neuroscientific perspective, primarily using the work of 
Antonio Damasio and key cognitive neuroscience studies that featured in chapter one.18 
There are two important issues that this framework attempts to resolve. The first issue 
is the apparent distinction between automatic and animalistic (i.e. non-autonomous) 
ways of “acting”, and highly deliberative and reflective acting. In Korsgaard’s theory, 
this appears to be a hard distinction, with no room for gradations. Using Damasio and 
the neuroscientific literature I will argue that this dichotomy is false, and that there is a 
spectrum of automaticity and deliberation in moral judgements. The second issue is the 
                                                 
18 Damasio broadly lays out his theory of decision-making in: Damasio, A. (1994) Descartes' error: 
emotion, reason, and the human brain. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 
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dichotomy between emotion and reason. I will also discuss why this is problematic and 
show that both faculties are intertwined and underlie practical reasoning.  
4.1 Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
A major hurdle for models of moral cognition in which reflection and reasoning have a 
primary role is in the explaining how reasons can motivation. As mentioned in chapter 
two, this challenge was crystallised by Hume:  
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of 
passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them. 
(Hume, 2007, p. 266) 
For Hume, and his modern exponents such as Prinz, reasons do not motivate; only 
passions or sentiments do. In their view, when someone is faced with a moral dilemma, 
there are not competing reasons for different ways to act (e.g. the rationalists), nor is 
reason competing against emotion (e.g. Greene’s dual process theory), but rather two 
opposing sentiments compete to motivate action. The role of reason, on these theories, 
is to enable us to think through the conflicting sentiments, and to compare their 
implications. Prinz is a sentimentalist and a motivational internalist (Prinz, 2007). The 
former means he thinks that sentiments constitute moral judgements, and the latter 
means he thinks that moral judgements necessarily motivate. These two positions go 
hand in hand, because if sentiments (a feeling or emotion) intrinsically motivate 
actions, and they are a judgement of right or wrong, then moral concepts are always 
linked to a motivation of some kind (Prinz, 2007, pp. 18-19). Prinz gives some 
compelling evidence for the necessity of emotions in motivation. Prinz (2007) argues 
that all moral judgements and actions (unless you are a psychopath) are accompanied 
by emotions. It is impossible to act in accordance with a moral judgement without 
feeling, and it is impossible to do something one knows is morally wrong (like stealing 
even if it is advantageous to oneself) without feeling a “bad” feeling, such as shame, 
guilt, sadness or remorse. This claim, that an emotional response of some kind is 
necessary to motivate moral judgements, seems in direct opposition to an account of 
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morality built on reason and reflection, such as Korsgaard’s. However, the relationship 
between reason and emotion is far more complex than what is generally assumed. 
Evidence on the necessity of feelings to guide and motivate action was gathered 
in an extensive study led by the neurologist Antonio Damasio in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s (Damasio et al., 1990). Damasio studied patients with a specific grouping 
of brain lesions, involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC).19 Damasio 
made several key observations of these patients. While they maintained their intellect, 
their decision making was greatly disrupted, largely concerning the personal and social 
realms (Damasio, 1996). Before the onset of the brain lesion, Damasio described these 
patients as “intelligent, creative and successful”, however now their ability to plan and 
organise their life was greatly disturbed. They would make choices that would lead to 
financial ruin, the disintegration of relationships, and which were generally not 
“personally advantageous”. Furthermore, their decisions were substantially different 
from what they would have been before developing the brain lesion.  
In the light of these observations, Damasio (1996) formulated the “somatic 
marker hypothesis”. The hypothesis states that emotions or feelings are a necessary 
“tether” for someone in making decisions, guiding and constraining reasoning, and 
motivating them to act appropriately, morally, socially and pragmatically (Damasio, 
1996). Throughout life, one encounters and learns from various practical and social 
situations and problems. In these contexts, one begins to associate particular feelings 
with actions and outcomes. Damasio refers to these feelings as “somatic markers”, 
meaning that they are embodied feelings (“gut feelings”) that include visceral and 
nonvisceral sensation (Damasio, 1994, p. 173). These somatic markers are subsequently 
re-experienced when encountering similar situations or contexts. Certain somatic 
markers would become associated with specific facts, experiences and actions, which 
are valued to varying degrees as either positive or negative. This allows for the 
reactivation of these feelings to help constrain potential reasoning, by alerting people to 
the “goodness” or “badness” of certain actions and their corresponding outcomes in a 
shared context of action. Now, instead of needing to reason through an extensive cost-
benefit analysis for every decision, these somatic markers can deter one from even 
                                                 
19 As outlined in Chapter One, the vmPFC is also the brain region damaged in the famous Phineas Gage, 
who according to Henry Harlowe, presented with similar social deficits to Damasio’s patients. Damasio 
uses Gage as his first example in his book ibid. 
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considering potentially disastrous actions by associating them with extremely negative 
feelings. This process constrains the range of options one considers, allowing one to 
make decisions quickly, efficiently and more effectively. Relying on only reasoning, 
without any somatic states to guide one’s thoughts can be overwhelming.  
To illustrate his theory, Damasio (1994) tells the story of one of his brain lesion 
patients who recently recounted a traffic accident involving road ice that he had 
witnessed, and now struggled to decide between two dates for his next laboratory visit:  
For the better part of a half-hour, the patient enumerated reasons for and 
against each of the two dates: previous engagements, proximity to other 
engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually anything one 
could reasonably think about concerning a simple date. Just as calmly as he 
had driven over the ice, and recounted that episode, he was now walking us 
through a tiresome cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining and fruitless 
comparison of options and possible consequences. It took enormous 
discipline to listen to all of this without pounding on the table and telling 
him to stop, but we finally did tell him, quietly, that he should come on the 
second of the alternative dates. His response was equally calm and prompt. 
He simply said: “That’s fine.” Back the appointment book went into his 
pocket, and then he was off. 
(Damasio, 1994, pp. 192-194) 
Without any guiding or motivating feeling the patient was overwhelmed with the 
potential avenues of actions and reasons ad infinitum to process. This illustrates the 
necessary merger of reasoning and feelings in order to function practically at all, 
reflecting Damasio’s claim that a “[r]eduction in emotion may constitute an equally 
important source of irrational behaviour” (Damasio, 1994). Feelings appear to be 
essential parts of practical reasoning. 
To explore the evidence supporting “somatic marker hypothesis” let us take two 
examples that demonstrate the deficits common to vmPFC patients: In his clinical work 
as a neurologist, Damasio encountered a patient he identified as sharing many of the 
same symptoms as Phineas Gage – the 19th century railroad worker turned famous 
neuropsychology patient.20 In Damasio’s book, “Descartes’ Error” he refers to this 
                                                 
20 Refer chapter one for a summary of his story and symptoms. 
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patient as Elliot, who he first met as a man diagnosed with a meningioma (a benign 
tumour that can impinge upon underlying brain tissue) (Damasio, 1994, p. 35). After 
first impressions, he noted Elliot was “pleasant and intriguing, thoroughly charming but 
emotionally contained”, “coherent and smart”, a “good husband and father” and a 
successful businessman (Damasio, 1994, pp. 34-35). Elliot underwent surgery to 
remove the tumour, however, soon afterwards Damasio noticed some lasting effect that 
the surgery had on his personality. He began to act in ways that were eerily similar to 
Gage.21 At work Elliot managed his time poorly and was unable to keep track of the 
“overall purpose” of his work, becoming consumed by peripheral and lengthy tasks. On 
an intellectual level he knew what work needed to be done and what procedures to use, 
but his decision-making was disturbed, and he would spend whole afternoons 
deliberating about minor tasks (Damasio, 1994, p. 36). Elliot lost the trust of his co-
workers and his job was terminated. Soon afterwards he started up new businesses, 
associated with a “disreputable character”, made foolish financial decisions and went 
bankrupt. He was divorced from his wife, married a second time, and was divorced 
again soon after. Elliot had intact IQ, performed normally on memory tests, and even 
performed well in the laboratory responding to tasks concerning social convention and 
moral value (Damasio, 1994, pp. 40-46). But in practice, when making important 
decisions out in the world of shared human activity, he failed again and again.  
Damasio included Elliot in an experiment where participants were presented 
with emotionally charged stimuli (e.g. burning houses), and their responses recorded. 
Elliot informed him afterwards that before the accident he would have reacted greatly 
to these kinds of pictures, but they no longer caused him to feel anything. This lead 
Damasio (1994, p. 45) to surmise his situation as “[t]o know but not to feel”. Similar to 
Phineas Gage, it was the vmPFC which was lesioned in Elliot, hence their striking 
similarities (Damasio et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994). 
The second example is experimental and involved tracking the behaviour and 
emotional responses of patients with vmPFC lesions. Bechara et al. (1996) studied the 
skin conductance response (SCR), a measurable physical response that indicates 
anxiety or arousal, of controls and vmPFC lesion patients when they underwent a risky 
                                                 
21 Elliot, being a contemporary case means that any clinical observations made about him compared to 
Gage are more empirically useful. Although Gage’s story is captivating, an overreliance on his case can 
be dubious, as his presentation can be susceptible to retroactive embellishment. 
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decision-making task. Subsequently named the Iowa Gambling task, it involved placing 
four decks of cards in front of the participant and giving them a fictitious loan of $2000 
to gamble with. Participants were then asked to repeatedly draw cards from any of the 
four decks, A, B, C and D with the goal being to make as much money as possible. 
Some cards in each deck caused the participants to win money, while others caused 
them to lose money, with the compositions of the decks being different. Decks A and B 
were high risk decks, the participants could potentially draw cards worth $100, but in 
the long term, because of higher values of penalty cards they would net lose money. 
Decks C and D were safe decks, the participants could potentially win only $50 with 
each draw, but the penalty cards were less and over the long term the participant would 
net win money. The compositions of the decks were initially unknown to the 
participants. Both the control and lesion groups exhibited SCRs after choosing a card, 
indicating an emotional response while experiencing either an award or punishment. 
However, over the course of the experiment, only control participants exhibited an 
anticipatory SCR, that occurred before drawing a card, and this response was greater 
before drawing cards from the risky decks. Lesion patients exhibited no such 
anticipatory SCR. In a similar experiment using the Iowa Gambling task it was shown 
that control groups shift towards picking from the advantageous decks over the course 
of the experiment, while the lesion group continued to pick from the disadvantageous 
deck (Bechara et al., 1994). Analysing these two experiments together, Bechara et al. 
(1996) hypothesised that the anticipatory SCR, indicating the presence of somatic 
markers, guide the participant’s decision-making by attributing positive or negative 
values to each deck. Patients with vmPFC lesions continually make disadvantageous 
decisions because of this absent biasing in potential choices. There is no negative 
somatic marker stopping the lesion patients for making dangerous or risky decisions. 
This might explain why Elliot made such poor decisions, and perhaps why Gage’s 
personality changed so drastically. 
One might take Damasio’s work as reinforcing the Humean thesis maintained 
by Prinz and others, in that his conclusion shows that feelings are necessary to act 
coherently in social and moral contexts. However, it actually shows that reasons and 
feelings are intertwined, and that both are necessary for one to navigate through the 
world practically and socially. Reasoning is still employed to categorise and direct 
actions, however it is guided and constrained by feelings – together they constitute a 
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practical form of reasoning. This dispels the arguments for the primacy of either 
emotion or reason, and instead presents a more complex model of decision making. In 
this way Damasio’s work is congruent with the neuroscientifically integrative feature of 
an integrative account of moral cognition that was discussed in chapter two. 
Damasio’s hypothesis also raises many serious questions for Korsgaard’s moral 
theory. Her account of moral motivation, relying on endorsing reasons by appealing to 
one’s identity, is problematic given Damasio’s hypothesis. According to the “somatic 
marker hypothesis” feelings and emotions are essential motivating and guiding factors 
in reasoning (Damasio, 1994). If one takes a traditional Kantian view of reason, that it 
is an objective, fact-based justification for acting, and that reason alone motivates, this 
is incompatible with Damasio’s account of morality. If one must endorse an inclination 
as a reason to act, and this reason alone is sufficient to motivate and guide actions, then 
why do we see so many problems with decision making in Damasio’s brain lesion 
patients? In these patients the link between emotions and decisions is severed. 
However, Korsgaard defines reason merely as “reflective success” (1996, p. 97). 
Reasoning, emotions, feelings, empathy and inclinations can be constituents of a moral 
judgement and be endorsed as reasons. With this in mind, one can see Korsgaard’s 
theory as able to accommodate Damasio’s findings. However, the kind of decision-
making to feature in the “somatic marker hypothesis” does not fit into the automatic 
and reflective binary set out by Korsgaard. This will be the primary focus of discussion 
in the remainder of this chapter. I will conduct an interdisciplinary analysis and 
integrate Korsgaard’s ideas about reflection and reason with the work of Damasio and 
modern neuroscience. Through this process will emerge an integrative account of moral 
cognition.  
4.2 Damasio, Korsgaard and a Spectrum of Deliberation 
In the previous section, I summarised Damasio’s “somatic marker hypothesis” which 
describes how feelings guide and constrain reasoning and motivate action (Damasio, 
1996). I also discussed the implication of Damasio’s work for sentimentalist views of 
motivation and briefly for Korsgaard’s view of motivation. In this section I will 
continue to compare Korsgaard’s and Damasio’s accounts of decision-making. The 
focus will be on a key distinction between these accounts, namely that there is a solid 
binary between automatic and deliberative modes of acting. I will resolve this conflict 
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and show the compatibility of both accounts, which similarly involve a reflective 
process and a valuation process. 
4.2.1 The Reflective Link Between Korsgaard and Damasio 
The type of decision making described in the “somatic marker hypothesis” does not fit 
into Korsgaard’s distinction between highly automatic and highly reflective modes of 
acting. Korsgaard’s theory seems to involve a binary between reflective and non-
reflective action. Korsgaard argues that either one is self-conscious and acts 
deliberatively or one is not and acts automatically. She says that “lower animals” are an 
example of the latter, where “its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will” 
(Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 92-93). It is fixated on the environment, and its desires and 
passions “push it around”, because it cannot reflect on the contents of its mind. One 
could argue that if a person refuses to reflect on their thoughts, and merely responds to 
their desires they are acting in this way. For example, if someone’s emotional reaction 
(of say disgust) after witnessing an act of vandalism functions as their moral 
judgement, and they do not reflect any further, then they are acting automatically. 
Korsgaard argues however, that because humans can self-consciously reflect, they are 
necessarily faced with a normative question: “is this desire really a reason to act?” 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 93). 
Damasio’s work shows that the distinction between reflective and non-reflective 
action is not binary, but a matter of degree. According to the “somatic marker 
hypothesis” many of our judgements do employ reasons, but these reasons are 
grounded by an evaluation – i.e. a “feeling” – of what is important in a given situation 
(Damasio, 1994). This reasoning is more embodied and automatic, as opposed to being 
introspective and deliberative. However, both models of action involve a kind of 
reflection, in that they refer to a notion of identity. This reflection is either implicit or 
explicit, depending on how automatic or deliberate the involved judgement is. 
There are reasons to think that Korsgaard is open to this idea. Different aspects 
of one’s practical identity involve different cognitive demands. If someone conceives of 
themselves as a slave to their passions, they will endorse any and all their desires, and 
Korsgaard says the person will be “wanton” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 101). Any reflective 
process will be as simple as identifying one’s wants. On the other hand, as they 
conceive of themselves as a moral agent, required to take account of the reasons for 
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their actions and the perspectives of others, then reflection and deliberation will be 
more demanding. They will need to ask whether their reasons to act are universalizable 
and take the desires and well-being of others into account. 
According to Damasio (1994), when someone is deciding, for example, between 
which deck to choose from in the Iowa Gambling task, or which charity to donate to, a 
somatic marker is generated which helps guide the process. This is automatic, one does 
not choose to experience this feeling, it merely arises because of the context one finds 
oneself. One does not reflect on and appeal to this feeling, it merely has its effect. 
Sometimes this feeling is so powerful that it forces one feels all but compelled to act in 
a certain way. Furthermore, somatic markers can affect actions unconsciously, meaning 
one can be moved without consciously reflecting on the motivating feeling (Damasio, 
1994). There is still space for reflection and reasoning after one’s initial reaction. Any 
subsequent reasoning process is automatically constrained and guided by feelings, but it 
is not inhibited. 
As with Korsgaard’s account, this feeling guided decision-making invokes a 
kind of reflection. This reflection however is immediate and partly unconscious, based 
on carefully moulded “habits of the heart” suiting one to the human ecosphere. Somatic 
markers become associated with particular actions and outcomes and reflect a sense of 
how the actions and outcomes affect the person. In this way, they enable a person to 
learn from previous experiences about how to act in accordance with who they are. 
When a context is reencountered, these somatic markers are reexperienced in order to 
avoid disadvantageous actions or encourage advantageous actions. The risky and futile 
actions of Damasio’s vmPFC lesion patients indicate the inherent wisdom in “somatic 
markers”, which they no longer feel (Damasio et al., 1990). When feelings are removed 
from the decision-making process, practical reasoning is impaired. 
There is a second substantial link between Korsgaard’s and Damasio’s accounts 
of decision-making, centring on the importance of identity as a valuation of actions. 
Decision-making akin to the “somatic marker hypothesis” requires no explicit appeal to 
identity. However, as just indicated, the fact that one can learn from past experiences 
demonstrates a degree of personal continuity over time. A person can only learn from a 
situation, and adopt a pattern of responding to particular situations, if the earlier self is 
in some way continuous with (“identified with”) the future self. This is the same 
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argument that Korsgaard uses in relation to reasons: just as using a reason entails a 
notion of personal identity, so too does forming a somatic marker. 
Here we can see some key similarities with Damasio. For Korsgaard (1996, p. 
101), what grounds or guides reasoning and decisions is an appeal to a valuation of 
oneself which is associated with actions. Similarly, according to the “somatic marker 
hypothesis”, somatic markers are attached as positive or negative values to actions and 
outcomes (Damasio, 1994). Let us take an example, part of my practical identity is of a 
medical student, and this contributes to my sense of self-worth and directs my actions. 
During medical school students enter the hospital to begin their clinical training. It is 
essential in this training that students will have many challenging experiences, that will 
become embedded in themselves, and akin to Damasio, will direct their actions in 
future clinical scenarios. This may be learning how to talk to patients or their families 
when they have experienced immense tragedy, for example. Through this learning 
process a medical student will strive to become a good doctor by valuing certain actions 
over others. This process contributes to a medical student’s conception of their 
doctorhood. If practical identity includes a description of what actions are “worth 
undertaking”, then it seems that Korsgaard’s account of morality is deeply similar to 
that of Damasio. The only issue that remains, is that for Damasio this is an automatic 
process, and for Korsgaard it is deliberate.  
4.2.2 Automatic Judgements in the Spectrum of Deliberation 
Decision-making akin to the “somatic marker hypothesis” does not fit into the binary 
distinction between automatic and reflectively deliberative judgements set by 
Korsgaard. However, these kinds of decision, despite being largely automatic maintain 
important properties laid out by Korsgaard. They are still reflective (albeit implicitly), 
and they still rely on a self-valuation of one’s actions (which is the function of practical 
identities according to Korsgaard). Thus, it makes sense to revise Korsgaard’s account 
of moral decision-making using the work of Damasio. This process indicates that 
perhaps the human ability to reflect and deliberate has many more gradations than first 
anticipated. In this section I will examine the neuroscience of automatic judgements, 
and I will relate these findings to the automatic-deliberative distinction between 
Damasio and Korsgaard’s accounts of decision-making. Akin to Damasio’s theory, 
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automatic judgements are more complicated than one would assume and integrate 
cognitive and emotive components. 
Damasio is not the only neuroscientist to focus on automatic decision-making. 
There is significant overlap between Damasio’s account of moral judgements and 
Greene’s dual process theory. Greene argues that in more personal, emotional and 
temporally demanding circumstances, one relies on a kind of automatic judgement, that 
often produces seemingly deontological results (Greene, 2016). The vmPFC is the brain 
region implicated in Greene’s account of these automatic judgements, as well as the 
critical link between deciding and somatic states in Damasio’s hypothesis (Greene, 
2016; Damasio, 1994). So, there is consistency across their works.  
If one examines Greene’s findings in the light of Damasio’s hypothesis, one 
would argue that the vmPFC does not just represent automatic and emotional 
judgements but exists as a more complex intertwinement of emotion and reasoning. The 
philosopher James Woodward (2016) has offered such a reinterpretation of Greene’s 
findings in the light of more recent neuroscientific studies. He argues that the vmPFC 
attributes subjective values to actions and judgements, in both utilitarian and 
deontological moral dilemmas (Woodward, 2016). And contrary to Greene’s assertion 
that the vmPFC is primarily implicated in emotive and automatic processing, 
Woodward (2016) argues that instead it is essentially integrative in its treatment of 
cognition and emotion. He focuses on some of Greene’s own results to critique his 
theory, specifically an fMRI study by Shenhav and Greene (2010). In this study the 
researchers examined the neural mechanisms of decision-making in response to 
complex moral dilemmas, which involved varying degrees of magnitude (the amount of 
lives lost) (Shenhav and Greene, 2010). They found that vmPFC activity correlated 
with the “expected moral values” of decision options, and hypothesised that in order to 
generate this valuation of moral action, the vmPFC must receive input from and modify 
affective representations (Shenhav and Greene, 2010). Woodward (2016) argues that 
these findings challenge the initial conception of Greene’s dual process theory, that 
automatic judgements are essentially emotive, and instead show that the vmPFC plays 
both cognitive and emotive rolls. 
A later fMRI study by Shenhav and Greene (2014), which was discussed in 
chapter one, appears to reinforce Woodward’s reinterpretation. Participants were 
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presented sacrificial dilemmas while undergoing fMRI neuroimaging and were asked to 
choose between two responses, one was more utilitarian in nature and the other more 
deontological. Firstly, they were asked to make a utilitarian assessment, then an 
emotional assessment, and finally an “all things considered judgement”, where they 
were asked: “Which do you find more morally acceptable?”.  The researchers found 
that activity in the vmPFC was greatest during the all things considered (i.e. integrative) 
moral judgement. Thus, its role was hypothesised to integrate and modulate affective 
signals into decision-making (Shenhav and Greene, 2014). Together these results 
indicate that the vmPFC carries out an integrated emotive and cognitive role. This 
coincides with Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis where the vmPFC computes 
subjective values, through an input and modulation of emotion. It also fits with 
Korsgaard’s claim that moral judgement involves a conception of the self, considered 
as an “integrated whole”. 
Further evidence of the complex and integrative nature of automatic judgements 
is provided by a paper by Decety and Cacioppo (2012), that was also discussed in 
chapters one and two. EEG was used to study the temporal involvement of brain 
regions, while the participant made a basic moral judgement. Participants were exposed 
to two 3-frame videos, either depicting someone intentionally or unintentionally 
harming another, and were then asked to judge the intention of the actor.  Using EEG, 
high-density event-related-potentials (ERP) were calculated. Increased activity in the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the amygdala and the vmPFC was observed 
when participants watched the ‘intentional harm’ clip compared to the “unintentional 
harm” clip.22 Importantly, these brain regions were activated in that order, with the 
pSTS first, then the amygdala and finally the vmPFC. The pSTS is involved in 
understanding the actions of others, including their intentions, representing a cognitive 
and categorisation process, which is necessary to proceed any judgement. The 
subsequent involvement of the amygdala represents an affective response to the 
categorised intention of the actor, and finally the involvement of the vmPFC, which is 
heavily connected to the amygdala represents an integration of this affective processing 
into a judgement. Decety and Cacioppo (2012) conclude that the amygdala acts a “gain-
switch” to alert one about salient information and guide decision-making. This whole 
process occurs within 300ms, indicating that even in fast, automatic judgements, brain 
                                                 
22 Refer to chapter one for summaries of these brain regions. 
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regions involved in reason and cognition both play important roles. These results are 
consistent with Damasio’s hypothesis and give one a chronological understanding of 
how emotion influences moral decision-making. 
These findings have implications for Korsgaard’s theory. In accordance with 
Damasio’s hypothesis, the evidence described here shows the importance of automatic 
judgements, and shows that we cannot regard automatic and reflective decisions as 
dichotomous. Although these kinds of judgements are not deliberative or reflective in 
the way set out by Korsgaard, they share essential aspects with her account. Decision-
making akin to the “somatic marker hypothesis” is implicitly reflective, involving 
learning from past experiences, which corresponds with Korsgaard’s assumption that 
humans are self-consciously reflective. It involves the intertwinement of reasoning and 
emotion, which constitutes a kind of feeling guided practical reasoning. This 
corresponds with Korsgaard’s argument that passions, desires and internal 
argumentation can all be endorsed as potential reasons to act. Finally, Damasio’s theory 
involves the valuation of ways of acting, which relates to Korsgaard’s conception of 
practical identities. Although there are differences between Korsgaard and Damasio’s 
accounts, they are compatible. And by applying some slight modifications to 
Korsgaard’s theory, it can provide us with a neuroscientifically informed foundation for 
an integrative account of moral cognition. What has been examined so far are automatic 
moral judgements. There is, however, considerable evidence for more cognitively 
demanding and reflective judgements. In the next section, deliberative moral 
judgements will be examined regarding their relation to Damasio and Korsgaard and 
the spectrum of reflection. 
4.2.3 Deliberative Judgements in the Spectrum of Deliberation 
The kind of decision-making described by Damasio is automatic while that of 
Korsgaard is highly deliberative and reflective. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
there are kinds of judgements that sit functionally between the two. In these judgements 
cognitive elements would be important, but there would be less deliberate reflection. 
Imagine a scenario where you have to decide to donate a modest amount to a charity, 
but need to decide which charity to donate to. Suppose there are two donation boxes in 
front of you, one belongs to a national cancer society, and the other belongs to the local 
homeless shelter. In this case, one could act automatically and just donate to whichever 
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charity one feels moved toward at the time. Alternatively, one could make a more 
cognitively demanding judgement. That person would not need to stand back and 
carefully reflect and deliberate, but some basic reasoning could still factor into the 
decision. They may need to exert cognitive control over their emotions in order to make 
a judgement better supported by reasons. Perhaps initially, they are subconsciously 
drawn to the cancer society because it recently featured in an advertisement, but then 
they reason that their dollar would go further at the local homeless shelter. Emotion and 
cognition still play important roles here, but there is greater emphasis on subsequent 
deliberation over initial reactions. 
Greene (2016) argues that when people give “utilitarian” responses to moral 
dilemmas they are thinking like this. Deliberation and cognitive control of more 
emotional brain regions play important roles in these decisions. Greene et al. (2004) 
implicates the dlPFC as one of these brain regions that works to resolve such a conflict. 
Somatic markers can still play a role in these decisions, however the emphasis rests on 
reasoning and executive control which occur after these feelings have had their effect. 
Damasio himself acknowledges that an extensive reasoning process can occur after 
somatic markers have their effect (Damasio, 1994). This process can be seen in a study 
by Suter and Hertwig (2011), who examined the relationship between deliberation time 
and the kind of judgement made by participants (“deontological” or “utilitarian”). 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a time-pressure condition where they 
were forced to give answers to moral dilemmas within 8 seconds, or a no-time-pressure 
condition, where they were given 3 minutes to deliberate. Participants under no time 
pressure were more likely to give consequentialist responses to the moral dilemmas 
compared to their time-pressured counterparts. Suter and Hertwig (2011) argued that 
under time pressure cognitive control mechanisms, which usually override or modify 
the effects of gut feelings, were lacking, leading to increased deontological decisions 
over consequentialist ones.  
Suter and Hertwig’s study helps to illustrate the differences between automatic 
decisions typical to the “somatic marker hypothesis” and more cognitively demanding 
decisions. Although regions such as the dlPFC play important roles, Greene’s 
distinction between the emotive and cognitive is too extreme. The dual process model 
of moral judgement ignores the role emotions play in more reflective decision-making. 
Likewise, as we saw above when discussing the complex emotive and cognitive 
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functioning of the vmPFC, the dual process model underestimates the involvement of 
cognitive aspects in automatic judgements.  
In more demanding contexts, Greene (2016) emphasises the role of cognitive 
brain regions over emotional ones. And the result is, according to Greene (2016), often 
a utilitarian decision. Woodward (2016) offers a valuable critique of this stringent 
categorisation by laying out a distinction between two different kinds of utilitarian 
judgements: “parametric” and “strategic”. “Parametric” utilitarian decisions treat moral 
problems as having a “simple and transparent structure characterised by a few fixed and 
stable parameters” that are known for certain (Woodward, 2016). For example, take the 
overbridge variant of the trolley problem. A participant is told for certain that they are 
strong enough and easily able to push the man over the bridge, and that this will 
certainly stop the trolley. The dilemma is stripped of uncertainty, and comes down to 
what may be considered a simple maths problem: five lives versus one. Perhaps all that 
is happening “cognitively”, is an exertion of control over one’s emotional aversion to 
sacrificial killing. These are the kinds of dilemmas that Greene uses in his studies,23 so 
it is not surprising that a limited set of cognitive brain regions are implicated during 
“utilitarian judgements” while emotional regions are deemphasised. “Strategic” 
utilitarian decisions on the other hand, are no less “utilitarian” in nature, but are far 
more practical and realistic. They involve deciding in the face of uncertainty, 
calculating probabilities, reasoning, attempting to retrieve more information from the 
unfolding scenario, problem solving, building an empathic relationship with potential 
victims and using empathy to detect any evil intentions (Woodward, 2016). In all these 
factors, as well as being more cognitively demanding in general, emotions and feelings 
can be a guide and can streamline thinking. In this respect, feelings are just as essential 
as cognition in practical reasoning. An example of “strategic” utilitarian decision-
making, using the overbridge trolley dilemma, would involve a calculation or 
estimation of the uncertainty in the ability of the large man to stop the trolley. It could 
involve empathically relating to this man, asking him or thinking about the real-world 
impact of killing him. Does he have a family or people who rely on him? How about 
the five people tied up? Will the man even consider sacrificing himself willingly? This 
is far more complex than a simple maths problem, yet remains completely utilitarian. 
                                                 
23 See for example: Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. (2004) 
'The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment', Neuron, 44(2), pp. 389-400. 
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Not only would cognitive brain regions be involved in these kinds of decisions, but 
emotional and empathy related brain regions would be involved as well (Woodward, 
2016). Unfortunately, these are not the kinds of decisions focused on in the literature. 
However, it is likely that in the real world equivalents of such “utilitarian” or 
cognitively demanding moral decisions are “strategic” in nature and thus involve a far 
greater role for emotions than first anticipated.  
As a final example, let us consider a study I outlined in chapter one: 
Feldmanhall et al.’s (2014) use of fMRI to examine which brain areas are involved in 
“difficult” moral dilemmas compared to “easy” moral dilemmas. To categorise 
dilemmas as either difficult or easy, participants were given a set of moral and non-
moral dilemmas with two potential choices, and their responses were recorded. Moral 
dilemmas were distinguished from non-moral dilemmas, using the definition of moral 
cognition from Moll et al. (2008), that it must altruistically motivate behaviour. 
Dilemmas were regarded as difficult when there was little consensus on the “correct” 
answer (proportions picking one response in the binary choice were between 0.45-0.55) 
and at least 80% participants had to rate the dilemma as difficult (4 or 5, out of a 5 
point-scale) (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). Dilemmas were regarded as easy if there was a 
consensus on the “correct” answer (either <0.20 or >0.80) and at least 80% of 
participants rated it as easy (1 or 2, out of 5). So, there was a clear and distinct 
difference between easy and difficult moral dilemmas.  
fMRI data was collected from participants when they made judgements in 
response to easy moral and non-moral dilemmas, and difficult moral and non-moral 
dilemmas (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). When difficult moral dilemmas were compared to 
difficult non-moral dilemmas, the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) was activated, and 
this activity extended into the temporal lobe to the temporal pole, whereas the vmPFC 
was relatively deactivated. The opposite was true when comparing easy moral decisions 
to easy non-moral decisions, with the vmPFC being relatively more activated, and the 
TPJ and the dlPFC being relatively more deactivated. Both of these results indicate 
specific differences between moral and non-moral thinking when difficulty is 
controlled for. When comparing difficult moral dilemmas to easy moral dilemmas, the 
bilateral TPJ and the right temporal pole were more activated in the difficult condition, 
and the vmPFC (and the left OFC) and the middle cingulate were relatively more 
activated in the easy condition. These results are consistent with Damasio’s somatic 
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marker hypothesis, as the vmPFC is most sensitive to dilemmas where there is a low-
cost and high-benefit option (i.e. one that is automatically obvious), which in turn can 
be encouraged through a feeling guided process (Damasio, 1994). On the other hand, it 
also shows that neural processing is different during more difficult and cognitively 
demanding scenarios, involving greater activity in the TPJ (FeldmanHall et al., 2014).  
In chapter two I discussed a meta-analysis of 70 functional neuroimaging 
studies by Decety and Lamm (2007). In this meta-analysis TPJ has been implicated in 
four distinct domains, theory of mind (reasoning and attribution of the mental states of 
another, similar to cognitive empathy), empathy (defined in this paper as affective 
sharing with another), agency (explicitly or implicitly attributing ownership of actions 
to oneself or another) and attentional-shifting (shifting one’s attention to a non-cued 
location or to detect and re-orientate to unexpected environmental changes). Hence this 
region is involved in many high-level cognitive processes important for social cognition 
and practical reasoning, which include emotional and cognitive components. The 
inclusion of attentional shifting here, corresponds to a reflective process. An actor is not 
narrowly focussed, but is assessing many salient stimuli, to factor in their decision. 
However, this process is not necessarily deliberative. This data supports the ideas put 
forward by Hughlings-Jackson about brain organisation, that higher-brain areas 
elaborate the functioning of simpler brain areas (Franz and Gillett, 2011). 
With all this evidence in mind, responding to difficult moral dilemmas, involves 
a different network of brain regions from automatic and easy judgements, yet is not 
highly deliberative and reflective in the way Korsgaard’s theory might seem to suggest. 
This kind of intermediate decision involves the intertwinement of emotion and 
reasoning, the collaboration of many different brain regions involved in many complex 
functions, and a modest level of reflection, represented by the shifting of attention 
between different salient factors in a dilemma. What this shows is that there are 
intermediate kinds of judgements in the spectrum of reflection. 
Finally, there is one other kind of decision that sits on the far end of the 
reflective spectrum. It is the kind of highly deliberative and reflective decision-making, 
which one might associate with Korsgaard’s account of morality (Korsgaard, 1996). 
This kind of highly reflective thinking is similar to when one does “arm-chair” 
philosophy. This is when one stands back from one’s thoughts, chooses what to reflect 
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on and decides whether one’s desires or certain arguments are truly reasons to act. This 
thinking is conscious and considered. 
However, this kind of decision-making does not fit into the typical research 
paradigm of the neuroscience of moral cognition. In studies that use fMRI to examine 
brain activity when a participant makes a moral judgement, they are told to make a 
choice within a few seconds. This is due to technological constraints, with brain activity 
only from a specific and controlled section of time being recorded. Studies using EEG 
to study moral judgements, examine ERPs (event related potentials), which is a 
recording of brain activity for a fixed and controlled amount of time after a specific 
event (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012). This is repeated many times, to achieve an average 
recording of brain activity in response to that event. If one wants to study a highly 
reflective and deliberative judgement in response to a complex and deeply personal 
moral dilemma, one would be at a disadvantage using these neuroimaging techniques. 
In Chapter two I discussed the challenge of temporality, i.e. the problem of reducing 
moral judgements to short and basic responses to problems. This is a common 
challenge in the neuroscience of moral cognition. Consequently, what is often 
overlooked is a kind of common moral thinking that takes place over minutes, hours 
and even days. Hence, there is limited focus of this incredibly complex, extended and 
integrative processing in the moral cognition literature.   
In Chapter three I raised a personal example about becoming a vegetarian, and I 
also asked you to think of your own personal examples of a detailed, interspersed and 
extended kind of moral thinking. Reflecting on these points it becomes obvious, that 
despite receiving a limited focus in the literature, highly reflective decision-making 
plays important roles in our lives. Also, in chapter three I introduced a study by Paxton 
et al. (2012) that examined the role of reflection in altering one’s moral judgements and 
responses to reasoning. It was found that when more time was given to think about a 
controversial moral scenario (allowing for greater deliberation and reflection) only then 
did argument strength effect the permissibility rating of the scenario given by 
participants. This shows that reflection and deliberation do occur, especially when 
significant time is given to contemplate moral problems, and that they do affect how 
one reasons and how one uses arguments to inform their judgements.  
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4.2.4 Modifying Korsgaard’s Theory According to a Reflective Spectrum 
of Deliberation 
In this chapter I have described three kinds of decisions. Firstly, automatic, feeling 
guided decisions, best described in Damasio’s “somatic marker hypothesis”. Secondly, 
more cognitively demanding, and basically reflective decision-making, at an 
intermediate level. And finally, the highly deliberative and consciously reflective 
decision-making described by Korsgaard in her account of moral decision-making. 
These three processes all have different levels of automaticity and deliberation yet 
maintain the essential aspects of Korsgaard’s moral philosophy. They are all reflective 
in some way yet vary depending on how implicit or explicit this reflection is. Secondly, 
they all involve emotion and cognition in an integrative way. 
So, in response to these findings I propose a modification of Korsgaards theory. 
Before laying out this framework, let us briefly review her theory. Korsgaard’s moral 
philosophy is a proposed solution to the normative question. She argues that 
normativity arises as we reflect on our thoughts and endorse particular reasons to act 
(Korsgaard, 1996). The reflective structure of self-consciousness, she maintains, forces 
one to form a conception of oneself, and this self-conception governs which reasons are 
endorsed. In her theory, if a person does not reflect and endorse reasons in this way 
then they are not truly “acting”; they are merely being pushed around by their desires. 
As a modification of her theory, instead of there being a stringent dichotomy 
between highly automatic and highly deliberative ways of acting, there is a spectrum of 
reflection. On one end of the spectrum are automatic and implicitly reflective decisions, 
and on the other end are deliberate and explicitly reflective decisions. There is 
significant evidence illustrating the gradations of possible ways humans can engage 
with ethical issues, which range through this spectrum. As an example of such an 
automatic decision, one might find oneself in a position where one decides to help a 
lost stranger in a large city. This decision to help is likely automatic and intuitive, 
existing merely as a feeling guided response. However, as we saw when discussing 
Damasio, these feelings and intuitions arise from an implicitly reflective process, 
specifically from automatically learning from past experiences and building these into 
the basic ways one responds to the world (Damasio, 1994). On the other, deliberative 
end of the spectrum, one might decide who to vote for in a democratic election, which 
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would obviously have many widespread ethical consequences. This decision may 
involve a great deal of reflection and deliberation, including an engagement with one’s 
own practical identity to govern this decision.  
Importantly, both processes are reflective in some way, and thus relate to the 
first of Korsgaard’s two major psychological assumptions. Secondly, both processes 
involve a valuation of actions. The former does this automatically, by attaching positive 
or negative signals to certain ways of acting based on past experiences. This learning 
process underlies how to be a good citizen in a society, or a good member of one’s 
profession, or a good partner or parent. Hence, certain ways of acting become valued 
over others and embedded in the actor. The deliberative way of deciding, does this by 
reflecting on reasons to act and endorsing them with reference to one’s practical 
identity, i.e. a valuation of oneself, the kind of life one finds worth living and the 
actions worth undertaking (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 101). So, when Korsgaard argues that 
normativity arises as we reflect on our actions and the possibilities available and 
endorse certain reasons, this process itself is complex. It can happen on automatic, 
intermediate and highly deliberative levels.  
 The third important feature to note is that at each level of this reflective and 
valuation-based decision making, feelings and cognition, or emotions and reasoning 
play important and intertwined roles. Through an examination of the work of Damasio, 
Korsgaard and other studies in cognitive neuroscience, it appears that the dichotomy 
between emotion and reason is a false one. Damasio (1994) argues that feelings as 
much as cognition are deeply involved in automatic and everyday practical reasoning. 
Emotive and empathic brain regions, similarly, are involved in more cognitively 
demanding decisions that warrant deliberation (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). And finally, 
Korsgaard argues that during rational reflection, emotions, desires, feelings and 
passions can all be endorsed as potential reasons to act. So, it appears that moral 
cognition is integrative at all cognitive levels in terms of emotions and reasoning.  
In this chapter I have proposed a modification of Korsgaard’s moral philosophy, 
using the work of Damasio and key neuroscience studies introduced in chapter one. The 
aim was to carry out an exercise in the interdisciplinary analysis indicated in the first 
three chapters. In the first three chapters I used moral philosophy to critically analyse 
neuroscience, whereas the focus of this chapter was to reciprocally critique theory in 
99 
 
moral philosophy using neuroscience. In this analysis I developed an integrative model 
of moral reasoning that shows how both sentiments and reasons are integrated in our 
moral judgements. This account abides by the three features I refer to as an “integrative 





The objective of this thesis is to discuss the need for an account of moral cognition that 
is integrative in character and interdisciplinary in approach. In the first three chapters I 
critically analysed the neuroscience of moral cognition using moral philosophy. In the 
fourth chapter I undertook an interdisciplinary analysis, including a reciprocal critique 
of moral philosophy using neuroscience.  
In chapter one I reviewed recent neuroscientific evidence concerning moral 
cognition. The literature shows that moral cognition involves a coordination of brain 
processes, which operate as a physically integrated network. However, many of these 
findings can be interpreted flexibly, and can be used to argue for multiple models of 
moral cognition. Such models differ in the proposed roles of reason and emotion and in 
the proposed organisation of brain networks. To aid in the interpretation of results 
neuroscience needs to turn to the world of moral theory. 
In the second chapter I discussed the pervasive link between theories in moral 
philosophy and models of moral cognition. Moral philosophy is necessary as a notion 
of “morality” is required prior to any neuroscientific study, in order to give the study a 
clear focus. Many researchers in this field are aware of this, and often explicitly take up 
philosophical presuppositions. However, they do so in cursory ways. For example, 
there is an overreliance on traditional and simplified versions of moral theories in the 
neuroscience literature. Furthermore, current neuroscientific techniques are unable to 
describe the temporal and holistic nature of moral cognition. Any analysis which relies 
solely on these techniques is missing normal aspects of moral thinking. Therefore, 
neuroscience can only be part of an interdisciplinary approach. A theoretical 
neuroscience informed by a nuanced moral philosophy is needed to start to approach a 
description of the relationship between the brain and morality. These challenges facing 
the neuroscientific study of morality indicate the need for an integrative and 
interdisciplinary account. 
In chapter three, I showed how the relationship between the brain and morality 
can be broken down into two perspectives. An explanatory account attempts to describe 
the causally related brain processes behind moral thinking, from a scientific 
perspective. Whereas a normative account of morality attempts to explain the inherent 
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obligatory nature of moral claims, and this is from first-person perspective. The moral 
philosophy of Christine Korsgaard was discussed as it is particular effective in 
introducing the first-person or normative account of morality. I showed the 
insufficiency of explanatory accounts of morality in addressing the normativity behind 
moral claims, hence the need for moral philosophy and an interdisciplinary analysis. 
Finally, this “integrative” work culminated in chapter four where I underwent 
such an interdisciplinary analysis. Specifically, I discussed how Korsgaard’s 
understanding of rational reflection is both supported and moderated by the work of 
contemporary neuroscience, particularly the work of the neurologist Antonio Damasio. 
The model that was proposed moves towards a more accurate account of moral 
reasoning and contributes to an understanding of the relationship between the brain and 
morality. 
In the introduction I summarised the three features of an integrative account of 
moral cognition. All three of these features represent a way the framework is 
“integrative”. Let us again review what they are:  
1. Neuroscientifically integrated: Moral Cognition implicates a network of 
brain regions. These regions operate with integrative brain processes and as 
such should be described using theories of higher-level cognition. The 
intertwinement of reason and emotion is essential in this framework. This 
represents a rejection of a strong distinction between these phenomena in 
this context. This feature was indicated in chapter one, where moral 
cognition was shown to operate as a complex network, and in chapter two, 
through a discussion of the inadequacy of neuroscience in describing the 
temporal extent and holistic nature of moral cognition.  
2. Integrated across disciplines (as in ‘inter-disciplinary’): From a 
methodological standpoint any comprehensive description of moral 
cognition ought to refer to moral philosophy, neuroscience and psychology 
(at least) and integrate their respective methods, generating a synthesis of 
perspectives. This feature was also indicated in chapter two, as a synthesis 
in perspectives can overcome challenges in the conceptualisation, testing 
and interpretation of any findings from empirical neuroscience.  
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3. Integrated explanatory and normative accounts of morality: To form a 
complete account of our moral lives, both explanatory and normative 
descriptions are necessary. Any explanation of moral cognition would be 
amiss if it did not account for the normative appearance of moral claims on 
us. This feature was indicated in chapter three, with a discussion of 
Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian account of moral obligation. 
Respecting these features, I have set out a framework of an integrative account of moral 
cognition. The framework is based on an integration of Korsgaard’s ideas about reason 
and reflection with current empirical and theoretical neuroscience. According to this 
framework, moral cognition can vary depending on the level of automaticity and 
deliberation yet remains essentially reflective across this spectrum. This can range from 
an implicitly reflective process, where past experiences are incorporated into one’s 
intuitive ways of acting using feelings that guide practical reasoning and acting, to an 
explicitly reflective process, where one can consciously deliberate on one’s thoughts, 
feelings and internal argumentation. What governs which thoughts are endorsed as 
reasons to act, or which actions are encouraged or discouraged via feelings, depends on 
a valuation process. At the automatic level, certain actions and judgements are valued 
or disvalued based on past experiences representing an intuitive understanding of 
correct ways to act in specific contexts. At the deliberative level, this involves reference 
to one’s practical identity, which contains a valuation of which actions ought to be 
carried out in certain contexts, including the actor’s role within them. 
Furthermore, at each point along this spectrum of reflection, reason, feeling and 
social cognition are intertwined and operate together to carry out the “higher-function” 
of moral cognition. Drawing from Hughlings-Jackson’s ideas about brain organisation, 
basic sensorimotor processes are represented and meta-represented at varying levels, 
integrating with other brain regions, to achieve this (Gillett and Franz, 2014). The view 
that moral cognition functions as a network, with feelings and reasoning being 
inseparable and collaborative elements of practical reasoning, dispels any stringent 
dichotomy between reason and emotion. This basic framework was generated through a 
synthesis of perspectives, using neuroscience, philosophy and psychology in 
accordance with the imperative of being methodologically interdisciplinary. 
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Not only does this framework, on a basic level, produce an explanatory account 
of morality, it remains open to a normative account of morality. The account of moral 
cognition present is essentially reflective and relies on a valuation of actions to guide 
judgements. This is true in more automatic and deliberative judgements. These two 
elements are represented in Korsgaard’s two psychological assumptions at the core of 
her theory. Humans are self-consciously reflective beings, and this forces us to examine 
our thoughts and ask ourselves whether they are good reasons to act. It also forces us to 
form a conception of ourselves, which Korsgaard (1996, p. 101) calls a “practical 
identity”, a “description under which you find your life to be worth living and your 
actions to be worth undertaking”. Normativity, the sense of “ought” underlying moral 
claims on us, arises when we reflect in the contents of our minds, and using our 
practical identity, ask whether the thought constitutes a good reason to act. If we 
endorse the reason, we are self-legislating, and we now have an obligation to act in that 
way. In this integrative account of moral cognition, there is a focus on both normative 
and explanatory components. 
How is this framework similar and different from previously existing models of 
moral cognition? It contains many similarities with Greene’s “dual process model of 
moral cognition” but remains essentially different. The dual process model includes an 
account of automatic and deliberative judgements and is multifaceted, involving 
important roles for both reasoning and emotions (Greene, 2016), which are points of 
agreement with the framework proposed in this thesis. However, in the dual process 
model, there is a hard distinction between automatic and deliberative judgements, and 
between emotion and reasoning, which implies that these faculties are disintegrated. 
The framework proposed by this thesis argues instead of the essential integration of 
brain processes, including processes involving feelings, reasoning and social cognition 
in moral judgements. For the same reason, it is opposed to the models of moral 
cognition formulated by Kohlberg, a rationalist and Prinz, a sentimentalist. These 
theorists argue for the primacy of either reason and deliberation or sentiments and 
emotions respectively in moral judgements (Kohlberg, 1971; Prinz, 2007). While there 
some is agreement with both cases, in that reasoning and emotions are constituent (and 
intertwined) parts in moral judgements, the rejection of Kohlberg and Prinz’s models’ 
rests in the complete dismissal of one of these faculties in favour of the other. 
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Finally, the framework of an integrated moral cognition has the most in 
common with the models of moral cognition put forward by Casebeer and Churchland 
(2003), and Moll et al (2008). Casebeer and Churchland (2003) argue in favour of a 
model of moral cognition best represented by a neo-Aristotelian virtue theory, where 
morality is concerned with what people should think and do to “function well as human 
beings”.24 They describe their model of moral cognition as “a large-scale brain affair 
depending on the appropriate coordination of many areas”, which, they claim is better 
represented by a neo-Aristotelian virtue theory, than by a form of rationalism, 
sentimentalism or utilitarianism (Casebeer and Churchland, 2003). Their description of 
a multifaceted model, involving reason, emotion and social cognition has much in 
common with the framework presented in this thesis, with its focus on integrational 
brain processes. The model of moral cognition proposed by Moll et al. (2008), is still 
primarily sentimentalist as it focuses on moral motivators but is more nuanced and has 
more in common with the framework proposed in this thesis. Moll et al. (2008) 
proposes that ‘emotion and cognition are nondissociable elements underlying moral 
motivations, and that such motivations are represented within cortico‐limbic neural 
assemblies’. This view maintains that both emotion and reason are important in moral 
cognition, and that they are integrated in this function. 
Obviously, what has been developed is only a broad and basic framework for 
understanding moral cognition. Much more work can be done in all applicable fields. In 
chapter three I clarified the overarching aim of this model, which is to overcome the 
challenges that face the neuroscientific study of moral cognition. This analysis will aid 
in the development of a more robust and pluralistic model, that reveals a critical link 
between reason and reflection. This is not intended to be a comprehensive or exclusive 
model of moral cognition. This work would likely be further enhanced with the 
addition of more perspectives in moral philosophy, and also a more specific focus on 
aspects of the moral network and how they operate together specifically. One such 
example for future study could involve analysing the role of empathy and human 
developmental ecology from the perspective of an interdisciplinary and integrative 
account of moral cognition. 
                                                 
24 For another theory of moral cognition from an Aristotelian perspective see Gillett, G. (2018) From 
Aristotle to cognitive neuroscience. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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The study of moral cognition is important as knowledge about the neuroscience 
underlying morality will inform and guide practical ethics. For example, neuroscientific 
and psychological information about how humans’ reason, intuit and reflect upon moral 
dilemmas can reveal psychological pitfalls that must be avoided if we want to be 
ethically consistent and robust. Some ethicists even go so far as advocating for 
biological enhancement to improve our moral decision-making (Persson and Savulescu, 
2008), and an understanding of moral cognition is essential here. 
However, if neuroscience is to further a study of moral cognition it needs to 
recognise the shortcomings and limits of the presuppositions made about the nature of 
morality, some of which come out in experimental restraints and others through a 
cursory use of moral philosophy. It is worthwhile for the neuroscience to be critiqued 
and developed by moral philosophy in this way, so that it performs its descriptive role 
as best as possible. Furthermore, a philosophically informed neuroscience will set 
reasonable limits to any normative account of morality. 
When I talk about the need for an interdisciplinary approach such as this, which 
integrates data and theory, empirical neuroscience and moral philosophy, I think back 
towards Kant’s aspiration for the study of ethics. He thought that morality required a 
systematic and methodical study, not unlike science. In the introduction I began with an 
excerpt from the end of Critique of Practical Reason where Kant argues for the 
synergism of the empirical and the rational (Kant, 1993). In the context of moral 
cognition, this passage empathises a need for a collaboration of empirical neuroscience 
with theoretical neuroscience and moral philosophy: 
We have at hand examples of the morally judging reason. We may analyse 
them into their elementary concepts, adopting, in default of mathematics, a 
process similar to that of chemistry, i.e., we may, in repeated experiments 
on common sense, separate the empirical from the rational, exhibit each of 
them in a pure state, and show what each by itself can accomplish. Thus we 
shall avoid the error of a crude and unpracticed judgment and (something 
far more important) the extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts 
of the philosopher’s stone, visionary treasures are promised and real 
treasures are squandered for lack of methodical study and knowledge of 
nature. In a word, science (critically sought and methodically directed) is 
the narrow gate that leads to the doctrine of wisdom, when by this is 
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understood not merely what one ought to do but what should serve as a 
guide to teachers in laying out plainly and well the path to wisdom which 
everyone should follow, and in keeping others from going astray. It is a 
science of which philosophy must always remain the guardian... 
(Kant, 1993, pp. 170-171) 
This thesis stands as a call for such a collaborative perspective on moral cognition. 
Every now and then a field, like that of moral cognition, with deep roots in multiple 
subjects needs a breath. It requires a moment of reflection of its goals and the methods 
to achieve them. This reflection informs any needed recalibrations. My hope is that an 
integrative account of moral cognition is such a reflection, where the neuroscientifically 
integrative, the interdisciplinary and the normative aspects of studying human morality 
are reemphasised. What now remains is for the momentous empirical and theoretical 
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